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Abstract  
This PhD thesis investigates sources of value in mergers and acquisitions, using a 
discounted cash-flow valuation method to develop a model that explains sources 
of economic gains. The model identifies three major sources of value in mergers, 
each of which can reduce or contribute to the combined wealth effect of a 
takeover deal. The overall value of the acquisition deal is a sum of the impacts of 
these factors on the combined value.  
The research significantly contributes to new knowledge regarding the sources of 
economic benefit in a merger. There are implications for researchers, practitioners 
and teachers. This research significantly contributes new knowledge on sources of 
value in mergers. Future research about mechanisms through which mergers 
create or destroy value flows from analysis and findings of this thesis. Moreover, 
using the model developed in this study, shareholders, investors, and analysts can 
make a more accurate estimation of value effects of mergers. This also helps 
investors and shareholders of the merging firms to make better investment 
decisions. 
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Policy makers will also find the results of this study helpful. Although findings of 
the study suggest an actual value creation in mergers, it seems that a significant 
amount of value transfers from acquirer bondholders to target bondholders. This 
observation has implications for policy makers to regulate the market for 
corporate control in a way that minimises expropriation of wealth. The formulas 
and empirical findings of this thesis will also enrich the teaching agenda of 
corporate finance.  
The model developed in this thesis suggests that the combined value effect of 
mergers can be broken down into three parts: (1) earnings synergies discounted at 
the rate of the WACC of the combined firm; (2) value effect of the difference 
between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer; and (3) the difference 
between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target.  
In any given merger, each of these components may add to or deduct from the 
total value of the merger. Moreover, the combined value of an acquisition 
estimated using this model might be negative, suggesting that the acquisition 
destroys value, or positive, suggesting that the acquisition creates value. The 
explanation of how mergers can be value creating, or value destroying, observes 
that the difference between the combined firm’s weighted average cost of capital 
and that of the acquirer and the target, along with the operating synergies, can 
account for total value effects of mergers.  
In the second stage, a sample of 68 US acquisitions during the period 1998 to 
2011 is employed to empirically decompose the total value effect of acquisitions 
(TVA) as suggested by the model. This study uses the mean I/B/E/S forecasts for 
stand-alone acquirer and target firms prior to the acquisition and forecasts for the 
combined firm in the month subsequent to the acquisition’ month in order to 
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estimate changes in forecasted earnings that occur following an acquisition. These 
forecasts are also used to estimate implied cost of equity of the firms prior and 
subsequent to acquisitions. Since I/B/E/S forecasts are typically one month apart, 
any change in the forecasts can be attributed to the impact of the acquisition.  
The empirical analysis provides important findings regarding the relative 
importance of the three components of the model suggested by this study. 
Specifically, the evidence provided in this study show that earnings synergies and 
the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer have a 
more significant role in value creation through mergers compared to the value 
effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target.  
Empirical evidence provided in this research shows that the combined value effect 
of acquisitions is positive, around 4%, on average. Aside from that, the results 
suggest that the two first components of the model account for more than 90% of 
value effect of acquisitions.  
While much emphasis is put on synergy gains from acquisitions by managers, 
analysts and researchers, the evidence provided in this study shows that the 
WACC of the combined firm and the merging firms may have a significant role 
on the value effect of mergers. These findings suggest that changes in the capital 
structure of the combined firm, compared to capital structures of the acquirer and 
the target, play a key role in determining the value of an acquisition. For example, 
all the value created because of synergies between the operations of the acquirer 
and the target can be counterbalanced by raising too much debt for financing the 
acquisition, which in turn increases the risk of default and cost of capital of the 
combined firm. Moreover, reducing the cost of capital of the combined firm 
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compared to the merging firms, is value creating even in the absence of operating 
synergies.   
The empirical evidence provided in this study shows that the component of value 
associated with the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the 
acquirer is mainly determined by leverage of the acquiring firm and the method of 
payment. While cash payment is value creating, high leverage of the acquirer 
prior to an acquisition can destroy value by raising the cost of capital of the firm 
too much. This is especially important to managers when they are planning an 
acquisition.  
Although an acquisition might potentially create significant synergies in earnings, 
it may also increase the WACC of the combined firm. As a result, total value 
created or destroyed in that merger will depend on the extent to which value 
creating components and value-destroying components of an acquisition 
counteract and neutralise each other. In other words, the value created because of 
synergies in earnings might be countervailed, for example, by raising too much 
debt for financing the acquisition which in turn increases cost of capital to a 
value-destroying level. 
Finally, univariate and regression analyses are used to further investigate the 
relationship between components of the TVA and a number of acquirer and deal 
characteristics that are suggested to affect value of acquisitions. The results 
suggest that diversifying mergers create negative synergies in earnings and 
destroy value this way. However, diversification does not reduce the WACC of 
the combined firm compared to the WACC of the acquirer. Moreover, cash 
payments and lower levels of debt in the capital structure of the acquirer reduce 
the WACC of the combined firm and create value.   
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By developing a model that creates a novel framework for decomposing value 
effects of merges, by documenting the relative importance of the components of 
the model, and by documenting how acquirer and deal characteristics affect value 
of acquisitions, this dissertation opens up opportunities for future investigations.    
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a framework for the dissertation. It concisely describes the 
significance of the study, research questions, research methods and structure of 
the dissertation. The chapter also reports a summary of findings and conclusions.  
The sources of value in mergers have been widely discussed and the literature 
presents a significant volume of repetition. While Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 
(2001a) noted more than a decade ago, “We hope that over the next decade 
merger research will move beyond the basic issue of measuring and assigning 
gains and losses to tackle the more fundamental question of how mergers actually 
create or destroy value”, there is not a lot of new thinking reflected in research 
during the last ten years.  
This study addresses the sources of value in mergers and acquisitions in a 
different way by developing a discounted cash-flow model in order to explore the 
possible sources of merger wealth effects. Then it explores the relative empirical 
importance of the three components of the model. It further investigates the 
relationship between components of value effects of mergers with factors that are 
suggested by prior research to affect these components.  
The findings of the study significantly contribute to knowledge regarding sources 
of value in mergers. Moreover, the study provides interesting evidence on how 
deal and acquirer characteristics affect value of acquisitions. Besides, the results 
of the study will help managers of acquiring firms to better analyse consequences 
of acquisitions and make more accurate estimations of value effects of mergers. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Financial analysts and investors will also find the findings of this study fruitful. 
They can incorporate the results to estimating value of the combined firms that 
come out from acquisitions.   
The discounted cash-flow model of valuation suggests that present value of an on-
going concern is a function of its expected future cash-flows and an appropriate 
discount rate at which these cash-flows are discounted. However, prior research 
on value effects of mergers
1
 and acquisitions mainly addresses the changes in 
incremental cash-flows subsequent to acquisitions. On the other hand, relatively 
little evidence is available on the impact of changes in the appropriate discount 
rate on the value effects of mergers. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) suggest 
that the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of a firm is an appropriate 
discount rate for valuation of future cash-flows of that firm. The WACC rate at 
which the cash-flows should be discounted is subject to change subsequent to 
mergers due to fundamental differences in the risk factors of the combined firm 
compared to the risk factors of the acquirer and the target firm prior to the merger. 
This study investigates the relative contribution of operating synergies and the 
WACC impact to the total value effect of acquisitions. 
This study develops a discounted cash-flow model that demonstrates combined 
acquisition value is a sum of three main components that may affect the combined 
value in different directions. In addition, the potential contribution of these 
components on the combined value effect of mergers is examined
2
. The first 
component is the present value of the expected future cash-flows generated or 
                                                 
1
 Terms mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
2
 Testing the model is parallel to testing market efficiency. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is not 
testable due to the joint test problem (Fama, 1970, 1991, 1998). Similarly, any difference between 
the market reaction to announcement of a merger and the value effect estimated by using a model 
like the one suggested in this study can be either attributed to market inefficiency or to the “bad 
model” problem. However, if we calculate the NPV of an acquisition as sum of the three 
components of the model, it is possible to decompose the contributions of each part of the model 
to the combined value effect of mergers. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
3 
 
destroyed because of the acquisition. This part of the acquisition value comprises 
all types of operating synergies that might be utilised, subsequent to, and because 
of the acquisition deal. These operating synergies include increases in revenues, 
decreases in operating costs, decreases in sales and distribution expenses, and 
reductions in capital expenditures. The present value of such cash-flows also 
depends on the post-merger WACC of the combined firm. If the marginal cost of 
capital exceeds the marginal changes in operating cash-flows, the contribution of 
this component of the model to the total combined value will be negative.  
Other components of the model focus on the rate at which the future cash-flows of 
the acquirer and the target are discounted. These components detect the value 
effects of the acquisition which take place because of changes in the discount 
rates. Specifically, the difference between pre- and post-merger present value of 
expected future cash-flows of the acquirer depends on the difference between the 
WACC of the combined firm and that of the acquirer. In this sense, we expect the 
combined value effect of a given acquisition to be negatively related to the change 
in the discount rate. If the WACC of the combined firm is greater than the WACC 
of the acquirer, then the present value of acquirer’s future cash-flows decreases. 
This devaluation negatively influences the combined value of the acquisition. 
Conversely, if the WACC rate of the combined firm is less than the WACC of the 
acquirer, the present value of expected future cash-flows of the acquirer increases, 
and positively contributes to the combined value of the acquisition.   
Likewise, the difference between pre- and post-merger present value of the 
expected future cash-flows of the target is related to the difference between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the target, i.e. the greater the difference in the 
WACCs, the greater the value effect. When the WACC of the combined firm is 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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greater than the WACC of the target, the contribution of this part of the model to 
the combined value of the acquisition is negative, and vice versa.  
This study is related to several other studies seeking sources of gains from 
mergers. Among recent studies, Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009) 
investigate three potential sources of synergy gains  in merger, namely, productive 
efficiencies, tax savings and increased market power. Their findings suggest that 
the main source of gains from mergers is better utilization of available resources 
in the economy rather than tax savings and exercising market power. Wang 
(2009) provides evidence that suggests transfer of control from poorly managed 
targets to well-governed acquirers is a source of synergistic gains in takeovers. 
His findings are consistent with those of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and 
Servaes (1991) who find well-managed acquirers with higher Tobin’s Q compared 
to their targets generate higher total gains. Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth 
(2011) show that even in the absence of operational synergies, liquid firms 
acquire financially distressed firms in their industries in order to reallocate 
liquidity to firms that are otherwise inefficiently terminated. 
1.2 Significance of the study 
The value effect of mergers has been extensively studied in prior research. 
However, there is relatively little known about how mergers create or destroy 
value. Prior studies generally focus on the operating synergies gained from 
acquisitions. These synergies can be generated through productive efficiencies in 
the form of improvements in operating profits or reductions in capital investments 
(Devos et al., 2009). One exception is the studies that investigate the changes in 
interest tax shields that occur because of the acquisitions (e.g. Hayn, 1989; 
Leland, 2007). Therefore, relatively little is known about the role of WACC 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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changes in merger gains. In contrast to prior research, this study examines the 
impact of the difference between the WACC of the acquirer and the target prior to 
an acquisition, and the WACC of the combined firm subsequent to that 
acquisition, in order to estimate the influence of this difference on the value 
effects of mergers. This study then further breaks down combined acquisition 
wealth effects, as suggested by the model that is developed in chapter 3, to 
estimate the relative role of the components of the model.  
Although the model developed in this study includes possible sources of 
synergies proposed by prior studies, it is different in four specific ways. 
First, it sees merger gains as an accumulation of different sources of gains 
that may vary in extent across merger deals, rather than looking for a 
single dominant source that can explain the wealth creating character of 
mergers. In a given merger, value creation and destruction take place 
concurrently and total value of a merger depends on the extent to which 
value destroying and value creating sources countervail. Second, it does 
not assume that the sum of the elements that affect acquisition value is 
positive for every takeover in the population. Third, rather than focusing 
on abnormal operating performance measures as evidence of synergistic 
gains, it explains that the net present value of acquisitions is affected by 
changes in both future cash-flows and cost of capital. Improvements in 
operating performance of a firm do not necessarily result in a greater 
present value, as the cost of capital may increase simultaneously, for 
example due to higher risk of investment in the combined firm. Finally, 
the model developed in this study suggests a novel source of gain, which 
is related to the difference between cost of capital of the target company 
and the combined entity.  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Aside from contributions of the theoretical model, empirical findings of 
the current research contribute to knowledge in three ways. First, the 
empirical findings of this study show that changes in the WACC of the 
combined firm compared to those of the acquirer and the target have a 
significant role in value creation through mergers. Second, the study 
documents the relative importance of the components of value that are 
suggested by the theoretical model. Third, the results show that factors 
that are suggested to affect value of acquisitions have different and even 
opposite impacts on different components of value of mergers. For 
example, diversifying mergers are associated with negative earnings 
synergies. However this does not explain the value created or destroyed 
because of the difference between cost of capital of the combined firm 
and the acquirer, as suggested by the regression analysis of this study.  
1.3 Research questions  
An influential body of research investigates the value effects of mergers. Yet, 
there is relatively little known about the mechanisms through which mergers 
influence shareholder wealth. A summary of studies on the combined wealth 
effects of takeovers is shown in Table 1. These findings show that although 
acquirers fail to enhance shareholder value through mergers, the average 
combined value gain to targets and acquirers is significantly positive. As Shleifer 
and Summers (1988) point out, if the value gains through mergers are merely 
transfers of wealth from other stakeholders to shareholders, they do not represent 
efficiency improvements. However, reviewing redistribution theories and related 
empirical studies, Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) conclude that little evidence 
has been found to support substantial wealth transfers from any group. Andrade et 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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al. (2001a) support this argument. The first question that this study addresses is: if 
acquisitions generate value for shareholders and this value is not transferred from 
other stakeholders, then what are its possible sources? 
3
 
By answering the first question, this research decomposes value effects of mergers 
and provides three possible sources of value that can be measured separately. This 
provides a novel framework for empirical decomposition of sources of value in 
mergers. Another key question of this study is about the relative importance of the 
value effect of changes in the WACCs of the merging firms and the combined 
firm compared to the value effect of earnings synergies. Most prior investigations 
in this area focus on potential synergies and changes in expected cash-flows as 
factors that can explain the overall value-enhancing effect of mergers (Berkovitch 
& Narayanan, 1993; Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1983, 1988; Caron & Jeffrey, 1999; 
Chatterjee, 1992; Devos et al., 2009; Firth, 1978; Hackbarth & Miao, 2012; 
Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991; Stan Xiao & Royston, 2004). 
However, as the discounted cash-flow model of valuation suggests, there is 
another important factor that can affect the value of mergers. That is the rate at 
which future cash-flows are discounted. The extent of the value effect of changes 
in the discount rate compared to the value effect of earnings synergies is 
undetermined yet. Thus, the second question that this research addresses is: what 
is the relative importance of possible sources of value in mergers as suggested by 
the theoretical model of this study? 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This study does not intend to analyse how the value created through mergers is divided between 
the acquirer and the target. Rather, it explains how mergers can create or destroy value as 
suggested by findings of prior empirical studies. 
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Table ‎1.3-1 Key extant studies addressing overall wealth effect of mergers 
Author(s) Period Sample Size Event window 
CAARs (%) 
Acquirer Target Combined 
Wang and Xie (2009) 1990- 2004 396  (-5, +5) −2.91*** 21.52*** 0.97** 
Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah (2005) 1962-2001 1018 (-5, +5) 0.18 30.01
***
 5.27
***
 
Andrade et al. (2001a) 1973-79 
1980-89 
1990-98 
598 
1,226 
1,864 
(-1, +1) −0.3 
−0.4 
−1.0 
16.0
***
 
16.0
***
 
15.9
***
 
1.5 
2.6
***
 
1.4
***
 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 1990-99 281 (-1, +1) −0.37 21.2*** 3.56** 
Smith and Kim (1994) 1980-86 177 (-5, +5) 0.50 30.19
**
 8.88
**
 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) 1979-84 50 (-5, close) −2.2 45.6*** 9.1*** 
Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) 1975-84 399 (-5, +5) −1.02* 28.04*** 3.90*** 
Lang et al. (1989) 1968-86 87 (-5, +5) 0.01 40.30
***
 11.31
***
 
Bradley et al. (1988) 1963-68 
1968-80 
1981-84 
74 
127 
203 
(-10, +20) 4.09 
1.30 
−2.93*** 
18.92
***
 
35.29
***
 
35.34
***
 
7.78
***
 
7.08
***
 
8.00
***
 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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Empirical decomposition of value of acquisitions opens up a new opportunity for 
investigating how a number of acquirer and deal characteristics are related to 
different sources of value in mergers. Do these characteristics have similar effects 
on different components of value or they influence value in different or even 
opposite ways? For example, theoretical discussions suggest that related mergers 
by firms from the same industry are more likely to generate operating synergies. 
On the other hand, diversifying mergers are suggested to reduce cost of capital by 
creating a coinsurance effect and reducing the cost of capital. Therefore, 
diversification has different potential effects on the components of value. 
Similarly, other factors may have different effects on different components of 
value effect of mergers. A deeper understanding of these relationships can 
potentially contribute to a better understanding of sources of value in mergers. 
Hence, the third and last question that this research addresses is: What are the 
relationships between different acquirer and deal characteristics and the 
components of value effect of acquisitions? 
1.4 Method 
Prior empirical investigations provide evidence suggesting that, overall, 
mergers create value (Andrade et al., 2001a; Healy et al., 1992; Lang et 
al., 1989; Wang & Xie, 2009). In other words, the combined wealth effect 
of mergers on the acquirer and target shareholders is positive, on average. 
A model of net present value of mergers is developed in chapter 3, in 
order to answer the first question of the research. The model yields 
predictions about the ways through which mergers can create value. 
Specifically, it demonstrates how discounting future cash-flows of a 
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target at the rate of weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of the 
merged firm can be value enhancing. 
In order to address the second and the third question of the research, this study 
compares analyst forecasts from before the acquisition to forecasts after the 
acquisition to detect the value changes that take place because of the deal. This 
approach avoids the limitations of conventional methods which rely on industry 
benchmarks to estimate the abnormal returns from acquisitions. The neoclassical 
theory of mergers suggests that acquisitions are clustered in industries through 
time and this clustering happens because of economic, technological and 
regulatory shocks especially at the industry level. Therefore, using conventional 
benchmarks to detect long-term measures of abnormal operating performance can 
result in biased inferences as these benchmarks do not control for the impact of 
severe environmental shocks. Since analyst forecasts provided by I/B/E/S are 
typically one month apart, expected changes in the industry are already 
incorporated in the pre-acquisition forecasts. Therefore, the differences in 
forecasts can be considered as a relatively precise measure of acquisition impact 
on the combined value of the firms. 
The method of this study is similar to Devos et al. (2009) who use analyst 
forecasts for estimation of acquisition effect of forecasted cash-flows. However, it 
is fundamentally different in three ways. First, this study estimates the effect of 
WACC differences as mentioned above and compares the relative importance of 
these effects to the operating synergies. This study uses an implied cost of capital 
method as proposed by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and the CAPM to 
estimate cost of equity capital. Second, this study investigates a sample of mergers 
from a more recent time period; mergers from 1998 to 2011. Finally, while Devos 
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et al. (2009) and others only consider different types of cash-flow synergies, this 
study highlights the role of the WACC as another source of value effect in 
mergers. This study uses I/B/E/S analyst forecasts and DataStream corporate bond 
yields for a sample of 68 acquisitions by US firms over the period 1998-2011 to 
decompose the effect of the three components of our model on the combined 
value of acquisitions.  
1.5 Research contributions  
This study develops a theoretical model that decomposes value effects of mergers 
in a novel way and provides empirical evidence on the relative importance of the 
components of the model. First, the current study compares the analyst forecasts 
prior and subsequent to our sample mergers to estimate the magnitude of effect of 
the merger announcement on the earnings forecasts and the WACC at which the 
forecasted earnings are discounted. This study shows that the difference between 
cost of capital of acquirers and combined firms is significant. It also shows that 
the cost of capital of the combined firm is significantly different from cost of 
capital of the target. Second, the impact of each component of the model proposed 
in this study is estimated and subsequently total value effect of each acquisition 
(TVA) is calculated. Finally, this study discusses the impact of factors such as 
method of payment and industry relatedness on the value components and the 
TVA.  
Specifically, this study finds that acquisitions create around 4% value, on average. 
More than 90% of value created through mergers comes from earnings synergies 
and the difference between cost of capital of the combined firm and the acquirer. 
The role of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the 
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acquirer is more pronounced when the CAPM is used for estimating the cost of 
equity. Moreover, diversifying mergers are found to underperform related mergers 
mainly because these mergers create less synergy. Besides, cash payments are 
associated with less synergy gains but positive value effect from the difference 
between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer. In addition, 
acquisitions returns decrease in percentage of debt in the capital structure of the 
acquirer. This relationship is especially significant between leverage of the 
acquirer and the value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the 
combined firm and the acquirer.   
This study is also relevant to an influential body of research which investigates 
the causes of merger waves. The neoclassical theory of mergers suggests that 
acquisitions happen in waves because of the need for restructuring at the industry 
level which is mainly driven by regulatory, technological and economic shocks 
(Gort, 1969; Harford, 2005; Jensen, 1993; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). In 
contrast, the behavioural theory of mergers argues that acquisition waves are 
driven by market mis-valuation (Bouwman, Fuller, & Nain, 2009; Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). According to 
this theory in a period of high merger activity, relatively overvalued firms use 
their stocks to acquire undervalued or less overvalued firms to take advantage of 
the hot acquisition market and create value for the acquirer shareholders at the 
expense of losses to the target shareholders or long-term shareholders of the 
combined firm. Therefore, under the behavioural argument potential synergies are 
not the drivers of acquisition but acquisitions are “market-driven”. Our findings 
do not support the theory of market-driven mergers.   
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1.6 Structure of the thesis   
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction. 
Chapter 2 reviews extant literature on mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 
constructs the theoretical model of this study. Chapter 4 provides details of the 
data used for this study and describes the sample. Chapter 5 discusses the method 
of analysis, and Chapter 6 reports the empirical findings. Chapter 7 provides 
inferences and discussions regarding the findings of the study. Chapter 8 draws 
conclusions and recommends directions for further research.   
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides a framework for the dissertation. Significance of the study, 
research questions, research methods and structure of the dissertation are 
explained in this chapter. The chapter also reports a summary of findings and 
conclusions. This chapter is the foundation for the following chapters.  
Chapter 2: Literature review 
This chapter reviews an extensive body of research regarding mergers and 
acquisitions. It summarises extant literature and presents theoretical explanations 
and empirical evidence regarding causes and consequences of acquisitions as well 
as the factors that may affect performance of acquisitions. The material provided 
in this chapter helps to understand what drives acquisitions, why mergers and 
acquisitions are clustered in industries over time, what theories are proposed by 
prior studies to explain sources of value in mergers, what different methods have 
been used by previous research to estimate acquisition returns and what are their 
findings, and finally what are the factors that are suggested to influence 
acquisition returns.   
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Chapter 3: Theoretical model of the study  
This chapter develops a model for decomposing value effect of mergers. This 
model is used in the empirical part of the study to investigate relative contribution 
of synergy gains and changes in the rate of cost of capital on total value effect of 
acquisitions. The chapter also provides theoretical discussions on how 
acquisitions affect WACC of the combined firm.  
Chapter 4: Data and summary statistics 
This chapter explains the procedure through which this study constructed a 
sample of acquisitions and collected data in order to empirically decompose the 
value effects of mergers and acquisitions based on the model introduced in 
chapter 3. In this chapter it is explained that how the sample of the study is 
constructed. Moreover, it explains why analyst forecasts are used for estimating 
implied cost of equity capital of merging firms and synergies created through 
mergers. This chapter also provides information about sources of data and 
summary statistics for the sample of this study. 
Chapter 5: Research method  
This chapter provides details of the method of this study. In order to decompose 
the combined value effect of an acquisition to its components as suggested by the 
model introduced in chapter 3 synergy effects as well as the WACCs of the 
acquirer, the target and the combined firm are required. In this chapter it is 
discussed that how each of these elements, the three components of the model and 
total value of acquisition (TVA) are estimated. Besides, factors that may affect the 
TVA and its components, and the method of analysis are discussed. This chapter 
also explains the method of calculation of synergy gains from mergers and also 
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discusses the method of calculation of the WACC as a weighted average of cost of 
debt and cost of equity. Methods of estimation of cost of debt and cost of equity 
are also talked over in separate subsections. Furthermore, this chapter discusses 
differences between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer as well as 
the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target. In 
addition, this chapter discusses the factors that are likely to impact the TVA and 
its components and provides details of the tests that are used to identify such 
impacts.  
Chapter 6: Empirical findings  
This chapter reports empirical findings of the study that are found using a sample 
set explained in chapter 4 and the methods that are discussed in chapter 5. The 
findings reported in this chapter are discussed in chapter 7 in light of different 
theories presented in chapter 2. The findings are reported in a similar sequence to 
the material provided in section 5 so that they can be followed seamlessly. This 
chapter reports the findings about changes in earnings forecasts for acquirers and 
targets subsequent to acquisitions, and interesting information about differences 
between WACC of combined firms, acquirers and targets. Further details about 
the cost of debt and cost of equity of merging firms are also provided in this 
chapter. Importantly, this chapter reports statistics for the TVA and its 
components. This chapter also reports estimations for combine abnormal 
announcement returns of acquisitions, the relationship between the TVA and 
abnormal announcement returns for market-driven and non-market driven 
acquisitions, and the relationship between the TVA and abnormal announcement 
returns for diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. It further provides results 
and estimations when the CAPM is used for calculating the cost of equity. Finally, 
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this chapter reports the results of univariate and multivariate analysis on the 
factors affecting the TVA and its components.  
Chapter 7: Discussions 
This chapter provides a thorough discussion on the empirical findings provided in 
chapter 6 in light of the literature reviewed in chapter 2. Discussions follow a 
similar sequence to the material provided in chapters 5 and 6 and provide 
inferences drawn from the empirical findings. This chapter discusses the findings 
about changes in earnings forecasts for acquirers and targets subsequent to 
acquisitions, and provides inferences about differences between the WACC of 
combined firms, acquirers and targets. Further discussions about the cost of debt 
and cost of equity of merging firms are also provided in this chapter. This chapter 
also discusses findings about the TVA and its components, the relationship 
between the TVA and combined abnormal announcement returns for market-
driven and non-market-driven mergers, and the relationship between the TVA and 
its components with combined abnormal returns of acquisitions for diversifying 
and non-diversifying mergers. Finally, it draws inferences from the results of 
univariate and multivariate analysis on the factors affecting the TVA and its 
components.  
Chapter 8: Summary and conclusions 
This is the final chapter of this dissertation. This chapter summarises the findings 
of the study and draws conclusions from the empirical evidence provided in 
chapter 6 and the model developed in chapter 3.  It also provides questions for 
future research. 
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1.7 Summary 
This study develops a model that decomposes value of acquisitions into three 
components and then empirically investigates the relative importance of the 
components. The evidence provided in this study suggests that synergy gains and 
the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer have 
key roles in determining value of acquisitions. The findings suggest that 
investigating the capital structures and the WACCs of the combined firm and the 
merging firms contributes to knowledge of sources of value in mergers. This 
study also shows that investigating the association of the components of value 
with the factors that are likely to affect them can contribute to discovering 
mechanisms through which mergers create or destroy value. Finally, it is found 
that factors such as diversification and method of payment have different and even 
countervailing effects on the value of acquisitions.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature on mergers and acquisitions is extensive. Mergers are one of the 
most important corporate activities that significantly influence a wide variety of 
different stakeholder groups. As a result, mergers have been a topic of immense 
interest for scholars in terms of theoretical and empirical investigations over the 
past four decades. Researchers have primarily focused on examining the causes 
and consequences of acquisitions. As a result, a large body of literature has 
accumulated that addresses different facets of the topic. This section reviews the 
relevant literature on mergers and acquisitions in an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive account of what we know about mergers and which parts of the 
puzzle are still incomplete. 
This literature review consists of three key sections. The first part of this chapter 
summarises the literature on the cyclical nature of mergers referred to in the 
literature as merger waves. The second section reviews the causes and 
consequences of takeovers; it first reviews the causes, or drivers, of acquisitions, 
while focusing on the fact that acquisitions happen in waves and then reviews the 
consequences of takeovers, with a predominant focus on the impacts of mergers 
on the economic performance of acquirers. The third part of the review 
summarises the theories as well as previous empirical studies on determinants of 
announcement returns and post-acquisition performance of combined firms.  
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2.2 Merger waves 
It has been well-established that mergers place in waves throughout time. There 
have been six key waves of merger activity as evidenced in the extant literature. 
These waves have occurred mainly in the USA since the late 1890s. Since the 
sample of our study includes mergers from recent waves, and also because most 
previous studies address specific characteristics and abnormal returns of recent 
takeover waves, this literature review generally focuses on recent merger waves. 
However, this section does provide a brief insight into the first three waves. 
Table  2.2-1 presents a summary of key attributes of different merger waves and 
average acquisition performance found by prior studies during each wave since 
the 1890s. The first merger wave, which started in the late 1890s, is characterised 
by horizontal consolidation of industrial production. The wave followed radical 
changes in technology after the electrification of industries. Incidentally, this 
period became known as an era of economic expansion and innovation. Stigler 
(1950) suggests that development of modern corporations with limited liability 
and also modern capital markets triggered the potential of profitable monopolistic 
gains through mergers. The takeover wave resulted in monopolistic power for 
many giant firms in their respective industries. The era of merger for monopoly 
ended in 1904 when a decision on Northern Securities made it clear that the 
monopolistic mergers were prohibited by antitrust laws. 
The second merger wave commenced in the late 1910s after a period of cold 
takeover market, which was affected by the First World War. Stigler (1950) 
argues that the new goal of mergers in this period was oligopoly. As the evidence 
shows, formation of oligopolies were mostly effected by the second class firms 
who took the opportunity to use antitrust legislation to reduce the market power of 
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the dominant firms in almost every industry. Stigler suggests that the Sherman 
Law was “the fundamental cause for the shift from merger for monopoly to 
merger for oligopoly” in the United States. Moreover, he argues that the capital 
requirements of mergers, and the tendency of rivals to grow in number and size, 
became barriers for dominant firms that could continue to engage in monopoly 
mergers. This wave of takeover activity ended at the start of the great economic 
recession in 1929.  
The third merger wave took place in the 1960s. The main attribute of this wave 
was diversification by firms that aimed to benefit from growth opportunities in 
new product markets through building large conglomerates. By this time, anti-
trust regulations had become even tighter in the United States. During the 1960s, 
rightly or wrongly, the market viewed conglomerates more favourably than we do 
today (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001). Indeed, stock markets reacted positively to 
most conglomerates in the 1960s (Matsusaka, 1993). Diversification could reduce 
earnings’ volatility and risk, and introduced the internal capital market as an 
alternative for imperfect external capital markets. Acquisition activity, however, 
declined in early 1970s when the oil crisis led the global economy into recession 
and did not return for more than a decade. 
The fourth takeover wave emerged in 1981. This wave is generally characterised 
as highly leveraged and hostile. Emergence of new financing methods, which 
were mainly based on bank debt and junk bonds, changes in anti-trust policies and 
the deregulations in the financial services industry along with innovations in the 
electronics industry, triggered the takeover activity that occurred during the 
1980s. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) report that the use of leverage was so great 
that from 1984 to 1990, more than $500 billion of equity was retired on net as 
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corporations repurchased their own shares, borrowed to finance takeovers and 
were taken private in leveraged buyouts. Although this merger wave of the 1980s 
is generally characterised as hostile, Andrade et al. (2001a) report that only 14 per 
cent of their sample in the 1980s were hostile bids. It is still significantly more 
than the four per cent share of hostile bids in their sample of 1990s takeovers, but 
less than the 23 per cent portion of hostile bids reported by Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996). These authors used a sample from the Value Line Investment Survey 
which usually reports acquisition by generally larger and better-known firms. 
Jensen (1986a, 1988, 1993) suggests the 1980s takeovers were ultimately driven 
by a failure in the internal governance mechanisms of US corporations. According 
to Jensen (1993), corporate mismanagement in the 1970s finally caused capital 
markets to react. The large windfall gains from the oil crisis that were spent on 
excessive oil exploration and diversification were a concrete trigger. Nevertheless, 
changes in technology and regulation more broadly had led to a large amount of 
excess capacity in many US industries. Managers were unwilling to pare down 
their operations or simply to exit as long as they had the financial resources to 
continue. In the early and mid-1980s, the capital markets finally found the 
instruments to reduce excess capacity. Leveraged acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, 
hostile takeovers, and stock buybacks were successful in eliminating free cash 
flow, because the debt service requirements that usually accompanied them 
prodded managers to find ways to generate cash to make interest payments. 
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Table ‎2.2-1 Mergers waves: main industries and key attributes  
This table summarises key attributes of the merger waves and the main industries that contributed to each wave. While the first four waves took 
place in production and manufacturing industries the two recent waves are mainly concentrated in service industries such as banking and 
telecommunications.  
Wave period Main Industries Key attributes  
2003-2007 Banking 
Media & telecom. 
Utilities 
Global scope  
Cross-border acquisitions 
Cash payments 
Friendly negotiations 
1993-2000 Metal mining 
Media & telecom. 
Banking 
Real estates 
Hotels  
Related mergers  
Consolidation of major industries  
Response to deregulation  
Stock payments 
1981-1989 Oil & gas 
Textiles 
Misc. manufacturing 
Non-depositary credit 
Food 
Hostile  
Leveraged takeovers using bank debt and junk bonds 
Split up 1960s conglomerates  
Efficiency gains 
1965-1969 Electricity 
Chemicals 
Combustion engines 
Diversification 
1916-1929 Food 
Steam engines 
Steel 
Railways  
Move towards oligopolies 
1897-1904 Steel production 
Hydraulic power 
Textiles  
Merging to form monopolies  
Horizontal consolidation of production 
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The fifth wave of merger activity commenced in the early 1990s. Andrade et al. 
(2001a) describe the picture of mergers in the 1990s as takeovers where merging 
parties, often in closely related industries, negotiate a friendly stock swap. During 
this wave of takeover activity, major industries became more consolidated 
through related acquisitions, which were paid for by stocks. Andrade et al. 
(2001a) suggest mergers in the 1990s were responses to deregulation in major 
industries. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that corporations in the 1990s 
began to emulate many of the beneficial attributes of leveraged buyouts of the 
1980s. However, they suggest two reasons for decline in the number of hostile 
takeovers. First, hostile takeovers were no longer needed as companies voluntarily 
restructured and adopted a shareholder value perspective with prodding from time 
to time of institutional shareholders. The fear of the 1980s-style hostile takeovers 
likely played a part on this development. Moreover, the researchers explain that 
managers became aware of the potential benefits of pursuing shareholder value by 
observing the success of LBOs and takeovers in the 1980s. Helped along by 
generous stock option programs, management came to endorse shareholder value 
in the 1990s and to pursue it with vigour.   
The sixth wave of takeovers started in 2003 after the economic downturn at the 
beginning of the 21st century. A unique characteristic of this recent wave is the 
large number of cross-border acquisitions. Also, international consolidation of 
industries continued during the takeover wave of the 2000s. Acquisitions were 
mostly completed through friendly negotiations, and cash payments which were 
financed by corporate cash-holdings and debt were popular. This last wave of 
takeover activity ended with the start of economic recession in 2008. 
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2.3 Acquisitions: causes and consequences 
The causes and consequences of acquisitions has been a topic of interest for 
researchers in the finance arena for several decades. Amongst the large number of 
theories that have been proposed to explain drivers and results of mergers, some 
are related to specific merger waves, while others stand out and retain their 
explanatory power through different waves. Dominant theories regarding causes 
and consequences of acquisitions are reviewed in this section. Theories which 
explain causes of acquisitions often make predictions about their testable 
consequences. Therefore testing these implications is a standard way to assess the 
validity of the theories. 
2.3.1 Causes of acquisitions 
An influential body of research that dates back to Nelson (1959),  suggests  
acquisitions are clustered through time. These time-clustered takeovers shape 
wave-looking plots of merger activity, known as merger waves. This stylised fact 
raises the question as to why mergers should happen in waves. The theories that 
attempt to explain merger waves provide reasons for the emergence of a wave, as 
well as its endurance, and death. Prior studies, which attempt to examine why 
mergers happen, offer several possible drivers. These drivers can be clustered in 
four groups. First, mergers can be explained by causes “on the part of individual 
decision makers”. These studies attribute mergers to managers of the acquiring 
firms hoping to create value for shareholders, for their self-interests, or because of 
their overconfidence. Second, scholars ascribe mergers to industry-level factors, 
such as industry shocks or distribution of firm sizes, within an industry. The third 
merger activity is related to economic conditions and the fourth group comprises 
behavioural studies. The behavioural hypothesis of mergers suggests that mis-
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valuation drives mergers. These theories are explained in detail in the following 
subsections.  
Managerial theories 
Separation of control from ownership and shift of control from owners to 
managers is a well-known result of the industrial revolution. This phenomenon 
puts managers in the centre of attention when important corporate decisions such 
as mergers are investigated. Jensen and Ruback (1983) give mangers a prominent 
role in takeovers. They see the takeover market (also known as the market for 
corporate control) as a market driven by competition between management teams 
who want to take control of valuable corporate resources. Jensen & Ruback 
(1983) explain that when a bidding firm acquires a target, the right to manage 
target resources are transferred to top management of the acquirer. In this view, 
regardless of what motivates managers to compete for corporate resources, the 
competition itself is the main reason for takeover activity. In fact, the theory does 
not make any specific mention of the motives managers use to engage in 
acquisitions. However, there are two potential possibilities. First managers can act 
to maximize shareholder wealth, which is an assumption from the neoclassical 
theory of mergers. Second, managers might pursue their own interests even if 
their decisions negatively affect shareholders. The latter possibility is an 
assumption of the agency costs hypothesis of mergers.  
The neo-classical theory of mergers suggests that managers undertake acquisitions 
in order to maximize shareholders’ wealth. In this sense, managers of the 
acquiring companies seek value creating opportunities and possible synergies that 
can be achieved through economies of scale and scope, tax savings or replacement 
of inefficient, incumbent managers of the target company with a more efficient 
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management team. Thus, value creating deals are acquisitions that can find these 
opportunities and utilise them to generate wealth. On the other hand, non-value-
creating deals are attributed to mistaken decisions. The “hubris hypothesis” of 
mergers proposed by Roll (1986) explains a source for such wrong decisions. The 
hypothesis suggests that over-confident bidder managers convince themselves that 
their valuation of the target company is right and the market does not reflect the 
full economic value of the combined firm. Therefore if, as empirical evidence 
from event studies shows, there are no overall gains from takeover deals, it is due 
to the overbearing opinions of acquirers that their valuations are correct. Roll 
argues that “even if gains do exist for some corporate combinations, at least part 
of the average observed takeover premium could still be caused by valuation error 
and hubris. The left tail of the distribution of valuations is truncated by the current 
market price. To the extent that there are errors in valuation, fewer negative errors 
will be observed other than positive errors.” Inefficient management hypothesis 
asserts that takeovers are partly motivated by the desire to improve poorly 
performing firms. Nevertheless, conducting a study on a large sample of 
acquisitions from 1926 to 1996, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) suggest that empirical 
evidence does not support the conjecture that targets perform poorly before 
acquisition. 
Contrary to neo-classical theory, “agency costs hypothesis” suggests that 
managers undertake takeover deals out of self-interest, not as a result of 
shareholder interests. Studies that take this perspective propose a number of 
scenarios that managers may take advantage of when making acquisitions in order 
to maximise their self-interests. For instance, Jensen (1986a, 1986b) argues that a 
major cause of acquisitions are the agency costs associated with manager-
shareholder conflicts over the pay-out of free cash flow. Free cash flow is cash-
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flow in excess of that is needed to finance all positive net present value projects of 
a firm. If managers do not pay out free cash flows, for example through stock 
repurchases or dividends, it is likely that they spend it on non-profitable 
investments such as value-destroying acquisitions. Paying dividends reduces the 
resources under managers' control, and subsequently reduces their power. Later, 
when the firm requires new capital, managers are subject to monitoring by the 
capital markets which re-assess their performance. Jensen (1986b) also suggests 
that managers of firms with unused borrowing power are more likely to undertake 
low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers. He explains that large amounts of 
debt set up organisational incentives to motivate managers to pay out free cash 
flow. Therefore, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow which, in the case 
of takeovers, implies that managers who pay-out free cash flow to bondholders 
are less likely to undertake value destroying acquisitions. 
Previous studies also suggest other incentives for managers to commence non-
value-creating acquisitions. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers may 
undertake conglomerate mergers in order to diversify their personal portfolio to 
reduce their “employment risk”. In conglomerate mergers synergies are not 
expected from the combined firm because acquirer and target are functionally 
unrelated. They find that diversification is most likely when acquiring firms have 
a dispersed ownership structure and are controlled by non-owner managers. 
Although conglomerate mergers still make a considerable proportion of mergers 
the sample of Amihud and Lev’s study is selected from the third wave of mergers 
when takeover activity was dominated by this type of acquisition.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) explain managers can “entrench” themselves, i.e. make themselves 
valuable to shareholders and costly to replace, and decrease chances of being 
replaced by diversifying through acquisitions. They argue that managers may pay 
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too much for their targets in order to extract higher salaries and larger perquisites 
from shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny see management entrenchment as a 
strategy to counter disciplinary forces such as being monitored by boards of 
directors, competition in the management labour market, threat of acquisition and 
also product market competition that puts pressure on managers to perform in the 
interest of shareholders. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) also provide 
empirical evidence that shows value destroying acquisitions can be driven by self-
interested managers.  
Conventional theories suggest managerial motives as drivers of mergers do not 
explain merger waves. Nevertheless recent theories attempt to show that they do. 
For example, Goel and Thakor (2010) propose that envious CEOs generate 
merger waves. They explain that in a situation where CEOs envy each other based 
on “relative compensation” and CEOs of bigger firms earn more, one merger in 
the industry that increases firm size for a CEO will tempt another envious CEOs 
to undertake value-destroying but size-enhancing acquisitions. This envy-based 
competition between CEOs in an industry causes merger waves. 
Industry level theories of mergers 
Takeover activity clusters disproportionately across industries. Prior studies 
provide evidence of industry clustering with merger activity through time. This 
finding suggests that common factors affect the acquisitions taking place in an 
industry. Andrade et al. (2001a) argue “If mergers come in waves, but each wave 
is different in terms of industry composition, then a significant portion of merger 
activity might be due to industry-level shocks.” Nelson (1959) notes the 
differences in takeover rates across industries in the period 1895-1956. Moreover, 
Gort (1969) finds that the distribution of acquisitions and the distribution of 
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acquiring firms are highly concentrated in certain industries. As a result, he 
develops an economic disturbance theory for mergers. He suggests that economic 
shocks generate discrepancies in valuation of stocks which consequently produce 
merger waves. Gort (1969) explains that the shock do so in two ways. First, they 
randomly alter the order of expectations of individuals which results in some non-
owners moving to the right of current owners on the value scale. Second, 
economic disturbances make the future less predictable, which results in an 
increase in the variance of individual valuations. This mainly occurs because 
information about the past becomes less effective in predicting the future due to 
the industry shocks. In fact, the historical data which represents information 
available to all investors is no more reliable for prediction purposes. Therefore, 
the common base of assumptions of different investors is narrowed, and 
consequently, the range of alternative predictions increases. Gort (1969) argues 
that if as a result of the disturbance, the mean of the entire distribution of 
valuations shifts to that of current owners or managers, the increased variance of 
valuations raises the chance that some prospective buyers will place a higher 
value on the assets of a potential acquisition than the valuation of the group that 
currently controls the firm. 
The emergence of new technologies may, for example, lead either to new 
products, or to new processes of production, for the same products. From past 
experience, it is difficult to predict demand, and therefore sales, for new products. 
It is also difficult to predict costs because total unit costs depend upon volume of 
production. Contrariwise, when production processes change, future costs are 
difficult to forecast from past costs; and, to the extent that cost changes are 
reflected in price changes, future prices and outputs are also independent of past 
prices and outputs. Thus, when technology changes rapidly, the record of the past 
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does not necessarily  contribute much to the formation of cash flow forecasts. As 
a result, the discrepancies in the valuations of investors rises and consequently the 
acquisition rate increases.  
Coase (1937), is among the first to note the impact of technology changes on 
merger activity. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) argue that when a new 
technology arrives, firms which are not sufficiently flexible to adapt become 
targets for takeovers by those who can utilise the new technology, particularly 
those who can use it in an efficient manner. The merger wave serves to get the 
assets into the hands of those who can use these assets best and dies once the 
reallocation is complete.  
Gort’s proposition emphasizes the role of industry related causes of acquisitions. 
The neo-classical theory of mergers sees mergers as an efficiency-improving 
response to industry shocks. Examples of such shocks are changes in antitrust 
policy, deregulation, change in input costs, innovation in financing methods, and 
emergence of new technologies. In this view, trustworthy managers reflect 
industry shocks in a way that maximises shareholders’ wealth. Under this theory, 
merger momentum may result from shocks that increase synergies for a group of 
mergers in which acquirers or targets are from a particular industry. Mergers 
announced following these shocks are expected to be more value-creating than 
other mergers, leading to correlated announcement returns.  
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) provide evidence of how industry shocks influence 
the takeover rates in an industry. Patterns in takeover rates in 51 industries were 
found to be related to the economic shocks that occurred across these industries 
during 1980s. They show that specific shocks such as deregulations and financing 
innovations raised the number of acquisitions during the 1980s. The researchers 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
31 
 
also suggest that these shocks have general implications for stock price 
fluctuations around merger announcement and also on the post-completion 
performance of acquirers. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) define industry shocks as 
any factor that alters industry structure and suggest that takeover and restructuring 
activity accommodates such change. These changes may affect firms in a positive 
or a negative way and takeovers are the message bearers of such fundamental 
changes. They study the effect of specific shocks including deregulation, oil price 
shocks, foreign competition, and financing innovations and show that these 
shocks can explain a significant proportion of takeover activity. Andrade and 
Stafford (2004) show that industry clustering continues during 1970-1994 while 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) provide evidence of industry clustering of 
acquisitions during 1990s.  
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001b) investigate the impact of major 
deregulation in eight industries and find that deregulations trigger takeover 
activity. They provide three reasons for which they select deregulation among 
other possible industry shocks. First, deregulation creates new investment 
opportunities for the industry. Second, it potentially removes long-standing 
barriers to merging and consolidating, which might have kept the industry 
artificially dispersed and third, it is fairly well-defined in time and in terms of 
parties affected, so empirically we know where and when to look.   
Harford (2005) provides evidence consistent with the neoclassical theory of 
mergers. He argues that merger waves take place in response to specific industry 
shocks such as economic, regulatory and technological shocks that require large 
scale reallocation of assets. However, he suggests that these shocks are not 
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enough on their own and sufficient liquidity at macro-level is necessary to 
accommodate the asset reallocation. 
Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009) propose that, in an industry with firms of similar 
size, anticipation of value-increasing merger opportunities can lead to defensive 
acquisitions, where managers acquire other firms to avoid losing private benefits 
if their firms are acquired. On the other hand, they argue that in an industry in 
which the largest firm is much larger than the other firms, firms undertake 
acquisitions to become more attractive targets for other firms. 
Gorton et al. (2009) suggest an eat-or-be-eaten theory in which a race to increase 
firm size through mergers, following an industry shock, results in merger waves. 
Furthermore, they argue that relative size of firms in an industry determines the 
way these firms react to a shock. The theory explains that in an industry with 
firms of similar size, anticipation of mergers makes self-interested managers, who 
intend to remain in control, to undertake unprofitable defensive mergers which 
only increases the size of their firms and therefore makes them immune from 
acquisition. On the other hand, if an industry consists of one very large firm and 
other firms are relatively small, then expectation of potential merger activities 
motivates managers of smaller firms to acquire other small firms to make 
themselves more attractive targets for the largest firm in the industry. In industries 
in which some but not all firms are of similar size both types of suggested 
acquisition patterns may occur. In such industries medium-sized firms may 
undertake defensive or positioning acquisitions depending on distribution of firm 
sizes and how much the managers care about shareholders’ value.  
Defensive mergers are used to reduce the magnitude of losses an acquirer would 
face otherwise. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that many 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
33 
 
acquisitions of the late 1990s in high-tech industries were a defensive strategy by 
overvalued acquirers to avoid massive long-term losses that would happen if they 
were not made. Gorton et al. (2009) suggest that acquisitions for stock by the 
glamour bidders are in fact a defensive strategy they model.  
Macroeconomic factors and theory of pro-cyclical mergers 
Economy-wide changes such as emergence of general purpose technologies, 
changes in anti-trust policies, and changes in bankruptcy regulations can partly 
explain the changes in merger activity level. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) 
argue that merger waves are pro-cyclical. Jensen (1993) suggests that 
technological, regulatory and economic changes are among the drivers of mergers 
and restructurings of the 1980s. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that 
deregulation and new information technologies which emerged before 1980 
created opportunities for many firms to improve their performance. These changes 
along with the increased role of institutional investors in the growing capital 
markets empowered investors and put pressure on managers to enhance 
performance. This combination of opportunity and demand for improving 
efficiency caused the merger wave of 1980s. With the popularity of stock options 
“shareholder value became an ally rather than an enemy”. Holmstrom and Kaplan 
suggest that managers, who had learned how to use mergers and other 
restructuring techniques to improve efficiency, could now share the returns with 
shareholders. Therefore, after a short decline, takeover activity continued to surge 
in the 1990s. 
A well-recognised theory to explain takeover waves at the industry level is the Q 
theory of mergers. The Q hypothesis of takeovers (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002, 
2008; Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991) is an extension of the Q theory of 
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investments (Brainard & Tobin, 1968). It states that takeovers reallocate target 
assets for different uses. These uses can generate higher or lower payoffs 
depending on the quality of bidder and target management, and on the business 
opportunities of bidder and target firms. Technically, dispersion in Tobin’s Q 
among existing and potential new firms causes reallocation of capital, either 
through mergers or through exit-and-return of capital. Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2008) argue that due to the easing of bankruptcy regulations, mergers became the 
predominant way of reallocation of capital over the 20
th
 century. They provide 
appealing evidence of how reallocation activity and also the contribution of 
mergers in reallocating capital increases during the period of utilisation of new 
general purpose technologies, namely the “electrification” epoch of 1890-1930 
and the recent IT revolution after invention of the 4004 chip by Intel in 1971.  
Figure 2.3-1 is borrowed from Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) to demonstrate the 
magnitude of reallocation activity over the 20th century. 
Figure ‎2.3-1 – Reallocated capital and its components as percentages of stock 
market value, 1890-2003 (Source: (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2008)) 
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(Dong et al., 2006) test the Q hypothesis over the period 1987-2000. Although 
they find empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis in some of their tests, 
they find that the central prediction of Q hypothesis of takeovers, which suggests 
that high valuation bidders earn greater announcement stock returns, cannot be 
confirmed in their sample. 
An alternative theory that explains the causes of mergers at the economy-wide 
level is proposed by Toxvaerd (2008). He suggests a dynamic model of takeover 
activity in which takeovers occur as an equilibrium phenomenon. In his model an 
underlying economic fundamental influences merger profitability as an exogenous 
stochastic process. He argues that, given a set of exogenous economic conditions, 
merger waves take place as a result of strategic interaction between a set of 
acquirers who compete over time for a set of scarce targets. The timing of 
takeovers is determined by the trade-off between the value of waiting for a 
favourable market condition and the risk of being pre-empted by rival acquirers. 
This trade-off leads to merger waves. The model has three implications. First, 
merger activity should be undertaken in beneficial economic conditions. Second, 
because of competition pressure, mergers occur earlier than suggested by pure 
profitability considerations. Third, multiple-bid contests are expected to be 
concentrated at later stages of merger waves, when competition pressure becomes 
more important.  
In summary, it seems plausible to conclude that in the very long run economy-
wide wide changes in technologies and regulations (and perhaps globalisation in 
the current era) are likely to drive huge merger waves (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 
2008), which in turn affect different industries in a way that resembles a domino 
effect. As empirical evidence suggests, some industries seem to be affected sooner 
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than others. Industry-level theories suggest industry shocks (Mitchell & Mulherin, 
1996) and industry structure (Gorton et al., 2009) can explain relatively smaller 
merger waves that rise and die in a window of a decade. Andrade and Stafford 
(2004) suggest that merger activity is both related to firm-level and industry-wide 
drivers. While conventional managerial theories like the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 
1986) and management entrenchment hypothesis (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) 
demonstrate no power to explain cyclic behaviour of takeover activity, recent 
theories that suggest managerial envy (Goel & Thakor, 2010) and managerial 
herding (Bouwman et al., 2009) drive mergers can explain micro merger waves.  
Behavioural Theories 
Behavioural finance sees corporate policies as a response to market mispricing. In 
the case of takeovers, behaviouralists suggest that mispricing of corporate stocks 
gives opportunity to highly overvalued firms to acquire less overvalued or 
undervalued firms using their overvalued stocks. Moreover, highly undervalued 
firms are likely to be the target of cash acquisitions which are often hostile 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 2003).  
In contrast with the hubris hypothesis of mergers, which presumes that financial 
markets are efficient but managers are not rational, the behavioural hypothesis of 
mergers suggests that mergers are a form of arbitrage by rational managers taking 
advantage of market inefficiencies. This hypothesis is founded on evidence of 
positive correlation between stock valuations and merger activity (Golbe & 
White, 1988; Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2001). Advocates of behavioural hypothesis 
posit that bidders take advantage of temporary mis-valuations and dispersion in 
mis-valuations in the market. Behaviouralists also argue that other hypothesised 
causes of merger waves do not explain the choice of medium of exchange.  
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Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a theory of takeovers based on stock market 
mis-valuations of the combining firms. In their model, combined long-term value 
of an acquisition is always zero, i.e. by assumption, mergers do not generate 
wealth, and therefore, what the bidder gains the target loses. They suggest that 
targets of cash takeovers are expected to be undervalued firms which must have 
experienced low returns before being acquired. Such takeovers are more likely to 
be hostile rather than stock acquisitions. One implication of this proposition, in 
the context of behavioural finance, is that target managers who are aware of the 
actual value of their firm are likely to ask higher premiums than the shareholders, 
therefore it is cheaper for the bidder to launch a hostile takeover and buy the 
stocks directly from the shareholders. Moreover, they suggest two reasons for 
why managers of relatively less overvalued firms would agree to be a target for a 
paid-by-stock merger: 
First, the difference in the horizons of various managers, i.e. if the sum of merger 
benefits is greater than the acquisition premium on the stock price of the target 
and the bid price is greater than the current market valuation of the target then 
both target and acquirer shareholders gain in short and long-run, respectively. The 
former gains the premium, the latter gains the difference between long-term 
synergies and the premium. The losers are those who hold onto the overvalued 
stocks of the merged firm in an overvalued market. 
Second, agency costs on the target-side, i.e. target managers accept overvalued 
stocks of the bidder to serve their own interests. It can be done through 
acceleration in exercise of the stock options, severance pay, or keeping target 
managers in top positions. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) provide empirical 
evidence to support this hypothesis. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that clustering in takeover activity is because 
stock market valuations drive a substantial portion of mergers. They suggest that 
bull markets lead groups of firms with overvalued stock to use the stock to acquire 
assets of undervalued targets through acquisitions. Their model allows for 
relatively less overvalued targets as well, relying mainly on dispersion in 
valuations. That is, target managers with short- term horizons are willing to accept 
the bidder’s temporarily overvalued equity. In this sense, overvaluation in the 
market or in certain industries causes merger waves.  
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that the explanation that overvalued 
bidders wish to use stock is incomplete, because targets should not be eager to 
accept overvalued stock. They propose a model of rational managerial behaviour 
and uncertainty about sources of mis-valuation that would also lead to a 
correlation between market performance and merger waves. When the market is 
overvalued, the target rationally reduces the expected value of a given stock offer, 
and thus the target, on average, values the offer correctly. However, the greater 
the market overvaluation, the higher the target overvaluation is likely to be, even 
though the target’s own stock is affected by the same market overvaluation. Thus, 
market overvaluation raises the chance of a merger occurring and a wave can 
occur due to mis-evaluation even if there is no underlying reason for the mergers.  
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan also suggest that mis-valuation influences the 
medium of exchange. For a stock merger to occur, the target’s management must 
expect the deal to increase value. Managers make errors when evaluating stock 
offers (although they get it right on average) but not when evaluating cash offers. 
Therefore, the medium of exchange will contain a higher proportion of stock 
offers when the market is overvalued and completed deals are more likely to be in 
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cash in undervalued markets. Furthermore, markets will react more positively to 
news of a cash merger than to an equity merger.  
The model of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) differs from that of Shleifer 
and Vishny in that target managers are rational in their model but they make 
mistakes in accepting overvalued equity because of imperfect information about 
the degree of synergies rather than their shorter time horizons.  
Decomposing market-to-book ratio as a measure of market valuation into three 
fundamental elements, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) find 
that merger intensity is highly positively correlated with short-run deviations in 
valuation from long-run trends, especially when stock is used as the method of 
payment. They also find that acquirers with high firm-specific error use stock to 
buy targets with relatively lower firm-specific error at times when both firms 
benefit from positive time-series sector error. Moreover, they provide evidence 
that cash targets are undervalued relative to stock targets and cash acquirers are 
less overvalued than stock acquirers. 
Dong et al. (2006) find that while the Q hypothesis better explains merger activity 
before 1990, post-1990 takeover activity, which is greater in terms of number and 
value of the deals, seems to be driven by mis-valuation. Dong et al. (2003) and 
Ang and Cheng (2003) also use accounting numbers to estimate a fundamental 
value and find evidence consistent with the behavioural explanation of merger 
activity. Verter (2002) confirms that the level and dispersion of stock market 
valuations are correlated with merger activity, especially mergers for stock. While 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004) recognize alternative interpretations of their evidence 
and try to distinguish between competing explanations, other studies that examine 
the behavioural hypothesis tend to only provide evidence consistent with 
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behavioural explanations, rather than considering both neoclassical and 
behavioural hypotheses and then formally rejecting the neoclassical. 
Rosen (2006) provides evidence of momentum in takeover markets. That is, when 
the capital markets have been reacting favourably to merger announcements, they 
tend to continue to do so. Hence, acquirers gain short-term abnormal returns 
during hot market periods. However, Rosen provides evidence that this short-term 
reaction reverses in the long-run resulting in long-term decline in the acquirer’s 
stock returns. Rosen concludes that his findings are consistent with investor 
sentiment being a major factor in the short-term reaction to merger 
announcements which along with agency-costs theory can explain the long-term 
reversal.  
Harford (2005) argues that “observed relation between high stock market 
valuations and merger waves has been misattributed to behavioural misvaluation 
factors. Rather, the relation is actually driven by the higher capital liquidity (lower 
transaction costs) that accompany an economic expansion.” His argument is based 
on the observation that the proportion of an industry involved in firm-level 
acquisition is strongly correlated with the proportion involved in partial–firm 
acquisitions. Since this finding is inconsistent with the behavioural hypothesis of 
mergers but is consistent with the neoclassical theory, Harford concludes that  
industy  shocks along with market liquidity are the actual drivers of takeover 
waves.  
2.3.2 Consequences of acquisitions 
Previous investigations into the consequences of acquisitions are mainly focused 
on their economic impacts. These studies can be classified into two groups: the 
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first group is concerned with macroeconomic effects of acquisitions, such as 
overall productivity gains and possible impairment of market competition. The 
second group is concerned with microeconomic, or firm-level, effects of 
acquisition deals on acquirers and targets.  
Macroeconomic effects 
 Overall productivity gains 2.3.2.1.1
Prior studies suggest that combined wealth effects of mergers on acquirer and 
target shareholders are slightly positive, i.e. around one per cent in most studies 
(Andrade et al., 2001a; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Wang & Xie, 2009). 
Nevertheless, from a macroeconomic perspective, an important question is 
whether mergers really generate value and improve efficiency or only transfer and 
redistribute wealth from other groups of stakeholders such as bondholders and 
employees to stockholders. Put another way; is there any economy-wide 
productivity gain from mergers? As Shleifer and Summers (1988) point out, if the 
value gains through mergers are merely transfers of wealth from other 
stakeholders to shareholders, they do not represent efficiency improvements. 
However, reviewing redistribution theories and related empirical studies, Jarrell et 
al. (1988) conclude that  little evidence has been found to support substantial 
wealth transfers from any group. Andrade et al. (2001a) support this argument.  
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that it is hard to pin down the overall effect 
of takeovers on the economy, because so many factors are involved that can 
provide alternative explanations for economy-wide changes in productivity levels. 
As Andrade et al. (2001a) explain, there are three challenges that make it difficult 
to conclude that the overall outcome of mergers for the economy is substantial. 
First, prior empirical studies find a negative long-term wealth effect on acquirers 
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which may imply that the gains from mergers are overstated or non-existent. 
Second, underlying sources of gains from mergers are still unknown. More 
popular large sample studies and in depth case-studies (e.g. Kaplan, 2000), have 
failed to discover such sources. Finally, most prior empirical findings suggest that 
all wealth gains from mergers seem to accrue to the target firms and this casts 
doubt on rationale behind such investment decisions by acquiring managers and 
make it hard to believe that mergers actually create value.   
Andrade and Stafford (2004) also investigate the economic role of mergers at the 
industry level. They suggest that acquisitions play two main roles: expansion and 
contraction.  They find that mergers play a dual economic role. On one hand they 
are a means of increasing the capital base of acquiring firms in response to 
emerging growth opportunities. On the other hand, mergers appear to facilitate 
industry contraction that in turn improves efficiency.    
 Impairment of market competition 2.3.2.1.2
Absence of anti-trust regulations can lead to mergers that build monopolies across 
industries similar to what was experienced in the first merger wave at the 
beginning of the 20th century. A major effect of a “merging for monopoly” 
pattern is impairment of market competition. (Stigler, 1950) reports that after the 
first merger wave, many industries were dominated by giant firms that had more 
than 50 per cent of the production share in their respective industries. However, 
anti-trust regulations which were around even before the emergence of the first 
takeover wave, prevented industries from monopolistic powers and formed 
oligopolies in long-term. 
A number of studies investigate the effect of mergers on market share of acquiring 
companies and their monopoly power. Mueller (1985) finds that market share of 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
43 
 
the acquiring firms substantially decreases after undertaking an acquisition 
compared to a non-merging benchmark group. His finding is significant for 
horizontal and vertical mergers. However, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and 
Zulehner (2003) show that despite a significant decrease in sales of acquirers after 
acquisition, the profit of the combined firm increases, especially in horizontal 
mergers. They conclude that takeover activity enhances market power of the 
merging entities.  
Microeconomic effects 
The most important theories regarding microeconomic consequences of 
acquisitions which are supported by prior empirical investigations are wealth 
effects, profitability, risk reduction, growth, excessive leverage effect, and income 
tax reduction. In this section, acquisition consequences are classified in three 
groups in order to create a new framework for analysis which reflects the 
Valuation Model and its elements. 
 Wealth effects 2.3.2.1.3
Theories that explain causes of mergers imply different predictions about post-
acquisition performance of merged firms. Table  2.3-1 presents these theories and 
their predictions about acquisition performance.  
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Table ‎2.3-1 Key predictions of the theories that explain causes of mergers about their consequences  
Theory Key authors Predictions  
Agency costs theory 
(management entrenchment 
hypothesis) 
(Morck et al., 1990) Self-interested managers undertake value-destroying acquisitions. Post-merger 
performance is expected to decline. 
Hubris theory (Roll, 1986) Over confident managers pay too much premium to acquire a target. Therefore, post-
merger performance is expected to decline 
Envious managers 
hypothesis 
(Goel & Thakor, 2010) Envious managers undertake value-destroying acquisitions. Post-merger performance is 
expected to decline. 
Economic disturbance theory  (Gort, 1969) Takeover Future is unpredictable. Makes no prediction about post-merger performance. 
Neoclassical theory (industry 
shocks hypothesis) 
(Harford, 2005; Jensen, 1993; 
Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996) 
Industry shocks that drive mergers might improve or deteriorate industry environment. 
Thus, post-merger performance should not necessarily be expected to improve or 
decline. 
Q theory of mergers (Lang et al., 1989); (Jovanovic 
& Rousseau, 2002, 2008; 
Servaes, 1991) 
Offers by well-governed (high-Q) bidders generate greater total gains from mergers and 
therefore higher bidder announcement returns.  
Dynamic model of takeover 
activity 
(Toxvaerd, 2008) Merger activity should be undertaken in beneficial economic conditions. Because of 
competition pressure, mergers occur earlier than suggested by pure profitability 
considerations.  
multiple-bid contests are expected to be concentrated at later stages of merger waves, 
when competition pressure becomes more important.  
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Theory Key authors Predictions  
Market-driven mergers 
(behavioural hypothesis) 
(Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 
2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) 
Combined long-term value of acquisitions is zero 
Long-term returns to acquirers are likely to be negative in stock acquisitions and 
positive in cash acquisitions. 
Short-term returns to acquirers are negative, on average. 
Eat-or-be-eaten theory 
(merger anticipation 
hypothesis) 
(Gorton et al., 2009) On average, acquirers’ abnormal returns are negative. However, profitability of 
takeovers depends on size of the acquirer as well as the firm size distribution in 
industry. 
Acquisition profitability is positively correlated with the ratio of the size of the largest 
firm in the industry to the size of the other firms in the industry. 
Large size acquirers destroy and small size acquirers create value through acquisitions. 
In industries with firms of similar size self-interested managers undertake defensive 
mergers to reduce the probability that their firms be acquired. Therefore, consistent 
management entrenchment hypothesis, such acquisitions are expected to be value 
destroying and cause a decline in post-acquisition performance. 
In the industries with a high ratio of size of the largest firm to size of the other firms 
acquisitions are profitable. 
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Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that, rather than the actual source of performance 
changes, takeovers is the messengers of the underlying economic changes happening in 
the industry. Therefore, takeovers cannot be considered as the primary cause of change in 
a firm’s value. An important implication of the neoclassical theory for acquisition 
performance is if industry shocks are a source of takeover activity then post takeover 
performance should not necessarily be expected to improve, especially compare to a pre-
shock benchmark or to industry cohorts.  
2.3.2.1.3.1 Announcement wealth effects 
The impact of acquisition deals on value of acquirer and target firms is extensively 
investigated in prior empirical studies. Table  2.3-2 summarises prior short-term studies on 
acquisition returns. On the one hand, there are wealth effects on target firms. Since 
targets, typically, do not exist after completion of acquisition deals the market reaction to 
an acquisition announcement is often measured as impact of acquisition on value of target 
firms. Prior researches provide robust evidence of positive abnormal returns for target 
firms, i.e. the overall value effect of acquisitions on target companies has been 
significantly positive and has been increasing over the takeover waves. This positive 
value effect on target shares is logical. Acquirers typically offer premiums to target 
shareholders to induce them to sell their shares, which consequently escalates market 
value of the target firms significantly. 
On the other hand, several studies have investigated acquisition wealth effects on 
acquirers. These studies can be classified into two groups: short-term and long-term 
studies. Short-term studies, similar to those concerned with target wealth effects, measure 
abnormal announcement returns of acquirers. The evidence from prior investigations 
suggests that the overall around announcement abnormal returns of acquirers are 
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economically insignificant. In other words, the average value effects of acquisition 
announcements on acquirer firms are indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with 
“Perfectly Competitive Acquisitions Markets” hypothesis.  
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Table ‎2.3-2: Prior studies on market reaction to acquisition announcement 
Author(s) 
Sample Method CAARs (%) 
Market Period 
Size 
D/A/T Event window Benchmark Acquirer Target Combined 
(Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 
2012) 
US 1996-2009 4803 D (-2, +2) MM 0.369   
(Ahn, Jiraporn, & Kim, 2010) US 1998-2003 1207 A (-1, 0) 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-5, +5) 
MM −1.007*** 
−1.304*** 
−1.463*** 
−1.878*** 
  
(Uysal, 2011) US  1990-2007 7814 D (-1, +1) MM 0.10***   
(Ushijima, 2010) Japan, PM 
M 
1994-2005 
 
106 D 
38 D 
(-1, +1) MA 1.3*** 
3.8*** 
  
(Bouwman et al., 2009) US,  1979-2002 2944 D (-1, +1) MM −0.48***   
(Wang & Whyte, 2009) US 1991-2004 10767 D (-1, 0) MM −0.0001   
(Wang & Xie, 2009) US, 
Domestic 
1990- 2004 396 D (-5, +5) MM −2.91*** 21.52*** 0.97** 
(Antonios, Dimitris, & Huainan, 
2007) 
UK, LSE 
frequent 
bidders 
1987-2004 1401 D (-2, +2) MA 1.26***   
(Fan & Goyal, 2006) US  1962-1996 2162D (-1, +1) 
(-10, +10) 
MM   1.9*** 
2.4*** 
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Author(s) 
Sample Method CAARs (%) 
Market Period 
Size 
D/A/T Event window Benchmark Acquirer Target Combined 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, & 
Stulz, 2005) 
US 1980-2001 12023D/1967T (-1, +1) MM 1.10
NA 
 1.35
NA 
(Bhagat et al., 2005) US 1962-2001 1018 (-5, +5) MM 0.18  30.01 *** 5.27***  
Conn, Cosh, Guest, and 
Hughes (2005) 
UK 1984-00 4320 (-1, +1) MA 0.59***   
(Danbolt, 2004) UK 1986-1991 514 (0, +20) 
(-2, +1) 
MA, MA, 
CAPM, 
Size-decile 
18.76*** 
20.64*** 
  
(Moeller, Schlingemann, & 
Stulz, 2004) 
US 1980-2001 12023 (-1, +1) MM 1.102***   
(Graham, Lemmon, & Wolf, 
2002) 
US 1980-1995 356 (-1, +1) MM −0.78*** 22.51*** 3.4*** 
(Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002) Korea 
Non-
financial  
1981-1997 107 A (-1, +1) 
(-5, +5) 
(-10, +10) 
MM 1.841*** 
2.666** 
3.387** 
  
(Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 
2002) 
US 1990-2000 3135D (-2, +2) MA 1.77***   
(Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & 
Raman, 2001) 
US 1993-1998 1719D (-1,0) MM 0.02   
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Author(s) 
Sample Method CAARs (%) 
Market Period 
Size 
D/A/T Event window Benchmark Acquirer Target Combined 
(Andrade et al., 2001b) US 1973-1998 3688 (-1, +1) 
(-20, close) 
MM −0.7 
−3.8 
16.0** 
23.8** 
1.8** 
1.9 
(DeLong, 2001) US, 
Banking  
1988-1995 280 (-10, +1) MM −1.68*** 16.61*** 0.04 
(Leeth & Borg, 2000) US 1919-1930 466A/72T (-1, close) MM, MA 0.14 15.57***  
(Walker, 2000) US 1980-1996 278 (-2, +2) MA −0.84*   
(Kang, Shivdasani, & Yamada, 
2000) 
Japan 1977-1993 154A (-1, 0) 
(-1, +1) 
(-5, +5) 
(close-1, close) 
(-1, close+1) 
MM 1.17*** 
0.90* 
2.22*** 
0.27 
5.37** 
  
(Mulherin & Boone, 2000) US 1990-1999 281D (-1, +1) MA −0.37*** 20.2*** 3.56*** 
(Higson & Elliott, 1998) UK 1975-1990 830 (0, close) 
(0, +20) 
Size-decile 0.43 
0.20 
37.5*** 
31.5*** 
 
(Smith & Kim, 1994) US 1980-86 177 (-5, +5) 
(-1, 0) 
MM 0.50 
−0.23** 
30.19** 
15.84** 
8.88** 
3.79** 
(Chatterjee, 1992) US, TO 1963-1986 436 (0, +20) MM 3.33* 22.04***  
(Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992) US 1971-1982 271A/209/209 (-5, +5) MM −1.49*** 26.9*** 3.74*** 
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Author(s) 
Sample Method CAARs (%) 
Market Period 
Size 
D/A/T Event window Benchmark Acquirer Target Combined 
(Healy et al., 1992) US, largest 
acquisitions 
1979-1984 50 (-5, close) MA −2.2 45.6*** 9.1*** 
(Byrd & Hickman, 1992) US, TO 1980-1987 128 (-1, 0) MA −1.23   
(Franks et al., 1991) US 1975-1984 399 (-5,5) MM −1.02* 28.04*** 3.90*** 
(Servaes, 1991) US 1972-1987 384/384/704 (0, close) MM −1.07** 23.64*** 3.66*** 
(Franks & Harris, 1989) UK, TO 
M 
1955-1985 1012/1693 
46/121 
(0, +20) MA 1.2** 
−3.6** 
24.0** 
14.8** 
 
(Lang et al., 1989) US, TO 1968-1986 87 (-5, +5) MM 0.01 40.30*** 11.31*** 
(Eckbo & Langohr, 1989) France, 
TO, Pub 
1966-1982 52/90 (0, +5) MM −0.29 16.48***  
(Dennis & McConnell, 1986) US, M 1962-1980 90/76 (-19, 0) 
(-6, +6) 
MA 1.07 
3.24*** 
16.67*** 
13.74** 
 
(Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, 
1983) 
US, M 1963-1979 214/54 (-20, 0) MM 2.8*** 16.8***  
(Eckbo, 1983) US, HM 1963-1978 102/57 
 
(-1, +1) 
(-20, +10) 
MM 0.07 
1.58 
6.24*** 
14.08*** 
 
(Asquith, 1983) US, M 1962-1976 211/196 
 
(-2, 0) 
(-20, 0) 
MM 0.2 6.20***  
(Malatesta, 1983) US, M 1969-1974 256/83 (0, +20) MM 0.90 16.8***  
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Author(s) 
Sample Method CAARs (%) 
Market Period 
Size 
D/A/T Event window Benchmark Acquirer Target Combined 
(Bradley, 1980) US, TO 1962-1977 88/161 (-20, +20) MM 4.36*** 32.18***  
(Dodd, 1980) US, M 1970-1977 60/71 (-20, 0) MM in 
growth 
return 
0.80 21.78***  
(Firth, 1980) UK, TO 1969-1975 434 (0, +20) MM −6.30*** 28.1***  
(Kummer & Hoffmeister, 1978) US, TO 1956-1974 17/50 (0, +20) CAPM 5.20* 16.85***  
(Dodd & Ruback, 1977) US, TO 1958-1978 124/133 (0, +20) MM 2.83** 20.89***  
(Franks, Broyles, & Hecht, 
1977) 
UK, M 1955-1972 70 (0, +20) MM 4.60
n/a 
16.0
n/a 
8.60
n/a 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal announcement returns of mergers and acquisition for firms involved in mergers and 
acquisitions. While most studies provide abnormal return estimations for acquirers, a number of previous studies also report combined 
abnormal returns and abnormal returns for target firms. Prior studies document a positive combined abnormal return on average as well as 
positive and significant abnormal returns for target firms. However, studies in the US and the UK typically report slightly negative and 
insignificant abnormal returns for acquirers. M: mergers, TO: tender offers, MM: market model, MA: market adjusted model, D: deal, A: 
Aquirer, T: target, n/a: not available. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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If as short–term studies assume financial markets are semi-strongly efficient, 
these results imply that acquisitions, on average, are zero net present value 
projects for acquirers. Behaviouralists, nevertheless, argue that this is only the 
reaction of market to acquisition announcements and does not necessarily reflect 
the value effects of the deals. For example, Rosen (2006) suggests that acquirers 
are likely to gain positive announcement abnormal returns if recent mergers by 
other firms has been received well or if the overall stock market is doing better. 
He suggests, however, there is long-term reversal in returns for acquirers who 
make a deal during hot market periods compare to those who acquire at other 
times.  
2.3.2.1.3.2 Long-term wealth effects 
Long-term studies, alternatively, investigate the long-term value effects of 
undertaking an acquisition deal on an acquirer’s returns. The results of prior 
investigations on long-term effects of acquisitions are highly dependent on the 
estimation method used to calculate the benchmark return. However, evidence 
suggests that overall long-term abnormal returns are either negative or 
insignificant. Table  2.3-3 presents a brief review of prior long-term investigations. 
Long-term post-completion performance of acquirers has been a focus of study 
for researchers during the past three decades. Table 2.3-3 includes an abstract of 
the numerous studies that have been undertaken to measure performance. A 
number of methods and metrics have been developed through efforts of several 
investigators and multiple influencing factors have been investigated, too. A 
number of questions remain unanswered. Most importantly, from a decision 
making perspective, the question is: will a particular acqusition deal improve the 
long-term performance of an acquirer firm? 
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A variety of metrics have been used for measurement of post-completion long-
term performance. However, there is not an overall agreement about average 
return for acquisitions. It is apparent that the results between investigations vary 
depending on the metric types (see Table 2.3-3), benchmarks and samples of the 
different studies. Most of the previous research that uses the long-term abnormal 
return method provides evidence that the post-completion performance of 
acquirers, on average, is negative or optimistically around zero. However, a 
number of studies that use accounting ratios or economic value-added methods 
document positive average performance.  
A number of investigations address the accuracy of different metrics and the 
appropriate benchmarks, predominantly concerning long-term abnormal returns 
on stock price. Although these discussions contribute to improved metrics, 
investigations are generally limited to one aspect of corporate performance and 
ignore the other dimensions. Aside from that, the variance surrounding the 
association between acquisition activity and post-completion performance 
suggests that subgroups of firms do experience significant positive returns from 
such activity (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004).  
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Table ‎2.3-3: Prior studies on long-term abnormal returns of acquisitions 
Author(s) 
Sample Method 
Abnormal 
return (%) Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(months) Metric 
(Bouwman et al., 2009) US 1979-02 2944 
252 
Size & B/M  
Four factor model 
(+1, +24) 
 
BHAR 
CALT 
−7.22*** 
15.84*** 
(Croci, 2007) EU 1990-01 83 
50 
23 
 (0, +12) 
(0, +24) 
(0, +36) 
BHAR −9.47 
−24.36** 
−6.94 
(Gregory & McCorriston, 2005) Cross-
border 
acquisitions 
by UK 
acquirers 
1984-94 333 Size & B/M (+1, +12) 
(+1, +36) 
(+1, +60) 
 
 
BHAR 
BHAR 
BHAR 
0.65 
−3.90 
−9.29 
(Conn, Cosh, Guest, & Hughes, 2005) UK 1984-00 4,344 Size & B/M (+1, +36) BHAR 
CALT 
−9.02 
−0.21 
(Aw & Chatterjee, 2004) UK 1991-96 77 MM (+1, +6) 
(+1, +12) 
(+1, +18) 
(+1, +24) 
CAR −1.86 
−8.01*** 
−9.45*** 
−17.87*** 
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Author(s) 
Sample Method 
Abnormal 
return (%) Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(months) Metric 
(Moeller et al., 2004) US 1980-01 12,023 Four factor model (0, +36) CALT 
(Ave. Mnth 
Return) 
6.48 
(0.018) 
(Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003) UK 1983-95 519 Size, B/M, MA (+2, +36) BHAR −14.76*** 
(Datta et al., 2001) US 1993-98 485 Size, B/M one-year 
pre-acquisition 
stock return, 
matched firm 
(0, +36) BHAR −9.31 
(Chatterjee, 2000) UK 1977-90 153 MA (0, +12) 
(0, +24) 
(0, +36) 
CAR 5.4 
−4.1 
−17.9 
(Mitchell & Stafford, 2000) US 1961-93 2,068 
 
389 
 
366 
Size & B/M 
 
 
 
FF3FM 
(+1, +36) BHAR-EW 
BHAR-VW 
CALT-EW 
CALT-VW 
CALT-EW 
CALT-VW 
−1.0 
−3.8** 
−1.44 
−1.08 
−5.04*** 
−2.52* 
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Author(s) 
Sample Method 
Abnormal 
return (%) Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(months) Metric 
(Higson & Elliott, 1998) UK 1975-90 814 
776 
722 
Size (0, +12) 
(0, +24) 
(0, +36) 
BHAR −0.74 
−1.14 
0.83 
(Loughran & Vijh, 1997) US 1970-1989 947 Size, B/M firm (+1, +60) BHAR −6.5 
(Gregory, 1997) US 1984-92 452 FF3FM 
 
 
(A, +6) 
(A, +12) 
(A, +24) 
CAR −5.12*** 
−10.63*** 
−18.01*** 
(Kennedy & Limmack, 1996) UK 1980-1989 345 Size (0, +23) CAR −5.03* 
(Agrawal, Jaffe, & Gershon, 1992) US 1955-87 765 Size & beta (+1, +60) CAR −10.26** 
(Bühner, 1991) Germany 1973-85 110 MM (+1, +12) 
(+1, +24) 
 −6.93 
−5.98 
(Franks et al., 1991) US 1975-84 399 size (+1, +36) CALT 1.8 
(Limmack, 1991) UK 1977-86 448 Adjusted Beta 
MM 
MA 
(A, +24) 
 
CAR −4.67* 
−14.96*** 
−7.43*** 
(Franks & Harris, 1989) UK 1960-85 1048 MM 
MA 
CAPM 
(+1, +24) CAR −12.6*** 
4.8** 
4.5** 
(Eckbo, 1986) Canada 1964-83 1138 MM (+1, +12) CAR 1.00** 
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Author(s) 
Sample Method 
Abnormal 
return (%) Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(months) Metric 
(Asquith, 1983) US 1962-76 196 Beta port. (0, +12) CAR −7.2*** 
(Malatesta, 1983) US 1969-74 256 MM (0, +36) CAR −7.6*** 
(Firth, 1980) UK 1969-75 434 MM (+1, +12) 
(+13, +36) 
CAR 0.5 
−0.4 
(Langetieg, 1978) US 1929-69 149 Industry (+1, +12) 
(+1, +24) 
CAR −0.87** 
−1.08** 
(Dodd & Ruback, 1977) US 1958-76 124 MA (0, +60) CAR −5.9 
(Franks et al., 1977) UK 1955-72 94 MM (-40, +40) CAR −0.04 
(Mandelker, 1974) US 1941-62 241 MA (+1, +12) CALT 0.6*** 
This table summarises prior studies on long-term abnormal returns of mergers. Prior studies typically document negative long-term abnormal 
returns. M: mergers, TO: tender offers, MM: market model, MA: market adjusted model, CAR: cumulative abnormal returns, CALT: 
calendar-time portfolios, BHAR: buy and hold abnormal returns. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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 Profitability and operating synergies 2.3.2.1.4
Devos et al. (2009) break down synergy gains from mergers. They suggest that 
operating synergies account for a major part of the synergy gains. Besides, 
synergies from interest tax shields contribute to 17per cent of gains in their 
sample of 266 large acquisitions in unregulated industries.  
(Houston, James, & Ryngaert, 2001) use management forecasts and 
estimate synergies in large bank mergers to average about 13 per cent. 
(Bhagat et al., 2005) find average value improvements of 13.1per cent in 
a sample of tender offers with competing bidders. Several previous 
studies use either ex post accounting performance or plant level 
productivity data to infer the existence of operating improvements and 
provide mixed evidence. For example, (Ghosh, 2001) finds little evidence 
of operating improvements compared to control firms matched on size 
and prior performance. Similarly, (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987) find no 
evidence of operating improvements for targets of tender offers using line 
of business data from the Federal Trade Commission. However, (Healy et 
al., 1992) and (Heron & Lie, 2002) rely on ex post accounting 
performance and find that operating performance improves after a merger. 
(Healy et al., 1992) also find that gains arise from improvements in asset 
turnover rather than operating margins. They document savings in capital 
expenditure to the tune of 25.4%. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) use 
plant-level data for manufacturing firms from the Longitudinal Research 
Database maintained at the Bureau of the Census of the US, and find no 
evidence that the productivity of the acquirer’s assets improves after a 
merger. But, when a firm adds capacity to its main divisions and increases 
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its focus, productivity increases too. Overall, this body of evidence does 
not permit definitive conclusions about improvements in operating 
performance following mergers. 
Houston et al. (2001) rely on management forecasts to assess synergy 
gains in 41 large bank mergers. They document average gains of about 13 
per cent and report that gains arise from cost savings rather than revenue 
increases. Bernile (2004) finds that management forecasts of synergy 
average about 6 per cent for a sample of 324 mergers during 1991–1999. 
Enhancement in operating cash-flows is especially important in the case 
of related mergers where merging firms are likely to enhance their 
combined operating income or reduce their operating costs through 
merging their operational activities. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) 
suggest that similarity and asset complementarity motivate mergers. 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) provide evidence that acquiring firms that 
offer asset complementarities but are also different from rival firms in the 
industry provide significant synergy gains. If present value of future cash-
flows generated through such synergies is greater than zero then the 
merger is value creating, ceteris paribus. However, diversifying mergers 
are unlikely to reduce operating costs or enhance operating incomes 
significantly (Maquieira, Megginson, & Nail, 1998). Thus, in such 
mergers this part of the model is negligible. In fact, it is not able to 
explain value creation through diversifying mergers which were 
especially popular in 1960s where findings of prior empirical studies 
show that the combined value effects of such mergers are positive as well 
and even greater (e.g. Bradley et al., 1988). 
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Table ‎2.3-4 Prior studies on profitability of acquisitions 
Author(s) Sample 
Method Average  Annual 
Abnormal operating 
performance % 
Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(years)  Metric Mean Median
1
 
(Wang & Xie, 2009) US 1990-04 297 Performance 
adj. control firm 
(+1, +3) 3Y average ROA 
3Y average ROS 
0. 3*** 
0. 4** 
 
(Carline, Linn, & Yadav, 
2009) 
UK 1985-94 81 Industry 
Pre-performance 
(0, +5) IAOCF/MVA 10.6*** 6.3*** 
(Powell & Stark, 2005) UK 1985-93 191 Industry 
Size 
Pre-performance 
(0, +3) IAOP/TMV 
IAOP/ATMV 
IAOP/BV 
IAOP/Sales 
ISPAOP/TMV 
ISPAOP/ATMV 
ISPAOP/BV 
ISPAOP/Sales 
 −0.14 
0.35 
−0.35 
0.67 
0.79 
1.61 
0.13 
0.80 
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Author(s) Sample 
Method Average  Annual 
Abnormal operating 
performance % 
Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(years)  Metric Mean Median
1
 
(Gugler et al., 2003) Worldwide 
US 
UK 
EU 
Japan 
AU/NZ/CA
N 
ROW 
1981-98 2704 
1950 
362 
178 
20 
165 
42 
 
Industry 
Acquisition-year 
performance of 
Acquirer+target 
(+1, +5) Profit change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sales change
 
10.90 
10.84 
11.82 
18.27 
-12.50 
-0.58 
39.12 
−19.54 
−20.30 
−16.89 
−17.77 
−7.13 
−25.61 
−18.04 
 
(Linn & Switzer, 2001) US 1967-87 413 Industry 
Pre-performance 
(+1, +5) IAOCF/MVA  1.81*** 
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Author(s) Sample 
Method Average  Annual 
Abnormal operating 
performance % 
Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(years)  Metric Mean Median
1
 
(Ghosh, 2001) US 1981-95 315 Industry 
size & pre-
performance 
(+1, +3) IACF/MVA 
CF/MVA 
CF/Sales 
Sales growth 
Employees/Sales 
0.66 
1.25 
0.79 
0.03 
−2.23 
0.27 
0.26 
1.06 
0.02 
−0.09 
(Dickerson, Gibson, & 
Tsakalotos, 1997) 
US 1948-77 2914 Non-acquirers 
+firm specific 
effects 
+time effects 
(+1, +5) ROA −2.4 
−4.9 
−1.7 
 
(Switzer, 1996) US 1967-87 324 industry (+1,+5) IACF/(MVA+BV-
Debt+P-stock) 
 1.97*** 
 
(Clark & Ofek, 1994) US 1981-88 31 Industry (+1, +3) EBITD/Revenues −2.263 −0.6 
(Healy et al., 1992) US 1979-84 46 
48 
44 
Industry 
Pre-performance 
(+1, +5) CF/Sales 
Asset Turnover 
Employee growth 
rate 
0.2 
0.2* 
−2.3** 
 
(Cornett & Tehranian, 
1992) 
US, banks 1982-87 30 Industry (+1, +3) OPTCF/MVA 1.2**  
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Author(s) Sample 
Method Average  Annual 
Abnormal operating 
performance % 
Market Period Size Benchmark 
Event window 
(years)  Metric Mean Median
1
 
(Odagiri & Hase, 1989) Japan 1980-87 46 
33 
Pre-performance (+1, +2) 
 
(+1, +3) 
Gross Profit/BVA 
Sales growth
4 
Gross Profit/BVA 
Sales growth 
−7.6 
0.2 
−4.3 
−3.7 
 
This table summarises prior studies on long-term abnormal profit of mergers. Prior studies typically document negative long-term abnormal returns. IAOP: 
industry adjusted operating profit, BV: book value of equity, ISPAOP: industry, size and pre-acquisition performance adjusted operating profit, IAOCF: 
industry adjusted operating cash-flow return, MVA: market value of assets, OPTCF: Operating pre-tax cash-flow, BVA: Book value of total assets. 
1
 Medians in the pre- and post-acquisition periods are the median values of the variables across the n years. 
2
 Percentage changes are calculated from tables 2B, 3A and 3B of  Gugler et al. (2003), significance levels are not available. 
3
 Calculated from table 4, panel A as average of mean and median of returns over 3 years subsequent to merger 
4
 The ratio of one year’s sales to that of the previous year 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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 Operating synergies versus financial synergies  2.3.2.1.5
Prior research proposes two types of synergies that can be retained from mergers: 
operational synergies and financial synergies. Operational synergies include 
different types of reduction in production and distribution costs whereas financial 
synergies comprise the use of underutilised tax-shields, increased leverage, 
reduced risk of default, and reduced agency costs because of higher debt (e.g. 
Jensen, 1986b; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Operational synergies are extensively 
investigated in extant literature (e.g. Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Bradley et 
al., 1983, 1988; Caron & Jeffrey, 1999; Chatterjee, 1992; Devos et al., 2009; 
Firth, 1978; Harrison et al., 1991; Stan Xiao & Royston, 2004). Reduction in 
production and distribution costs can be achieved through realisation of 
economies of scale and scope, using more efficient technologies, and the benefits 
of changes in control (e.g. Wang & Xie, 2009).  
On the other hand, the literature on financial synergies from mergers is not as 
extensive. Lewellen (1971) suggests that mergers reduce risk of default and 
thereby cost of capital. Leland (2007) argues that Lewellen’s proposition, 
although correct, is incomplete in that financial synergies are not always positive. 
Leland breaks down financial synergies from an acquisition into three 
components: (1) the change in unlevered firm value that results from an 
acquisition, (2) the change in the value of tax savings from optimal leveraging of 
the combined versus stand-alone merging firms, and (3) the change in the value of 
default costs. Leland assumes that there is no operational synergy from mergers in 
developing his model.  
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Studies that compare the magnitude of operational and financial synergies are 
rare. An exception is research by Devos et al. (2009) who decompose synergy 
gains from mergers. They suggest that operating synergies account for a major 
part of the synergy gains. Besides, synergies from interest tax shields contribute to 
17 per cent of gains in their sample of 266 large acquisitions in unregulated 
industries. Their proxy for financial synergies, however, is limited to tax benefits 
of debt.  
Prior research also suggests that components of the WACC, such as cost of debt 
(Billett, King, & Mauer, 2004) financial leverage (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 
2009) and effective tax rate of acquirers (Devos et al., 2009) change substantially 
subsequent to acquisitions. These findings imply that the WACC of the combined 
firm is expected to be different from that of the acquirer and the target.  
Acquisitions and financial leverage of merging firms  
Prior studies find that acquirers are significantly less levered compared to a 
portfolio of control firms prior to acquisitions and increase their leverage levels 
subsequent to acquisitions (Uysal, 2011; Welch, 2004). Lewellen (1971) argues 
that mergers reduce the risk of default, and thus increase debt capacity. This 
increased debt capacity in turn leads to greater leverage and greater tax savings 
that generate financial synergies and create value. Ghosh and Jain (2000) provide 
evidence that shows combined firms can increase their financial leverage mostly 
because of an increase in their debt capacity compared to acquirers. This increase 
in debt capacity can be attributed to unused debt capacity of the merging firms 
(e.g. Bruner, 1988) from the pre-merger years
4
. Moreover, in diversifying mergers 
                                                 
4
 Clayton and Ravid (2002) find that firms with higher leverage are likely to lose bidding contests. 
Therefore it is likely that acquirers have some unused debt capacity prior to acquisitions.  Ghosh 
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where there exists an imperfect correlation between cash-flows of the acquirer and 
the target, a coinsurance effect can reduce cost of capital of the combined firm 
compared to the stand-alone merging firms (Hann, Ogneva, & Ozbas, 2013; 
Leland, 2007). The coinsurance effect that reduces cash-flow volatility may 
consequently reduce both cost of debt and cost of equity capital. The new rates for 
cost of capital components lead to a new optimal capital structure that might be 
different from optimal capital structure of each of the merging firms. This study 
argues that this does not necessarily lead the combined firm to a leverage level 
higher than that of the acquirer. While tax benefits from higher leverage are 
realised as enhanced cash-flows, a reduction in the WACC may also create value. 
Therefore, the notion that mergers only produce new debt capacity seems to be 
naïve. This is especially important when decomposing the value effect of 
acquisitions where ignoring this effect may lead to underestimation of the value 
effect of mergers. 
A number of prior studies investigate the distribution of merger gains between 
extant bondholders and stockholders (Higgins & Schall, 1975; Kim & McConnell, 
1977; Scott, 1977; Shastri, 1990). They argue that if the merging firms have 
existing debt that is callable at par, or can be retired at a price that reflects pre-
acquisition risks, then bondholders of the stand-alone merging firms will not 
participate in gains from an acquisition. However, this is not typically the case. 
For example, while bondholders of nonfinancial acquirers earn negative 
announcement period returns (Billett et al., 2004), bondholders of banks earn 
significantly positive returns during a two-year window around merger 
announcements (Penas & Unal, 2004). On the other hand, bondholders of both 
                                                                                                                                     
and Jain (2000) find weak evidence that some of the increase in financial leverage of the acquirer 
following the merger is due to its past unused debt capacity. Palepu (1986) finds that highly 
levered firms are less likely to be acquired.  
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financial and non-financial targets are reported to gain significantly positive 
returns.  
Mergers that increase debt capacity create opportunities for decreasing cost of 
capital and increasing tax benefits from leveraging up. Debt-holders gain profits 
from relatively safer debt whereas tax benefits from increased leverage go to 
share-holders. Although shareholders can appropriate benefits from bondholders 
by increasing financial leverage, there is a limit for this expropriation as becoming 
overleveraged destroys value. Therefore, shareholders are only able to appropriate 
benefits from debt-holders to an optimum point where the value of the combined 
firm is maximised. 
Leland (2007) argues that a number of factors including tax rates, default costs, 
relative size, and the riskiness and correlation of cash-flows determine the 
magnitude of financial synergies. He suggests that although the coinsurance effect 
reduces risk of default and the cost of capital of firms who engage in diversifying 
mergers, it does not always overcome the disadvantage of forcing a single 
financial structure onto multiple activities. Therefore, diversifying mergers are 
value-creating only when the coinsurance effect dominates. In fact, financial 
synergies from acquisitions can be negative when firms have very different risks 
or default costs. Leland (2007) suggests that “financial synergies by themselves 
are insufficient to justify mergers, but they can become important in specialised 
circumstances. 
2.4 Determinants of acquisition performance 
Since the aggregate results are inconclusive, identification of the factors likely to 
affect long-term performance is crucial. The impact of various factors on post-
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completion performance has been studied in a number of prior empirical studies. 
In the current proposal, these factors have been categorized in five main groups: 
1) Acquirer Characteristics 
2) Target Characteristics 
3) Bid Characteristics 
4) Industry and Competition Factors 
5) Economic Environment   
2.4.1 Acquirer Characteristics 
Relationships between a number of acquirer characteristics and post-completion 
performance have been investigated in previous studies. One of these 
characteristics is the experience of the acquirer in M&A activity. Kusewitt (1985) 
suggests a significant negative relationship between the number of previous M&A 
experiences and the firm performance. In contrast, a number of studies (e.g. 
Fowler & Schmidt, 1989) argue that there is a significant positive correlation 
between experience and long-term performance of M&A.  
Size 
Prior studies document that acquirer returns are negatively correlated with 
acquirer size (Gorton et al., 2009; Moeller et al., 2004). In other words, while very 
large acquirers lose value around announcement date of mergers, small acquirers 
tend to gain abnormal returns.  
Tobin’s Q 
Another acquirer characteristic that has been investigated previously is the pre-bid 
historical performance of the acquirer measured by Tobin’s Q. It is expected that 
well-governed acquirers with higher Tobin’s Q perform better in acquisitions, 
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especially when the target’s Q ratio is low. That is, acquisition of poorly managed 
firms by well-managed acquirers is value creating.  Lang et al. (1991) investigated 
209 successful tender offers and suggest that the relationship between cash flow 
and acquirer returns differs significantly for low Q and high Q acquirers. They 
also argue that acquirer returns are significantly negatively related to cash flow for 
low Q acquirers but not for high Q acquirers. Moreover, investigating 704 
takeovers, Servaes (1991) argues that acquirers with high Q ratio experience a 
higher post-completion return.  
However, a number of recent studies suggest otherwise. Bhagat et al. (2005) find 
that acquirer’s Q is negatively correlated with synergies from acquisitions. Dong 
et al. (2006) and Moeller et al. (2004) also suggest that acquirer’s Q and its close 
substitutes, such as market-to-book ratio, have negative effects on acquirer 
returns.  
Glamour versus value acquirers 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) propose the “extrapolation hypothesis” that suggests 
the market overreacts to the past performance of acquirers at the time of 
announcement of an acquisition. Glamour acquirers with a low book-to- market 
ratio tend to have a high share price that reflects their recent high growth in cash-
flows and earnings as well as signalling high expected future growth to the 
market. The extrapolation hypothesis suggests that, based on past performance of 
managers of these acquirers, the market reacts positively to the announcement of a 
new acquisition plan by glamour firms. On the other hand, the market reacts 
negatively to acquisition announcements by value acquirers with low market-to-
book ratios based on their weak, recent performance. However, over time the 
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market reassesses the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer and corrects 
the previous over-extrapolation of past performance. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) provide evidence in support of their extrapolation 
hypothesis. They examine a sample of US takeovers during the period 1980 to 
1991 and find that glamour acquirers experienced gains of -5.6%, -5.4% and 0.1% 
during the first, second and third year respectively after completion. Conversely, 
value acquirers in their sample gain 5.6%, -1.1% and 5.4% during the first, second 
and third year respectively after completion. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) re-
examine this hypothesis on a sample of UK acquisitions during the period 1983 to 
1995 and that value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers by 0.9% around 
announcement of acquisitions. However, in the long-term, their results are 
consistent with those of  Rau and Vermaelen (1998) over the three post 
acquisition years. Both studies find that, in the long-term, glamour acquirers with 
high market-to-book ratios underperform value acquirers with low market-to-book 
ratios. Conn et al. (2005) also find that glamour acquirers experience long-run 
negative returns in public acquisitions. However, they find no evidence of this in 
private acquisitions where value acquirers experience negative long-run returns. 
Table 2.4-1 reports findings of prior studies that compare returns of glamour and 
value acquirers from acquisition activities.  
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Table ‎2.4-1 Value versus glamour acquirers 
Author(s) 
Sample Method Type of Acquirer 
Market Period 
Size 
G/V 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window 
Glamour 
High M/B 
Value 
Low M/B 
(Conn et al., 2005) UK 1984-00 705/3,615 
 
CAR, short 
CALT 
(-1, +1) 
(+1, +36) 
0.42** 
−0.16 
0.71** 
−0.94*** 
(Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003) UK 1983-95 173/173 CAR, short 
BHAR 
(-1, +1) 
(+43,+750)
1 
- 1.84*** 
-19.13*** 
-0.91** 
-13.00*** 
(Datta et al., 2001) US 1993-98 214/199 BHAR (0, +36) −1.96 0.83 
(Mitchell & Stafford, 2000) US 1961-93 526/257 BHAR-EW 
BHAR-VW 
(+1, +36) 
(+1, +36) 
1.8 
−3.1 
 
2.7 
−14.2 
(Rau & Vermaelen, 1998) US, mergers 
US, TO 
 932/931 
105/104 
CAR (+1, +36) 
(+1, +36) 
−17.26*** 
4.25 
7.64 
15.53 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal returns to glamour and value acquirers. TO: tender offers, CAR: announcement cumulative 
abnormal returns, CALT: calendar-time portfolios, BHAR: buy and hold abnormal returns, EW: equally weighted, VW: value weighted, G: 
glamour acquirer, V: value acquirer. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
1 
+43 to +750
 
Days 
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Cash-holdings 
Prior studies find that firms with greater cash reserves are more likely to make 
acquisitions that destroy value. Harford (1999) suggests that acquisitions by cash-
rich firms (i.e. firms that have accumulated cash reserves above predictions) are 
value decreasing. He argues that, on average, such acquisitions are followed by 
abnormal declines in their stock price. He also proposes that, consistent with the 
stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash-rich show declines in 
abnormal operating performance. Overall, the evidence of his study supports the 
agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash-rich firms. 
Devos et al. (2009) find evidence consistent with this idea. They find that firms 
with higher levels of liquidity make poorer acquisition decisions.  
Ownership structure 
A number of studies investigate the relationship between ownership structure of a 
firm and its long-term performance in different regions around the world (e.g. 
Lichtenberg & Pushner, 1994; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Jensen (1993) 
proposes that corporate performance increases with the portion of managerial 
equity ownership. This is in contrast with Morck et al. (1988b), McConnell & 
Servaes (1990, 1995), and Kole (1995) who suggest a non-linearity in the 
relationship between insiders’ ownership and corporate performance. More 
specifically, Wright et al. (2002) propose that CEO stock ownership has a non-
linear relationship with acquisition abnormal returns. They also suggest that 
institutional investors influence the profitability of acquisitions. Moreover, Cosh, 
Guest, and Hughes (2006) suggest a strong positive relationship between takeover 
performance and CEO ownership, which holds for both long- run returns and 
operating performance measures. They propose that shareholdings of other 
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executive directors, non-executive directors, and non-board holdings have no 
significant effect on takeover performance. 
Experience 
Undertaking an investigation from a behavioural learning perspective, Haleblian 
& Finkelstein (1999) propose a U-shaped non-linear relationship between acquirer 
experience and acquirer long-term accounting performance. They find the best 
performers are either those without experience or those who had a significant 
amount of experience. Hayward (2002) provides more details by investigating the 
nature, performance and timing of a firm’s acquisition experience. Investigating 
acquisitions by 100 of the largest US firms in six different industries, the study 
suggests that a firm’s focal acquisition performance positively relates to prior 
acquisitions that are, 1) not highly similar or dissimilar to the focal acquisition, 2) 
associated with small announcement losses and 3) not too temporally close to or 
distant from the focal acquisition. His findings endorse the view that quality of 
acquisition experiences is important in addition to the quantity. 
Hayward’s (2002) first finding implies a non-linear relationship between 
performance of acquirer and similarity of previous targets with the focal target. 
This will be discussed more under the bid characteristics subsection. His second 
proposition implies that acquirer performance is related to the announcement 
returns of previous acquisition experiences. Although, as he explains, this 
measure taps the market’s view that the acquisition has resulted in a small mistake 
and acquiring managers may not share that view. He argues that firm managers 
are likely to follow the market’s reaction to their acquisition announcements and 
thus such reactions may affect managers’ views about acquisition performance. 
Therefore, this will be the second variable.   
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The third finding of Hayward’s study is a non-linear relationship between the 
time-lag of the focal acquisition and the last acquisition activity of acquirers and 
their performance. However, his investigation is limited to abnormal stock returns 
one year after the announcement of an acquisition. On the other hand, this current 
study will contribute to the explanations, investigating the impact of these 
variables on long-term performance of acquirers.  
Board size 
Cheng (2008), suggests that corporate performance variability and the frequency 
of acquisition activity of a firm are negatively associated with board size. His 
results imply that firms with larger boards undertake less risky activities such as 
acquisitions. Hence they tend to have less variation (risk) in returns. Another 
implication might be that firms with larger boards make acquisitions that are more 
likely to create wealth for stockholders and they avoid risky acquisition activities. 
On this ground, a relationship is expected between acquisition success and board 
size of a firm. Carline et al. (2009) argue that corporate governance characteristics 
of acquiring firms  such as board ownership, board size, and block-holder control 
have an economically and statistically significant impact on operating 
performance changes following mergers. 
Executive compensation  
Consistent with the agency problem hypothesis, prior research finds that equity-
based executive compensation is positively correlated with acquisition returns. 
Datta et al. (2001) examine how executive compensation structure determines 
corporate acquisition decisions. They find a strong positive relation between 
acquiring managers’ equity-based compensation and announcement and post-
completion returns of acquirers. They also find that compared to managers whose 
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compensation contracts are less equity based, managers with equity-based 
compensation contracts pay lower acquisition premiums, acquire targets with 
higher growth opportunities, and make acquisitions engendering larger increases 
in firm risk. 
2.4.2 Target Characteristics 
There are also a number of target characteristics that are likely to be related to 
returns from acquisitions. Public status of the target, and its historical and 
premerger performance are two factors that are investigated in previous studies 
Public versus private targets 
Prior research finds that acquirers of privately held targets outperform acquirers of 
private targets. A summary of findings of the studies comparing acquisition of 
public and private targets is provided in table 2.4-2. In an interesting study, Chang 
(1998) examines three hypotheses that are suggested to explain acquirer returns 
from taking over private targets with regard to method of payment: (1) the limited 
competition hypothesis; (2) the monitoring hypothesis; and (3) the information 
hypothesis.  
According to the limited competition hypothesis, if the acquisition market is 
competitive, the acquisition itself will be a zero net present value project. 
Therefore, acquiring firms will experience no abnormal stock returns when they 
pay cash for an acquisition. However, if the competition for privately held targets 
is limited, perhaps because of high information search costs, acquirers can 
experience positive stock returns because the likelihood of underpayment is high. 
Alternatively, acquirer returns can be positive when the acquisition creates 
acquirer-specific synergy gains. 
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The monitoring hypothesis suggests that acquiring privately held firms through 
common stock exchanges creates outside block-holders and increases value 
because these block-holders can serve as effective monitors of managerial 
performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). On the other hand, more concentrated 
ownership can be value destroying if it allows managerial entrenchment or makes 
takeovers more costly (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988b).  
The asymmetric information hypothesis suggests that offering stock payments in 
acquisition deals signals that the acquirer’s stocks are overvalued (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). According to this hypothesis, market reaction to acquisition 
announcement will be negative. However, in case of acquisition of privately held 
targets with a small number of shareholders, this problem can be mitigated 
through the disclosure of private information of acquiring firm’s managers to the 
target shareholders. The target shareholders assess the acquirer’s prospect 
carefully as they intend to hold a substantial amount of acquirer’s stocks after 
acquisition. Thus, when they decide to hold a large block of acquirer’s shares, this 
results in a positive reaction from the market and increases the stock price of the 
acquirer.   
Chang (1998) finds that, in contrast with the negative acquirer abnormal returns 
that are found for acquirers who acquire publicly traded firms, acquirers who 
takeover privately held targets experience positive abnormal returns. However, 
acquirers gain no abnormal returns in cash-paid acquisitions. Chang suggests that 
the positive wealth effect is related to better monitoring by target shareholders and 
decreased information asymmetries.  
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Table ‎2.4-2: Public versus private targets and acquirer abnormal performance 
Author(s) 
Sample Method Type of target 
Market Period 
Size 
Pub/Prv 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window Public Private 
(Moeller et al., 2004) US 1980-2004 2642/5583 CAR, Short (-1, +1) −1.02*** +1.49*** 
(Fuller et al., 2002) US 1990-2000 456/2060 CAR, Short (-2, +2) −1.0** +2.08*** 
(Chang, 1998) Stock 
Cash 
US, 
1981-1992 154/150 
101/131 
CAR, Short (-1, 0) −2.46*** 
−0.02 
+2.64*** 
+0.09 
(Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2006) Europe 1996-2001 735/3694 CAR, Short (-2, +2) -0.38 +1.48*** 
(Conn et al., 2005) UK 1984-00 705/3,615 CAR, short (-1, +1) −0.82*** 0.86*** 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal returns to acquirers of public and private target firms. Prior studies suggest that acquisitions 
of privately held firms are more profitable especially when the acquisition is paid by stocks. CAR: announcement cumulative abnormal 
returns. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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Premerger performance of target  
Historical performance of the target is one of the characteristics that are proposed 
to affect post-acquisition returns. Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) propose 
that acquisition abnormal returns are larger when targets have low Tobin’s Q 
ratios. Morck et al. (1990) find that announcement abnormal returns to the bidders 
are negatively correlated with pre-announcement performance of the targets in 
non-banking industries. Likewise, DeLong (2001) finds that abnormal 
performance of acquirer upon announcement decreases in the pre-merger 
performance of target, in the banking industry.  
2.4.3 Bid Characteristics 
The relationship between post-completion performance and bid characteristics has 
been investigated by a number of researchers. Method of payment, mode, industry 
relatedness of acquirer and target, domesticity, cultural compatibility, and level of 
rivalry between acquirers of a bid are some of the variables that are likely to be 
related to post-completion performance of acquirers. 
Stock versus cash versus mix payment 
Method of payment is often mentioned as a factor that affects market reaction to 
an acquisition announcement. Table 2.4-3 gives a summary of the findings of 
prior studies concerning method of payment and acquisition returns. There are 
three methods of payment for acquisitions: (1) cash, (2) equity, and (3) mixed 
cash and equity. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) discuss two hypotheses 
regarding the method of financing. First, target stockholders would prefer stock 
because cash acquisitions create an immediate tax liability for them, while stock 
payments are taxable only when they are redeemed. Second, the information 
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asymmetries hypothesis suggests that acquirers who use stock to purchase a target 
are signalling to the market that their stock is overvalued. Hence, their stock price 
declines around announcement of the acquisition. In contrast, stockholders of 
targets who know their stock is undervalued prefer payment in stock rather than 
cash so they may enjoy the benefits of corrected valuation. While theory offers 
several conflicting interpretations of the choice of financing, empirical evidence 
by Amihud et al. (1990) and Travlos (1987), among others, shows that acquirers 
who pay in cash earn significantly more than those who choose stock payments.  
Aside from that, a number of studies investigate such a relationship in the long-
term (e.g. Linn & Switzer, 2001). A recent study Savor and Lu (2009) proposes a 
31.2% abnormal return for successful stock acquirers compared to a benchmark 
portfolio of unsuccessful acquirers. Their results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that stock-financed acquirers create value for their long-term 
shareholders. Acquirers can also use their overvalued equity to purchase hard 
assets of the target at an effective discount.  
Stock financed mergers, from an acquirer point of view, are in fact two corporate 
events occurring simultaneously: a merger and an equity issue. Therefore, the 
value changes cannot be interpreted as pure merger effects. Prior studies suggest 
that equity issues are associated with negative abnormal returns of about -2 to -3 
per cent around the announcement day. An explanation is that by issuing equity, 
mangers signal to the market that the stocks of their firms are overvalued. 
Consequently, investors adjust for the equity issue news and the stock price 
declines (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Hence, it is essential to consider the equity 
issue effect in the analysis of acquisition returns. In fact, prior empirical studies 
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suggest that negative market reaction to acquisitions is limited to acquirers who 
finance the takeover with stock. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that managers of overvalued acquirers use 
their stock to acquire relatively less overvalued targets to benefit their 
shareholders. They conclude that the decline in long-term performance of 
acquirers who use stock is because they are initially overvalued, not due to their 
bad performance after acquisition. However, Lehn and Zhao (2006) find no 
significant relationship between method of payment and the probability of CEO 
turnover of unsuccessful acquirers. They argue that stock acquisitions with 
negative long-term returns destroy value because whether managers use stock or 
cash as the medium of exchange to take over a target firm, they are equally likely 
to lose their jobs after acquisition if they make negative returns.  
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Table ‎2.4-3: Method of payment and acquirer abnormal performance 
Author(s) 
Sample Method Method of payment 
Market Period 
Size 
C/S/M 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window Stock Cash Mixed 
(Travlos, 1987) US, M 1972-1981 60/100 CAR (MM), 
Short 
(-10, +10) −1.6 −0.13  
(Uysal, 2011) US, 3M 1990-2007 7814 CAR, Short (-1, +1) 0.008** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
(Savor & Lu, 2009) US 1978-2003 1000/926 CAR, short 
 
BHAR,  Long 
 
CT-FF3, Long 
 
(-1, +1) 
 
(-1, +250) 
(-1, +500) 
(-1, +750) 
(0, 12) 
(0, 24) 
(0, 36) 
−3.3*** 
 
−7.0*** 
−9.8*** 
−13.1*** 
−0.2 
−0.4*** 
−0.4*** 
 
0.3 
 
3.0* 
3.0 
1.6 
0.2 
0.0 
−0.1 
 
(Dong et al., 2006) US 1964-1982 34/92/56 CAR (0, +20) +3.86*** +0.87 +2.10*** 
(Franks et al., 1991) US 1975-1984 128/156/114 CAR, Short (-5, +5) −3.15*** +0.83 −1.18 
(Leeth & Borg, 2000) US 1919-1930 156/41 CAR, Short (-1, CD) −1.12 +2.47  
(Chang, 1998) Public targets 
Privet targets 
US, 
1981-1992 
 
154/101 
150/131 
CAR, Short (-1, 0) −2.46*** 
+2.64*** 
−0.02 
+0.09 
 
(Loughran & Vijh, 1997) US 1970-1989 405/314/228 BHAR (+1, +60) −24.2*** 18.5 −9.6 
(Gregory, 1997) US 1984-92 333/84/35 CAR  (A, +24) −19.23*** −9.8** −4.17 
(Kang et al., 2000) Japan 1977-1993 95/59 CAR, Short (-1, 0) +1.0**  +1.4* 
(Kohers & Kohers, 2000) US, High Tech  1987-1996 673/961 CAR, Short (0, +1) +1.09*** +1.37***  
(Datta et al., 2001) US 1993-1998 337/1382 
125/360 
CAR 
BHAR 
(-1, 0) 
(0, +36) 
N/A 
NA 
+0.52*** 
−18.82* 
−0.10 
−6.00* 
(Non cash) 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
83 
 
Author(s) 
Sample Method Method of payment 
Market Period 
Size 
C/S/M 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window Stock Cash Mixed 
(Moeller et al., 2004) US 1980-2004 2958/4862/4203 CAR, Short (-1, +1) +0.15*** +1.38*** +1.45*** 
(Faccio et al., 2006) Public targets 
Privet targets 
Europe 
1996-2001 189/436/110 
201/2876/617 
CAR (-2, +2) −1.81** 
+3.90*** 
+0.30 
+1.17*** 
−0.66 
+2.14*** 
(Goergen & Renneboog, 2004) Europe 1993-2001 33/86/23 CAR (-2, +2) +2.57*** +0.90* +0.22 
(Andrade et al., 2001b) US 1973-1998 2194/1494 CAR (-1, +1) −1.5*** NA +0.4  
Non-stock 
(Franks, Harris, & Mayer, 1988) US  
UK 
1955-1984 392/127 
207/221 
CAAR, long (+1, +24) −1.8** 
−9.4 
−3.6 
+1.75** 
 
(Conn et al., 2005) UK 1984-00 2,273/1,958 CAR, Short 
CALT 
(-1, +1) 
(+1, +36) 
NA 
NA 
0.53*** 
−0.25 
0.63*** 
−0.19 
Non-cash 
(Linn & Switzer, 2001) US 1967-87 152/211/50 IAOCF/MVA (+1Y, +5Y) 0.77 3.14*** 2.03 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal returns and the method of payment. Prior studies suggest contradictory evidence about the relationship 
between acquisition returns and the method of payment in acquisition deals, the findings are different across samples from different markets and different 
periods. CALT: calendar-time portfolios, BHAR: buy and hold abnormal returns, CAAR, long-term cumulative abnormal returns. IAOCF: industry adjusted 
operating cash-flows, MVA: market value of assets, CD: completion date. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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Tender offers versus mergers  
The other deal characteristic that is likely to affect the post-completion performance of 
acquirers is whether the acquisition is a merger or a tender offer. Table 2.4-4 reports a 
summary of results of previous studies on the difference between tender offers and 
mergers in terms of acquirer returns. Most studies find that tender offers outperform 
mergers. 
Friendly versus hostile 
Mode acquisition and its impact on acquirer performance is another deal characteristic 
that has been investigated in prior research; i.e. whether an acquisition is friendly or 
hostile. In recent decades, most acquisitions have been negotiated mergers. However, a 
number of tender offers are announced and completed every year. Table 2.4-5 
summarises findings of prior research regarding the effect of the mode of acquisition on 
announcement and post-completion acquirer returns. Moreover, (Schwert, 2000) 
documents that hostile takeovers result in lower target valuations than those of average 
targets.  
(Schwert, 2000) examines the relationship between different measures of hostility and 
finds that that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from 
friendly deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part 
of the bargaining process. He also documents that the correlations among different 
measures of hostility are positive, but not high. He argues that the phrase “hostile 
takeover” has different meanings for different people, and thus, the ambiguities inherent 
in this classification should be understood and the term should be used carefully by 
researchers and professionals. 
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Table ‎2.4-4 Acquirer returns in mergers and tender offers 
Author(s) 
Sample Method Abnormal performance 
Market Period 
Size 
M/T 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window Merger 
Tender 
offer 
(Kohers, Kohers, & Kohers, 2007) US 1984-99 1239/332 CAR, short (-1, 0) −0.95 0.03 
(Datta et al., 2001) US 1993-1998 1577/142 
125/360 
CAR 
BHAR 
(-1, 0) 
(0, +36) 
−0.003*** 
−10.67*** 
−0.23 
6.20 
(Walker, 2000) US 1980-1996 278 CAR, Short (-2, +2) −1.3**  0.51 
(Loughran & Vijh, 1997) US 1970-1989 788/135 BHAR  (+1, +60) −15.9*** 43.0*  
(Loderer & Martin, 1990) US 1966-1984 1135/274 CAR, short (-5, 0) 0.99** 0.52** 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal returns to acquirers in mergers and tender offers. Prior studies suggest that tender offers 
typically outperform mergers. CAR: announcement cumulative abnormal returns, BHAR: buy and hold abnormal returns. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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Table ‎2.4-5 - Acquirer Returns in Friendly and hostile acquisitions  
Author(s) 
Sample Method 
Abnormal 
performance 
Market Period 
Size 
F/H 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window Friendly Hostile 
(Leeth & Borg, 2000) US 1919-1930 156/41 CAR, Short (-1, CD) 0.38 −3.62 
(Schwert, 1996) US 1975-1991 959/564 CAR, Short (0, close) −3.4* 2.5 
(Servaes, 1991) US 1972-1987 307/77 CAR, short (0, close) −0.16 −4.71 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal returns to acquirers in mergers and tender offers. (Schwert, 2000) argues that the phrase 
“hostile takeover” has different meanings for different people, and thus, the ambiguities inherent in this classification should be 
understood and the term should be used carefully by researchers and professionals. CAR: announcement cumulative abnormal returns, 
CD: completion date. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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Focused versus Diversifying 
Diversification is another factor that has appealed to investigators as a factor that 
may affect the performance of acquirers. In theory, diversification may cause a 
co-insurance effect and reduce cash-flow volatility. This effect reduces cost of 
capital of the acquirer and creates value. On the other hand, if managers undertake 
diversifying acquisitions to reduce their personal risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981), they 
may sacrifice value of their firm and make value destroying takeovers. Consistent 
with this idea Morck et al. (1990) find that diversifying mergers are value 
destroying. Moreover, DeLong (2001) finds that bank mergers that are non-
diversifying create value, whereas diversifying mergers are value-destroying. 
Other prior empirical studies provide different and mixed evidence on the 
relationship between diversification and acquisition returns. While a number of 
researchers suggest a positive relationship between industrial relatedness and 
acquisition returns (e.g. Anand & Singh, 1997; Walker, 2000), some of them 
argue that related mergers do not outperform unrelated ones (e.g. Matsusaka, 
1993; Seth, 1990), and others suggest a nonlinear relationship (Gautam & Riitta, 
2001). A summary of findings of previous research on the effect of diversification 
on acquirer returns is provided in table 2.4-6. 
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Table ‎2.4-6: Diversification and acquirer abnormal performance 
Author(s) 
Sample Method Abnormal performance 
Market Period 
Size 
R/U 
Metric, 
Horizon 
Event 
window Related Unrelated 
(Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010) US 1950-2006 3472/1291 CAR, Short (-1, +1) −1.3*** −0.6*** 
(Doukas, Holmen, & Travlos, 2002) Sweden 1980-1995 46/46 CAR, Short (-5, +5) +2.74*** −2.37* 
(Bae et al., 2002) Korea 1981-1997 66/41 CAR, Short (-5, +5) +3.94*** +0.672 
(DeLong, 2001) US, 
Banking  
1988-1995 280 CAR, Short (-10, +1) +1.47*** −0.91** 
(Leeth & Borg, 2000) US 1919-1930 417/28 CAR, Short (-1, CD) +0.61 −2.30 
(Kang et al., 2000) Japan 1977-1993 104/50 CAR, Short (-1, 0) +1.4** +0.8 
(Hubbard & Palia, 1999) US 1961-1970 392 CAR, Short (-5, +5) +1.61*** +0.24 
(Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988a) US 1975-1979 
1980-1987 
34/120 
57/115 
CAR, Short (-2, +1) +1.54 
+2.88 
+0.23 
−4.09** 
(Eckbo, 1986) Canada 1964-4983 215/552 CAAR, long (+1, +12)  +0.60 +0.74** 
(Haugen & Udell, 1972) US 1961-1967 21/27 BHAR, long (0, +48)  +3.0 +6.6** 
(Gregory, 1997) US 1984-92 269/183 CAR, long  (0, +24) −12.19** −15.69*** 
(Agrawal et al., 1992) US 1955-87 79/686 CAR, long (+1, +60) −25.5*** −8.6 
This table summarises prior studies on abnormal returns to acquirers in diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions. Prior studies suggest the acquirers gain 
more in related acquisition in short-term. However, the results vary across samples and different methods of estimation in long-term. BHAR: buy and hold 
abnormal returns, CAR, long-term cumulative abnormal returns, CD: completion date, R: related mergers, U: unrelated mergers. 
*** 
significance at 1% level. 
** 
significance at 5% level. 
* 
significance at 10% level. 
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Domestic versus cross-border mergers 
A number of prior studies propose that cross-border acquisitions demonstrate 
different post-completion performance effects compared to domestic mergers. For 
instance, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005a) document that domestic US mergers 
have higher announcement returns than cross-border acquisitions by US acquirers. 
Moreover, Conn et al. (2005) find that domestic mergers outperform cross-border 
mergers both in announcement and  post-completion returns for UK acquirers. 
Moreover, some investigations provide evidence that the long-term performance 
of acquirers depends on specifications of the acquirer and target countries. 
Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) argue that the impact of cross-border mergers on 
firm performance varies, depending on the country affiliations of the two merging 
firms. They also find returns are inversely related to the degree of economic co-
movement between acquirer and target countries. Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005a) argue that acquirer returns are positively related to takeover activity in the 
target country and to a legal system offering better shareholder rights.  
Relative size of target to acquirer  
James and Wier (1987) find a positive relationship between relative size of the 
target to bidder and acquirer’s return in the banking industry. DeLong (2001) 
finds that the relative size of target to bidder is positively related to the 
announcement abnormal return of acquirer in the banking industry. In contrast, 
Gorton et al. (2009) argue that announcement returns to medium-sized acquirers 
decrease as the relative size of target-to-bidder increases. They also suggest a 
number of reasons for why we rarely see firms acquire larger rivals. First, a larger 
acquisition is more difficult to finance. Typically, it is more difficult to raise funds 
by issuing debt for a larger acquisition. Adding too much debt can extensively 
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increase the chance of financial distress, and managers of the acquirer avoid this 
because managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to lose their jobs 
(Gilson, 1989). On the other hand, acquiring a larger firm with stock dilutes the 
acquirer’s ownership of the combined company and perhaps leads to a loss of 
control for incumbent management.  
Termination fees and lockups 
A large number of merger agreements include a target termination fee or a lockup 
option clause. A target termination (or breakup) fee clause in an acquisition 
agreement requires the target to pay the bidder a fixed cash fee if the target denies 
completing the agreed acquisition. Lockup options (lockups) serve a similar role, 
but in a different form. That is, a selected bidder is granted a call option to 
purchase a portion of the target stocks or important assets at a discount off the 
price any competing bidder must pay. On the one hand, in the context of agency 
costs theory, entrenchment hypothesis presumes that self-interested target 
managers use termination fees to discourage competing bids and protect deals 
with one particular bidder in return for benefits such as job security, which 
consequently results in lower premiums for target shareholders. On the other 
hand, the shareholder interest hypothesis posits that the termination fees and 
lockups serve a less exploitative role as contractual devices that efficiently solve 
contracting problems between parties (Officer, 2003). For example, the bidder 
deals with the risk of exposing future plans to competing bidders who may offer a 
higher premium to the target if they get access to the plans of the first bidder. 
Therefore, target termination fees can protect a bidder’s investment and increase 
their willingness to invest in the acquisition.  
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Prior studies provide empirical evidence that, on average, acquisition contracts 
with termination-fees or a lockup option clause have a greater chance of 
succeeding and involve significantly higher premiums (Burch, 2001; Coates & 
Subramanian, 2000; Officer, 2003). Burch (2001) finds that bidders in deals with 
lockup options earn significantly lower announcement returns. However, he 
suggests that a significant lower return is not the case when the long-term post 
announcement performance for completed acquisitions by the bidder is 
considered. 
Termination fees and lockup options seem to discourage competition. However, it 
is also possible for them to benefit target shareholders. In other words, termination 
fees and lockups can increase target management's bargaining power when 
negotiating a deal with a bidder. For example, suppose bidder A owns no toehold 
in the target. If a bidder with a higher valuation appears, bidder A may have little 
incentive to compete. Because of this possibility, granting an exclusionary lockup 
option to bidder A can increase the joint gains to trade for the target and bidder A. 
By eliminating the possibility that bidder A will lose the target, the lockup option 
increases bidder A's ex ante expected value from signing the merger deal. This 
value improvement can in theory be split between the target and acquirer through 
the negotiation process. 
2.4.4 Industry Characteristics 
Despite the large number of studies on the relationship between corporate 
acquisition activity and acquirer performance, the role of the external 
environmental context, i.e. industry and macro-environment, on such a 
relationship remains underexplored (Wan & Yiu, 2009). However, as systems 
theory proposes, to have a complete model of investigation the impact of the 
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external environment should not be overlooked. Prior investigations provide 
evidence that appropriate timing of acquisition activity is associated with acquirer 
success. The extant literature suggests that acquisitions occur in waves (e.g. 
Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). Carow et al. (2004) argue 
that early-mover acquirers who can capitalise on their superior information in 
order to identify and/or act upon some initiatives to gain a head start over peer 
firms at the beginning of merger waves (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) 
capture significant advantages.  
Carow et al. (2004) also propose that early-mover acquirers who realize superior 
stock returns are those that conduct acquisitions during industry expansionary 
phases. In other words, the firms that undertake acquisitions during growth phases 
in an industry’s life cycle are more likely to improve their performance because of 
the market growth opportunities that appear in growth periods. On the other hand, 
a number of studies (e.g. Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997) suggest that firms operating 
in declining industries are more likely to undertake unrelated acquisition, which as 
Anand and Singh (1997) argue, are expected to underperform related acquisition. 
Hence, it can be postulated that post-completion performance of an acquirer is 
likely to be related to timing of an acquisition over the life cycle of the acquirer 
and target’s industries. 
Shahrur (2005) shows that industry concentration impacts total acquisition gains 
as measured by the combined wealth effects to the acquirer and target 
shareholders. Gorton et al. (2009) argue that profitability of acquisitions is 
positively correlated to the ratio of size of the largest firm in the industry to the 
size of the other firms in the industry. Andrade et al. (2001a) suggest that 
empirical research on mergers should attempt to control for industry shocks. 
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Moreover, several studies on merger returns focus on a particular industry. 
Investigating deals in a particular industry controls for industry-specific factors 
that could affect returns. For example, DeLong (2001) focuses on banking 
industry mergers to control for interest rate risk and other bank-related risks.  
2.4.5 Macro-Environment Characteristics 
The characteristics of target and acquirer’s macro-environments are also expected 
to affect the post-completion performance of acquisitions. Level of market 
activity, regulations and cultural differences are among factors that have a 
significant impact on returns from merger activities.   
High-market versus low-market 
Previous studies show that the acquisitions market is significantly more active 
when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. For example, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) show that level of market activity is correlated 
with the level of market valuation. Bouwman et al. (2009) find that acquirers who 
buy during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement 
returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those 
buying during low-valuation markets. Moreover, Rosen (2006) argues that firms 
announcing an acquisition during a hot acquisition market perform no better in the 
long-term and possibly worse than those announcing at other times.  
Regulatory system 
A sizable stream of research suggests that international variation in rules and 
regulations affects firm value (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 2002). Regulations not only influence the market for corporate control, 
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as discussed in section  2.3.1, but also affect acquisition premium (Palia, 1993) and 
therefore the division of returns between parties involved in the deal (Daines, 
2001).  
2.5 Summary 
The literature on mergers and acquisitions is extensive. Mergers are one of the 
most important corporate activities that significantly influence a wide variety of 
different stakeholder groups. In this section, the main findings and propositions of 
prior studies are reviewed in detail to create a complete picture of extant literature 
on mergers and acquisitions. This chapter comprises three sections in which 
merger waves, causes and consequences of acquisitions and determinants of 
acquisition performance are discussed.  
Main findings and propositions of previous studies in the area of mergers and 
acquisitions are: 
 Merger activity demonstrates a wavy pattern, i.e. mergers are clustered in 
industries through time. 
 The causes suggested for this fluctuating pattern include industry and 
economy-level shocks, mis-valuation, and managerial herding.  
 Market reaction to announcement of acquisitions is, on average, slightly 
negative for acquirer stocks and significantly positive for target stocks. 
The combined abnormal return is positive. These findings have been 
consistent over several decades of investigation. 
 The prior research also identifies a number of factors that are related to 
performance of acquisitions. These factors are categorised and reviewed 
in five different groups: (1) Acquirer characteristics, (2) Target 
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characteristics, (3) Bid characteristics, (4) Industry characteristics, and (5) 
Macro-environment characteristics 
The review of extant literature also illustrates a number of issues. Prior research is 
heavily biased towards gains to acquirers and factors that affect these gains. It is 
also biased towards finding sources of value creation through mergers despite the 
fact that several theories suggest that mergers can be value-destroying. In fact, 
value destruction is often attributed to managers’ self-interest (agency problem) 
and mistakes (hubris). However, the mechanisms through which mergers destroy 
value are rarely addressed. Aside from that, the possibility of simultaneous 
creation and destruction of value in acquisitions is not often considered. Finally, 
after several decades of investigation a key question is not completely answered 
yet: “what are the sources of value in mergers and acquisitions?” 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Model of the Study 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces a model for decomposing value effect of mergers. 
Subsequent chapters use this model to investigate the relative contribution of 
synergy gains and changes in rate of cost of capital on the total value effect of 
acquisitions. This chapter also provides theoretical discussions on how 
acquisitions affect WACC of the combined firm.  
3.2 Construction of the model 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that the value to an acquirer from 
acquiring an on-going concern can be expressed as the present value of 
the target's future cash-flows and the discounted growth opportunities the 
acquisition provides. As long as the expected rate of return on the growth 
opportunities is greater than the cost of capital, the acquisition creates 
value and should be undertaken. Conversely, when the expected rate of 
return on these growth opportunities is less than the cost of capital, the 
merged entity destroys value and the merger should not take place.  
Assuming that a firm has a very long life, the general form of the 
discounted cash-flow model can be written as: 
           ∑
    
(   ) 
 
           (3.2-1) 
Where:  
NPV = Net Present Value 
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t = Number of periods that      is discounted for 
T = Total number of periods 
c = Cost of capital  
Therefore, value of an acquirer before acquisition can be calculated as:   
            ∑
      
(    ) 
 
               (3.2-2) 
Where:  
                                                                    
   = Cost of capital of acquirer  
Net present value of target can be calculated as: 
            ∑
      
(    ) 
 
                 (3.2-3) 
Where:  
                                                                 
   = Cost of capital of target  
When acquiring a target, the acquirer’s payment as initial investment 
(      ) consists of current value of the target (     ) plus an 
acquisition premium (  ): 
                                    (3.2-4) 
The future cash flow of the merged firm for each period will be the sum 
of expected future cash-flows of the acquirer (      ), future expected 
Chapter 3 Theoretical Model  
98 
 
cash-flows of the target (      ), and also expected future cash-flows 
purely associated with the acquisition project (      ), for example, due 
to synergy effects. On the other hand, cost of capital of the acquirer is 
subject to change after completion of the deal. Thus, for accurate 
estimation of net present value, future cash-flows of the merged firm must 
be discounted at the new rate of WACC (  ). Therefore, net present value 
of the merged firm can be calculated as:  
            ∑
                     
(    ) 
                (3.2-5) 
Net present value of an acquisition deal (    ) can be calculated as post-
acquisition value of the merged firm (    ) minus pre-acquisition value 
of the acquirer: 
                                (3.2-6) 
Or
5
, 
     (∑
                     
(    ) 
 (    ∑
      
(    ) 
 
       ))  ∑
      
(    ) 
 
       
           (3.2-7) 
Rearranging equation (3.2-7) we have:  
     
(∑
       
(    ) 
       )  
(∑
      
(    ) 
 ∑
      
(    ) 
 
   )  (∑
       
(    ) 
     
 
   ∑
      
(    ) 
 
   )               (3.2-8) 
Combined value of an acquisition is sum of NPVD and MD: 
                                                 
5 For brevity        ∑  is written as ∑  hereafter. 
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(    ) 
 
   )   
           (3.2-9) 
Equation 9 shows that the combined value of a merger, i.e. sum of the 
value effects on acquirer and the target (        ) comprises three 
components: (1) merger benefits such as synergy gains (∑
       
(    ) 
 
   ); (2) 
the difference between pre- and post-merger present value of future cash-
flows of the acquirer (∑
      
(    ) 
 ∑
      
(    ) 
 
   
 
   ); and (3) the difference 
between pre- and post-merger present value of future cash flows of the 
target (∑
      
(    ) 
 
    ∑
      
(    ) 
 
   ). This model provides a novel 
framework for analysis of value creation through mergers and suggests 
variables and parameters that may affect the extent of impact of the deal 
on the combined value effect of the parties. The next section analyses the 
model. 
3.3 Implications of the model 
3.3.1 Synergy gains 
Synergy gains are reflected in the model as the component including all 
changes in future cash-flows of the combined firm that occur due to the 
acquisition. Prior studies suggest several sources for such changes. 
Operating cash-flows may increase due to increase in revenues or 
reduction in production and distribution costs. Theory suggests that this 
may occur either as a result of efficiency improvements or through 
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exercise of market power by the merged firm. However, an improvement 
in market power is not supported by most prior empirical research. 
Theory also suggests that efficiency improvements might be related to 
better post-merger governance or eliminating inefficient management. 
Wang and Xie (2009) find that synergy gains from acquisitions have a 
positive relationship with stronger acquirer’s shareholder rights relative to 
the target’s. They conclude that acquisition of firms with poor corporate 
governance by well-governed firms creates greater combined value.
6
   
Operating cash-flows can also improve because of economies in capital 
expenditure and decreases in working capital. Devos et al. (2009) show 
that these types of investment cutbacks have significant impact on 
operating synergies in mergers. Mergers can also improve future cash-
flows of the combined firm by offering new investment opportunities. 
Wang and Xie (2009) argue that when a bidder with good investment 
opportunities acquires a target with poor investment opportunities, the 
combination may create value because after the transaction, the target’s 
assets will be used to exploit the better investment opportunities available 
to the bidder. John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) suggest that better investor 
protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value 
enhancing investments. Their argument is consistent with findings of 
Wang and Xie (2009) regarding the difference between shareholder rights 
of the acquirer and the target in relation to acquisition synergies.  
                                                 
6
 Better governance can also reduce cost of capital. This issue is discussed in the next section 
3.3.2, “Mergers and cost of capital of the combined firm”.  
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Enhancement of operating cash-flows is especially important in the case 
of related mergers where merging firms are likely to enhance their 
combined operating income or reduce their operating costs through 
merging their operational activities. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) 
suggest that similarity and asset complementarity motivate mergers. 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) provide evidence that acquiring firms that 
offer asset complementarities, but are also different from rival firms in the 
industry, provide significant synergy gains. If present value of future 
cash-flows generated through such synergies is greater than zero then the 
merger is value creating, ceteris paribus. However, diversifying mergers 
are unlikely to reduce operating costs or enhance operating incomes 
significantly (Maquieira et al., 1998). Thus, in such mergers, this part of 
the model is negligible. In fact, it is not able to explain value creation 
through diversifying mergers, which were especially popular in 1960s, 
where findings of prior empirical studies show that the combined value 
effects of such mergers are positive as well and even greater (e.g. Bradley 
et al., 1988). If synergy gains cannot explain acquisition returns 
completely, then we need to question what the other possible sources of 
value in mergers are.  
3.3.2 Mergers and cost of capital of the combined firm 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) point out that leveraged takeovers in the 
1980s forced managers to recognize the cost of capital. They argue that it 
was no longer possible for managers to treat capital as costless because of 
the strong financial discipline imposed on them by the high amount of 
debt incurred in the leveraged takeovers during the 1980s. This situation 
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is in contrast with the perceived cost of capital in firms with a low degree 
of leverage. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) suggest that this change in 
perception of cost of capital motivated the creation of performance 
metrics like Economic Value Added (EVA) and Total Business Return 
(TBR), which measure returns net of the cost of capital. Managers are 
then monitored and compensated on the extent to which the return on 
capital exceeds the cost of capital.  
Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that financial motivations including 
underutilised tax shields, increased leverage, and other types of tax 
advantages can drive mergers. Hayn (1989) provides empirical evidence 
that shows tax attributes of target firms are significant in explaining 
abnormal returns. She finds that the amount of net operating loss which 
may be carried forward is the most important tax attribute in tax-free 
acquisitions during the period 1970-1985
7
. Recently, Devos et al. (2009) 
report that the interest tax shield accounts for 17% of synergy gains, 
realized in their sample of 246 large US mergers from 1980 to 2004.  
Prior studies focus on leverage and tax benefits of mergers. Using a 
related but different approach this study analyses the impact of 
acquisitions on components of WACC including leverage and interest tax 
shields. This research suggests that a tax shield is only one of the 
components of WACC that can be affected by merger activity. Mergers’ 
                                                 
7
 Tax Reform Act of 1986 strictly restricted the use of net operating loss carry-forwards in mergers 
which may partially explain the decline observed in combined abnormal returns of mergers 
reported by studies which investigate post-1986 samples as presented in table 1.1-1. 
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impact on WACC is complex and the aggregate impact may vary in 
different acquisitions. In this study WACC is defined as: 
     (   )               (10) 
Where  
c = weighted average cost of capital 
T = tax rate 
wd = weight of debt 
rd = cost of debt 
we = weight of equity 
rd = cost of equity 
Our model suggests that once an acquisition is completed, net present 
value of the combined firm is determined through discounting future 
cash-flows at the rate of WACC of the new combined entity. This new 
discount rate is different from WACC of the acquirer and the target. It can 
be affected by leverage ratio of the combined firm, the new tax rate 
applied to incomes of the firm, revised cost of debt and revised cost of 
equity. The current reasearch argues that these factors are subject to 
dramatic changes around mergers and can be very different from that of 
the merging firms, when it is determined for the resulting combined firm. 
Consequently, the appropriate discount rate of the discounted cash-flow 
model for the combined firm is different from the discount rates of the 
merging firms. This study specifically emphasises the influence of 
method of payment on WACC of the combined firm.  
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The magnitude of change in components of WACC may vary across 
acquisitions and depends on a number of decisions made by acquirers 
regarding the merger; mainly choice of target and method of payment. 
Target characteristics such as beta, size and leverage influence WACC of 
the combined firm. Ceteris paribus, acquiring riskier assets generally 
increases expected return on equity, and therefore cost of equity capital of 
the combined firm would be relatively higher than that of the acquirer. 
Size and leverage of the target firm in conjuction with method of payment 
affects size of the combined firm and its leverage. The larger the target, 
the greater either the size of the combined firm or its leverage. 
Consequently, cost of capital is affected because size and leverage are two 
determinants of WACC.   
Prior studies suggest that characteristics of the acquirer, industry and 
economy-wide conditions may affect choice of target and method of 
payment. For example, acquirers prefer targets with similar market-to-
book ratios as their own  (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson, 2008). Moreover, 
smaller firms and firms with lower levels of debt are more likely to be 
acquired (Garvey & Hanka, 1999). Besides, in choosing a target firm and 
planning method of payment, acquirers consider current variation from 
their target leverage (Harford et al., 2009; Uysal, 2011). García-Feijóo, 
Madura, and Ngo (2012) show that method of payment is affected by 
industry structure. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that stock 
payments are more common during high stock valuation periods 
(Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2001; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001).  
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These factors that influence acquirer decisions are related to WACC of 
the combined firm. Leverage is determined by weight of debt and weight 
of equity in the capital structure of a firm. Thus, it is affected by changes 
in either debt or equity. It increases (decreases) with the level of debt 
(equity) in the capital structure. According to the trade-off theory of 
capital structure, firms have target debt levels which are reached when 
they trade off tax benefits of debt financing against financial distress costs 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963) and agency costs of debt (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The current study argues that in the case of acquisitions, 
target leverage of the combined firm, where WACC is minimized, is not 
necessarily the same as target leverage of the acquirer. Since method of 
payment is the most effective tool in hand that can be used to adjust the 
capital structure of the combined firm, it takes an influential role in 
determining its WACC and therefore NPV of the acquisition.  
When acquisitions are paid by cash, their source of funding is usually 
either debt or internal financing.
8
 This method of payment retires equities 
of the target firm, and in cases that the source of cash is new debt replaces 
them with debt for the combined firm.
9
 As a result, leverage of the 
combined firm resides at a higher level compared to that of the acquirer. 
Stock-paid acquisitions have the opposite impact. They increase the 
portion of stocks in the combined firm’s capital structure. However, that 
does not necessarily mean that leverage of the combined firm is lower 
than the acquirer, because the combined firm will still have the debt of the 
                                                 
8
 According to the pecking order theory of capital structure (Myers & Majluf, 1984), firms first use 
their internal funds for new investments, then they use debt if sufficient internal funds are not 
available, and if neither internal funds nor debt were available at a reasonable cost, then they issue 
new equities.  
9
 Even when the source of cash funding is internal financing the reduced portion of equity in the 
capital structure of the combined firm increases the firms leverage.  
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target firm in its capital structure. In fact, the leverage ratio of the 
combined firm can be estimated as weighted average of leverage ratios of 
the acquirer and the target. The mix of payments by cash and stock can 
tune the impact that the method of payment has on the leverage of the 
firms. Harford et al. (2009) show that when planning large acquisitions, 
acquirers take into account their target leverage. When a bidder’s debt 
level is over its target level, the bidder is less likely to finance the 
acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with 
equity. Their finding supports the propositionregarding the role of method 
of payment when adjusting capital structure of the combined firm. 
Other components of WACC can also be affected by takeovers. Tax rates 
applied to corporate incomes can make a difference; especially in cases of 
cross-border mergers where tax rates may essentially vary from country 
to country and international double taxation increases the amount of tax 
applied to the combined firm’s income. For example, Huizinga and Voget 
(2009) show that the international tax system systematically affects the 
choice of parent country in cross-border mergers in a parent-subsidiary 
relationship framework. In fact, merging firms choose the parent entity in 
a way that minimizes their international double tax liabilities. Huizinga 
and Voget’s finding emphasizes the fact that tax considerations affect 
value of acquisitions, and therefore the decisions of acquirers.  
Another element of WACC that can be influenced by merger activity is 
cost of debt. Cost of debt is expected to increase with the level of debt as 
the credit rating of a firm downgrades with higher risk of default and 
potentially bankruptcy where the firm is unable to repay its debt to 
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creditors. That is, debt holders of firms with higher leverage expect higher 
yields. Therefore, if a merger drives the cost of debt beyond its optimum 
level, according to trade off theory of capital structure, an acquisition can 
be value destroying as it increases the cost of capital. Likewise, if it 
deleverages the combined firm in a way that pushes interest tax shields 
below the optimum point or increases agency costs of debt to points 
above the optimum point, it may destroy value as well. 
In addition, cost of equity capital, measured as expected return on equity, 
can be affected by risk factors, such as beta in the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM)  (Black, 1972; Da, Guo, & Jagannathan, 2012; Lintner, 
1965; Sharpe, 1964) and the size and book-to-market ratio (B/M) of a 
firm (Fama & French, 1992, 1993). Beta, as a measure of relative risk, is 
a conventional determinant of expected return, i.e. the higher the beta, the 
higher the expected return. Although, the validity of CAPM in estimation 
of expected returns on equity of firms has been criticized by several 
studies, Da et al. (2012) show that the empirical evidence against CAPM 
based on stock returns does not invalidate its use for estimating the cost of 
capital for projects when making capital budgeting decisions. A difficulty 
is that the beta of the combined firm is not immediately available on 
completion of a merger because historical data on its stock prices do not 
exist. However, it can be calculated as beta of a pseudo portfolio of the 
acquirer and the target, i.e. weighted average beta of the merged parties. 
This can range between betas of the acquirer and the target and typically 
tends to be similar to that of the acquirer due to its greater weight in the 
pseudo portfolio.  
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Size, or market value of equity, is another determinant of expected return. 
Generally, smaller firms are expected to provide greater returns. The size 
of the combined firm depends on size of the acquirer, size of the target, 
and also method of payment. Acquisitions, typically, increase the size of 
the acquirer. Thus, the return on equity of the combined firm is generally 
expected to be lower than that of the acquirer. In mixed acquisitions, 
where payment is made through a combination of cash and stock, ratio of 
cash-to-stock payment can be used as a tool to adjust the size of the 
combined firm. 
Book-to-market ratio (B/M) is the other factor that is suggested to explain 
expected return on a firm’s equity. Prior investigations suggest that firms 
with higher B/M typically have greater expected returns. B/M of the 
combined firm depends on B/M of the acquirer and target and also 
method of payment. In stock-paid acquisitions both book value and 
market value of the combined firm can be estimated as sum of the 
respective values of the acquirer and the target. Nevertheless, since B/M 
ratios of the parties are normally similar (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson, 
2008) significant differences in B/M between the acquirer and the 
combined firm are not expected in stock acquisitions. Similar to its effect 
on size, cash-stock combination determines B/M of the combined firm in 
mixed-paid acquisitions. 
3.3.3 Post-merger NPV of target’s cash-flows 
Another fact that has received even less attention is that when calculating 
NPV of mergers, future cash-flows of the target should be discounted at 
the rate of WACC of the acquirer once the acquisition is complete. If 
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WACC of the combined firm is greater than WACC of the target then the 
merger destroys value in this part of the model of this study. In contrast, 
when WACC of the combined firm is smaller than WACC of the target, 
the acquisition can be value-creating even in the absence of operating 
synergies and reduction in WACC of the acquirer. Here again, pre-merger 
size and leverage of the acquirer and the target, along with method of 
payment, determine the new appropriate discount rate for future cash-
flows of the acquired firm. Lower risk, larger size or lower B/M of the 
combined firm, compared to the target firm, results in lower cost of equity 
which in turn enhances the present value of future cash-flows of the 
target. Likewise, if the target is underleveraged and has unutilised debt 
capacity, a debt- financed acquisition can utilise this capacity and create 
value. Moreover, when the target firm is overleveraged, the acquirer can 
use stock or its cash reserves to retire part of the debt of the acquired firm, 
resulting in minimum cost of capital of the combined firm and value 
creation. In this sense, it is possible to create wealth through mergers even 
without generating synergistic cash-flows. The greater the difference 
between WACC of the combined firm and the target, the greater the value 
created in a merger through reallocation of capital. This is consistent with 
the neoclassical view of mergers which suggests mergers reallocate 
capital to value enhancing activities.  
Counter scenarios are also possible, perhaps due to the agency problem 
on the acquirer side, or because of mis-estimating the extent of value-
creation by the acquirer managers. For example, an incorrect combination 
of the medium of exchange, unsuitable sources for financing a takeover 
deal, or selecting a target firm with inappropriate size or leverage - 
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whatever the underlying motivation - destroys value. If these counter 
scenarios take place, the acquisition is expected to decrease the value of 
the prospect cash-flows of the acquired firm. This, in turn, results in lower 
total value of the acquisition.  
Improvement in quality of governance can also reduce cost of capital and 
result in higher valuation of the prospect cash-flows of the acquired firm. 
Thus, if the combined firm provides better governance than the acquired 
firm, and everything else being equal, we expect higher value for its 
future cash-flows as part of the cash-flows of the combined firm. Prior 
studies in this area investigate the effect of investor protection on the cost 
of capital (Castro, Clementi, & MacDonald, 2004; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 
2002). These studies suggest that better investor protection reduces cost 
of capital. In this sense, acquisition of firms located in countries with poor 
minority investor protection by firms from countries with strong investor 
protection decreases cost of capital and creates value. This value cannot 
be attributed to improvements in operating profits nor to lower cost of 
capital of the combined firm relative to the acquirer. Such value creations 
solely result from the difference between cost of capital of the combined 
firm and cost of capital of the target. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced a discounted cash-flow model that decomposes 
value effect of acquisitions into three components. While one of these 
components captures synergy gains from mergers, two others detect 
potential gains that may occur because of the difference between the 
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WACC of the combined firm and the WACC of the acquirer and the 
target. It is emphasised that in each given merger, the value of each of the 
components of the model can be positive or negative. In other words, 
value can be created or destroyed in each component of the model. 
Therefore, combined value effect of an acquisition, as a sum of these 
components, can be positive or negative. This implies that value creation 
and value destruction can take place simultaneously in an acquisition and 
the acquisition itself can be value-creating or value-destroying at the 
aggregate level.   
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Chapter 4 Data and Summary Statistics 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains how this study constructed a sample of acquisitions and 
collected data in order to empirically decompose the value effects of mergers and 
acquisitions based on the model introduced in chapter 3. The next subsection of 
this chapter explains how the study sample is constructed. Section 4.3 explains 
why analyst forecasts are used for estimating implied cost of equity capital of 
merging firms and synergies created through mergers. Section 4.4 provides 
information about sources of data. Section 4.5 provides summary statistics for the 
sample of this study. 
4.2 Sample 
The list of mergers and acquisitions completed between July 1981 and December 
2011 is drawn from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database, 
initially totaling 4223 acquisitions. The initial sample comprised completed 
domestic US acquisitions involving public companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and Nasdaq. From 
this list, the researcher identifies all completed domestic mergers during 1998–
2011 where: 
a) both merging firms are listed on Nasdaq, AMEX or NYSE,  
b) the acquirer takes over 100% of the target firm (partial acquisitions, sales 
of subsidiaries, etc. are excluded),  
c) the consideration offered includes cash, common or preferred stock, or 
debt, 
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d) value of the acquisition is at least $10 million, and 
e) the ratio of value of the deal to total book value of assets of the acquirer is 
greater than 10%. 
f) Stock price data and required financial data are available. 
This study excludes mergers in regulated industries such as utilities, financial 
services, and telecommunications, retaining 466 mergers involving industrial 
firms. It further requires that target, acquirer and the combined firm to be either 
zero-debt
10
 firms or have data for non-convertible corporate bond yields available 
on Datastream. This restriction limits the number of sample acquisitions to 74.  
This study chooses a sample of relatively recent acquisitions mainly because 
corporate bond yields are generally not available for the sample firms prior to 
1998. Finally, this study also require the firms to be followed by I/B/E/S. This 
results in a sample of 68 mergers.  
4.3 Using analyst forecasts for estimating implied cost of capital 
and synergies 
Three sources of data have primarily been used in prior research in order to 
estimate synergy gains from mergers: ex post realized data, management 
forecasts, and analyst forecasts. In these studies, ex post realized accounting data 
have been used to detect operating synergies generated in acquisitions. The 
studies often compare changes in operating performance of the acquiring firm to 
an industry benchmark to identify abnormal performance related to the 
acquisition. Extant literature raises two concerns about the accuracy of operating 
synergies estimated using this method. First, employing a long time series of 
                                                 
10
 We define a firm zero-debt if its market leverage is less than 0.01%.  
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financial data increases the likelihood that other factors have changed during this 
period, rendering the estimates noisy. The neoclassical theory of mergers suggests 
that mergers are often responses to significant changes, such as regulatory and 
technological changes in the industry conditions (Harford, 2005; Mitchell & 
Mulherin, 1996). These changes could trigger significant restructuring, and entry 
and exit of firms, exacerbating concerns about the appropriateness of benchmarks 
used to estimate abnormal operating performance several years into the future. For 
example, in case studies of two mergers, Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck (2000) 
provide evidence that traditional measures of operating performance may lead to 
incorrect inferences about the success of acquisition deals. Moreover, using ex 
post realized data to estimate operating synergies introduces a survivorship bias. 
Consistent with the literature of the market for corporate control, Mitchell and 
Lehn (1990) show that the firms that make value-destroying acquisitions are more 
likely to become the target of acquisition attempts. Hence, combined firms that 
emerge from value-creating mergers are more likely to survive. Since employing 
ex post realized accounting data requires the combined firm to survive for several 
years after the completion of the acquisition, presence of survivorship bias in such 
analyses is likely. 
Management forecasts are also used by a number of prior studies to estimate the 
synergy gains through mergers. These forecasts, however, tend to be biased 
according to the evidence provided by prior research. Two types of error may 
affect these forecasts. First, selection bias may affect inferences drawn from 
management forecasts because it is likely that management unveils detailed 
synergy forecasts only when they are expected to be significantly positive. 
Consistent with an optimistic bias in management forecasts, Houston, James, and 
Ryngaert (2001) report 3.15 per cent combined bidder and target abnormal 
Chapter 4 Data and Summary Statistics  
115 
 
announcement return for the 41 mergers where managers disclose precise 
estimates of cost savings and revenue enhancements related to the merger, 
compared to −0.48 per cent in the other 23 mergers in which no such information 
is disclosed. 
Second, using management forecasts could yield inaccurate synergy estimates if 
managers manipulate the estimations, using expected operating improvements that 
may already exist even in absence of the merger, to make the merger look better 
than it actually is. For example, in the case of the Chase Manhattan-Chemical 
Bank merger in 1995, $250 million of the forecasted $1.5 billion cost savings was 
attributed to cost-cutting programmes that were already underway (Houston et al., 
2001). Ismail (2011) finds that synergy does not explain the premium paid for 
mergers, implying that it may have been announced to persuade shareholders to 
agree with the deal. Devos et al. (2009) also find evidence consistent with 
management optimistic bias. They find that all the management forecasts of post-
merger incremental cash flows in their sample acquisitions were positive. 
However, they report that classifying mergers into value-enhancing and value-
destroying mergers based on Value Line synergy forecasts reveals that in value-
destroying mergers, management forecasts are significantly higher than Value 
Line forecasts in the years following mergers. Nevertheless, in value-enhancing 
mergers, they do not find a significant difference between Value Line and 
management forecasts. 
In addition to the errors that management forecasts are likely to cause, the 
forecasts typically provide aggregate predictions about merger synergies that are 
expected to be realized over a period of time. In such forecasts, details of 
Chapter 4 Data and Summary Statistics  
116 
 
individual synergy components and the timing of the synergy gains which are 
crucial for the purpose of this study are often not reported.  
In contrast, as Schwert (2000) suggests, the security analysts’ reaction to the 
acquisition announcement provides an unbiased assessment of acquisition effects 
by independent parties. Besides, analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S provide one-year 
and two-year forecasts for a complete set of variables that are required for 
estimation of the implied cost of equity capital and changes in forecasted cash-
flows. In addition, it provides an estimated long-term growth rate which enables 
us to estimate the required variables in the long term. These long-term estimates 
are especially necessary in calculation of terminal values of forecasted cash-flows. 
Analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S are also frequently used by extant literature for 
estimating the implied cost of equity capital. Therefore, I/B/E/S forecasts enable 
us to measure the timing and magnitude of all three components of combined 
value effect of acquisitions for the sample of this study. To analyse combined 
value effect of acquisitions, I compare the earnings forecasts and WACCs 
estimated using I/B/E/S forecasts for the individual acquiring and target firms in 
the month before the month of the acquisition announcement, with the first 
available forecasts for the combined firm in the month following the month of 
acquisition. The time gap between these forecasts is typically two months. This 
short gap in the timing of the forecasts minimizes the concerns regarding 
survivorship bias and extraneous noise associated with using a long time-series of 
realized cash flows.  
The model suggested in chapter 3 provides a theoretical basis for decomposition 
of value effects of mergers. For determining the contribution of each component 
of this model it is necessary to calculate the expected synergy gains as well as the 
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WACC of the target, the acquirer and the combined firm. In an efficient market, 
the stock price of a given firm is a precise estimation of the present value of 
expected future cash-flows of the firm, based on available information. Prior to 
the merger announcement, stock prices of both the acquirer and the target reflect 
the available information about their future cash-flows and their WACC. 
Combined abnormal return to the firms is measured as the weighted average of 
the abnormal returns to the merging firms, and is attributed to the announcement 
of the merger. Therefore, combined abnormal return is equal to the difference 
between present value of the combined forecasted cash-flows of the merging 
firms prior to the merger announcement and that of the combined firm subsequent 
to the announcement. I use forecasts immediately before and after the 
announcement, which are typically only two calendar months apart. This method 
minimizes the noise caused from other factors affecting the forecasts. 
4.4 Data 
SDC Platinum provides data on transaction value, method of payment, whether 
the deal was a tender-offer or not, and announcement and closing dates for 
mergers. Returns and financial data are from DataStream. I require firms to have 
book value, earnings, dividends and long-term debt, corporate bond yields, stock 
prices, and shares outstanding information available on DataStream. The expected 
future earnings of acquirers and targets are estimated from I/B/E/S analyst 
forecasts prior to the acquisition announcement. Expected cash-flows of the 
combined-firm are calculated from the analyst forecasts subsequent to the 
acquisition announcement.  
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Data required for estimation 
of the WACC and earnings of 
acquirer and target: 
1. Earnings forecast 
2. Stock prices 
3. Ltg 
4. Corporate bond yields 
 
Data required for estimation 
of the WACC and earnings of 
the combined firm: 
1. Earnings forecast 
2. Stock prices 
3. Ltg 
4. Corporate bond yields 
 
M
o
n
th
 t
a 
M
o
n
th
 t
a-
2
 
 M
o
n
th
 t
a-
1
 
 M
o
n
th
 t
a+
1
 
T
h
ir
d
 T
h
u
rs
d
a
y
 o
f 
m
o
n
th
 t
a-
1
 
T
h
ir
d
 T
h
u
rs
d
a
y
 o
f 
m
o
n
th
 t
a+
1
 
A
n
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
Figure ‎4.4-1 Measurements timeline 
 
  
  
 
119 
 
Figure 4.4-1 depicts the timing of data items calculated for estimation of 
components of the model of this study. Data items for estimation of forecasted 
earnings and corporate bond yields of acquirers and targets are collected on the 
third Thursday of the month preceding the month of acquisition. This includes 
stock prices, earnings forecasts, long-term growth rates (Ltg), and corporate bond 
yields. Moreover, Data items for estimation of forecasted earnings and corporate 
bond yields of combined firms are collected on the third Thursday of the month 
following the month of acquisition. 
I estimate implied cost of capital for stand-alone acquirer and target firms from 
the last available forecast before the acquisition. Moreover, implied cost of capital 
is estimated for the combined firm using a mean analyst forecast provided for the 
month subsequent to the month of the acquisition announcement. Implied costs of 
capital are estimated by substituting the forecasted earnings and book values into 
equation 5.3.1 and solving the resulting equation for re.  
4.5 Summary Statistics 
Although the sample size of this study is relatively small, it is well distributed 
across industries and time periods. The sample comprises mergers with acquirers 
from 24 Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. The target firms in the 
sample come from 26 different industries. The sample mergers are also well 
spread through the years of investigation - 1998 to 2011. Panel C of table 4.5-1 
reports distribution of sample mergers through time.  The first and last sub-period 
consists of four years, while two other sub-periods comprise three years each. The 
first sub-period (1998-2001) accounts for 25.7% of the sample and the second 
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sub-period accounts for 24.3% of the sample. Two other sub-periods account for 
29.7% and 20.3%, respectively. 
The mean transaction value in the sample of this study is about $6.3 billion. This 
mean value is greater than mean transaction value of other studies (e.g. Moeller et 
al., 2004), mainly because this study requires yield to maturity of sample merging 
firms to be available. This restriction drops mostly smaller acquisitions in which 
the acquirer or the target is not followed by DataStream’s Bonds and Convertibles 
database. Although the study sample mainly comprises large acquisitions, it also 
includes smaller acquisitions since the first quartile of transaction value is about 
$248 million. The mean market value of acquirers and targets calculated on the 
third Thursday of the month preceding the mergers month are $15.5 and $4.6 
billion, respectively. The liquidity ratio measured as cash and short-term 
investments over total assets is 29% for acquirers and 31% for targets.  
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Table ‎4.5-1 Summary Statistics  
Panel A: merging firms’ characteristics  
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 # of 
Observations 
Deal Value ($ 
million) 
6,337.874 1,447.515 248.741 4,732.713 
68 
Acquirer characteristics  
MV ($ million) 15,500 2,629.756 679.162 1,290 68 
Leverage (%)  
    (Ex. zero-
debt) 
22.78 19.03 7.21 35.43 
 
68 
Liquidity (%) 29.06 20.83 5.93 50.51 68 
BTM of equity 0.52 0.42 0.16 0.61 68 
Target characteristics  
MV ($ million) 4,678.197 913.121 164.736 4,194.273 68 
Leverage (%)  
    (Ex. zero-
debt) 
29.89 24.74 14.25 36.57 
 
68 
Liquidity (%) 31.41 22.41 4.20 53.14 68 
BTM of equity 0.59 0.37 0.20 0.69 68 
Liquidity is measured as cash and short-term investments over total assets. 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to common equity.  
 
Panel B: Characteristics of sample mergers 
 % Yes % No 
All-cash 27.9 72.1 
Diversifying merger 42.6 57.4 
Tender offer 10.8 89.2 
Zero-debt acquirer 35.3 64.7 
 
Panel C: Distribution of sample through period of investigation 
Period 1998-01 2002-04 2005-07 2008-11 
% in period 25.7 24.3 29.7 20.3 
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Book-to-market ratio (BTM) of equity is 0.52 for acquirers. This is comparable to 
0.55 and 0.50 bidders’ BTM of equity reported in Moeller et al. (2004) and Devos 
et al. (2009). Moreover, BTM of equity of the sample targets in this study is 0.59 
which is similar to 0.61 in the study by Devos et al. (2009). Mean leverage of 
non-zero-debt acquirers and targets are 22.8% and 29.9%, respectively. All-cash 
acquisitions account for 27.9 % of the sample while 72.1% of acquisitions in the 
sample of this study are paid by stocks or a mix of cash and stocks. Related 
mergers, identified based on a 4-digit SIC industry classification, account for 
57.4% of the sample. On the other hand, 42.6% of the sample of this study 
consists of diversifying acquisitions. An acquisition is defined as related when 
both acquirer and target firms are from same 4 digit SIC code industry, otherwise 
it is defined as diversifying. Furthermore, while 10.8% of acquisitions are tender 
offers, 89.2% of the sample are negotiated mergers. Finally, 38.2% of acquirers 
are zero-debt firms and 61.8% of acquirers are leveraged firms. This sample 
characteristic is different from samples in other studies on mergers and 
acquisitions, again mainly because of the unavailability of cost of debt for 
leveraged firms. This increases the relative proportion of mergers by zero-debt 
firms in the sample. The impacts of this observation on the results of this study are 
further discussed in empirical findings of chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 Research Method 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides details of the study method. In order to break down the 
combined value effect of an acquisition to its components, as suggested by the 
equation 3.2-9, synergy effects, and the WACCs of the acquirer, target and 
combined firm are all required. This chapter discusses how each of these 
elements, the three components of equation 3.2-9 and the total value of acquisition 
(TVA) are estimated. Factors that may affect TVA and its components, and the 
method of analysis are also discussed. Section 5.2 explains the method of 
calculation of synergy gains from mergers. Section 5.3 discusses the method of 
calculation of the WACC as a weighted average of cost of debt and cost of equity. 
Methods of estimation of cost of debt and cost of equity are also talked over in 
separate subsections. Furthermore, this section discusses differences between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer and the differences between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the target. Section 5.4 explains the method of 
calculation of the TVA and breaks down TVA into its comprising components. 
Section 5.5 discusses the factors that are likely to impact TVA and its components 
and provides details of the tests used to identify such impacts. Section 5.6 
discusses combined announcement abnormal returns and their relationship with 
TVA.  
First, synergy gains are calculated. Then the WACCs of the individual acquirer 
and target firms and the combined companies are estimated. The investigation 
shows that WACCs of the combined firms are significantly different from those of 
the acquirer and the target. Then, calculated synergy gains and estimated WACCs 
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are applied to equation 5.4-1 in order to estimate TVA for each sample 
acquisition. We also divide total value effect of acquisition into its components: 
earnings synergies, WACC synergies for the acquirer, and WACC synergies for 
the target. Then we examine the relationship between calculated TVAs and 
combined announcement returns of the merging firms. Finally, cross sectional 
tests are employed to explore the association of estimated TVAs and their 
components with firm and deal characteristics that are suggested to affect value of 
acquisitions.   
This study uses the mean I/B/E/S forecasts for stand-alone acquirer and target 
firms prior to the acquisition and forecasts for the combined firm in the month 
subsequent to the acquisition’ month in order to estimate changes in forecasted 
earnings that occur following an acquisition. These forecasts are also used to 
estimate the WACC of the firms prior and subsequent to acquisitions. Since 
I/B/E/S forecasts are typically one month apart, any change in the forecasts can be 
attributed to the impact of the acquisition. Although other factors that affect the 
forecasts may add noise, these noises should not make a bias when averaged 
across the sample (Devos et al., 2009). The forecasts are extracted for forecasted 
earnings per share (FEPS) of fiscal year 1 and fiscal year 2 and also for long-term 
growth rate (Ltg) from I/B/E/S. The values of FEPS are then estimated for the 
intervening years using long-term growth rates provided by I/B/E/S.  
5.2 Earnings forecasts changes subsequent to acquisitions 
There are three sets of forecasts for each acquisition, including two sets of 
forecasts prior to the acquisition for the acquirer and the target, and one set of 
forecasts for the combined firm subsequent to the acquisition. These sets of 
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forecasts are used to estimate changes in expected earnings following an 
acquisition from equation 5.2-1. Changes in expected earnings of each year 
(      ) are measured as the difference between the sum of forecasted earnings 
for the acquirer and the target before the acquisition (            )  and 
forecasted  earnings of the combined firm subsequent to the acquisition (     ), 
where the two analyst forecasts are two months apart.  Forecasted earnings (FE) 
of a firm are defined as the number of shares outstanding for that firm multiplied 
by their FEPS. FE of the combined firm is estimated as FE of portfolio of the 
acquirer and the target subsequent to an acquisition announcement.  
              – (            )                                                                         (5.2-1)  
Equation 3.2-9 suggests that the appropriate discount rate for the changes in 
expected cash-flows that take place because of the acquisition is the WACC of the 
combined firm rather than the WACC of the acquirer prior to the merger. 
Consistent with this notion, this study estimates the present value of such changes 
in cash-flows by using the WACC rate of the combined firm. The method for 
WACC estimation is discussed in section 5.3. 
5.3 WACC differences 
5.3.1 Details of calculation of weighted average cost of capital 
Examining the effect of WACC on the combined value of acquisitions is an 
important question of this study. In this study, WACC is calculated as a sum of 
weighted after-tax cost of debt and weighted cost of equity. Prior studies use 
corporate bond yields as a proxy for the cost of debt. Consistent with this idea, 
pre-acquisition cost of debt for the acquirer and the target is measured as the 
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weighted average of the yields on corporate debt issues prior to announcement of 
the acquisition where the weights are market values of the bonds. Similarly, post-
acquisition cost of debt of the combined firms is measured as the weighted 
average yields on a portfolio of acquirer and target debt issues subsequent to 
announcement of the acquisition.
11
 The cost of debt is then adjusted to an after-tax 
measure by multiplying it by (1- Tavg), where Tavg is the tax rate equal with 35%. 
Finally, this research follows recent literature on implied cost of capital to 
calculate the cost of equity. The details of calculation of implied cost of equity 
capital is provided in section 3.2.2 of chapter 3. 
The weight of each component of the WACC for both acquirer and target is 
calculated as the relative percentage of a firm’s capital structure; that is debt or 
equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to the year of merger announcement. 
Likewise, the weight of each cost of capital measure for the combined firm is 
calculated as the relative percentage of a firm’s capital structure - that is debt or 
equity at the end of the year of acquisition announcement. Specifically, for stand-
alone acquirer and target firms, firms’ debt is calculated as the level of long-term 
debt at the end of the year prior to the year of acquisition. Moreover, combined 
firms’ debt is calculated as the level of long-term debt at the end of the year of 
acquisition. Further, firms’ equity is calculated as the market value of equity at the 
end of the year prior to the year of acquisition for stand-alone target and acquirer 
firms, and combined firms’ equity as the market value of equity at the end of the 
year of acquisition. We then multiply the after-tax cost of debt estimate by the 
relative percentage of debt in the firm’s capital structure (i.e., firms’ debt divided 
by the sum of firms’ debt and equity). Similarly, we weight the cost of equity 
                                                 
11
 Credit ratings do not incorporate information that is priced by debt markets (Campbell et al., 
2012). Therefore, they are not appropriate proxies for cost of debt. 
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estimate by the relative percentage of equity in the firm’s capital structure (i.e., 
firms’ equity divided by the sum of firms’ debt and equity). 
5.3.2 Implied cost of equity capital 
Conventional methods of estimation of cost of capital use the CAPM and Fama 
and French (1992, 1993) three factor model (FF3F) and ex post realized returns to 
estimate the unobservable ex ante expected returns.  These methods are supported 
by the argument that in an efficient market where risk is priced appropriately, the 
average realized returns should be an unbiased estimator of ex ante expected 
returns. However, even in an efficient market, this argument is not necessarily 
correct. For example, Miller (1977) points out that in a market with heterogeneous 
expectations and short-selling constraints, ex post mean returns reflect the 
expectations of a minority of most optimistic investors about a stock, rather than 
the expectations of the average investor. In addition, empirical tests of the CAPM 
and FF3F show that these estimates of cost of capital are not accurate. Fama and 
French (1997) suggest that difficulties in identifying the right asset pricing model, 
imprecision in the estimates of factor loadings and inaccuracies in the estimates of 
factor risk premia are three potential problems that make the expected returns 
calculated by these models inaccurate.  
The case is even more complicated when these models are applied to estimate the 
cost of equity capital of the firms involving merger activities. The neoclassical 
theory of mergers suggests that industry shocks such as economic shocks, 
deregulations, and emergence of new technologies and new financing methods 
drive merger waves (Harford, 2005; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). These shocks 
make severe changes in the industry environment and consequently increase 
uncertainty (Duchin & Schmidt, 2012; Gort, 1969). Since the new business 
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environment is different from what is experienced previously, ex post realized risk 
factors are not precise estimators of corporate risk under new industry conditions. 
In addition, the combined firm may have different risk factors than those of the 
acquirer and the target. For example, beta, size and leverage of the combined firm 
are likely to be different from the relative factors of the acquirer and the target 
prior to the acquisition. These factors are not estimable for the combined firm 
based on ex post realized data because there is no historical data available for it. 
Hence, these abrupt changes in the risk factors make ex post estimates of cost of 
capital even more imprecise. 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) propose a method based on the residual income model for 
calculating implied cost of capital as an alternative solution. They argue that if the 
market consistently assigns a higher or lower discount rate to certain firms and 
industries, these relationships should be exploited to derive a cost of capital 
estimate for valuation and investment purposes. They also provide empirical 
evidence which supports this argument. An important advantage of this approach 
is that, in contrast with conventional asset pricing models, it does not rely on ex 
post realized returns.  This is especially important when investigating value 
effects of acquisitions where the cost of capital of the combined firm is not 
precisely estimable based on ex post return data due to the problems discussed in 
preceding paragraphs. In fact, this characteristic of the implied cost of capital 
approach resolves the problems faced when estimating the appropriate cost of 
capital at which the forecasted cash-flows of the firms should be discounted 
around mergers.  
Other researchers also suggest a variety of methods for estimating implied cost of 
capital. For example, Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) propose a 
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method for simultaneous calculation of implied cost of capital and the rate of 
growth that is implied by the market prices, book values and forecasts of earnings. 
However, evidence on the relationship between a firm’s risk, measured as its 
market beta, and implied cost of capital estimated by using different methods 
suggested in extant literature, is mixed. While a number of studies find a positive 
relationship between the implied cost of capital and market beta (Botosan, 1997; 
Easton & Monahan, 2005; Gode & Mohanram, 2003; Kaplan & Ruback, 1995), 
others report an insignificant relationship (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Lee, Ng, & 
Swaminathan, 2009). Still some other studies suggest that implied cost of capital 
is more closely related to stock return volatility than to beta. Botosan and Plumlee 
(2005) report that a number of implied cost of capital measures are significantly 
related to firm risk, while others are not. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) assess the 
usefulness of five measures of implied cost of capital based on their ability to 
capture the cross-sectional relation between expected returns and risk. They 
suggest that some of these measures are related to firm risk while others are not. 
Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008) undertake a similar approach and assess 
implied cost of capital based on its ability to detect the time series relation 
between expected returns and risk. They suggest that implied cost of capital   
measured by methods of either Gebhardt et al. (2001), or Easton et al. (2002), can 
effectively capture this relationship and therefore is “quite useful”. Based on these 
findings of prior studies this study mainly uses the method proposed by Gebhardt 
et al. (2001) to calculate implied cost of equity capital.  
5.3.3 Details of calculation of implied cost of equity capital 
This study uses I/B/E/S analyst forecasts to estimate the implied cost of equity 
capital (re) for acquirer and target prior to acquisition, and for the combined firm 
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subsequent to acquisition. Then these implied cost of equity measures are used to 
calculate WACCs of the acquirer, the target and the combined firm. Subsequently, 
these WACCs are used to estimate the impact of capital synergies and cash-flow 
synergies on the acquisition value effect. Moreover, the combined value effect of 
mergers is estimated as the sum of the abnormal returns to the acquirer and the 
target around the announcement of the acquisition. An OLS model is then used to 
estimate the significance of impact of each of these components on the combined 
value effect of acquisition.   
Pastor et al. (2008) show that implied cost of equity measures capture time 
variation in expected stock returns better than that ex post realized returns do. 
This study follows them and uses the Gebhardt et al. (2001) model to estimate 
implied cost of equity capital. The model equates market value of equity of the 
firm to its discounted future cash-flows. The implied cost of equity capital is the 
discount rate at which the present value of future cash-flows of the firm is equal 
with its current market value. This study follows Campbell, Dhaliwal, and 
Schwartz (2012) and uses analyst forecasts of firm's earning per share to estimate 
future cash-flows, and then solves equation (5.3-1) below for the discount rate, re.  
      
           
     
   
           
(    ) 
                                                (5.3-1) 
Where  
Pt = price per share of common stock, 
Bt = Book value at the end of year t divided by the number of common 
shares outstanding at the end of year t,  
re = the implied cost of equity 
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FROEt+i =  forecasted return on equity for year t + i. For years 1-3, this 
variable is equal to FEPSt+i /Bt+i−1. Beyond year 3, FROEt+i is a linear 
interpolation to the industry median ROE. Industry median ROE is defined 
as the moving median ROE for the prior 5–10 years for the firm’s industry 
(excluding loss firm-years). Industries are defined using the 48 
classifications in Fama and French (1997). 
Bt+i  = Bt+i-1 + FEPSt+i  ─ FDPSt+i, where FDPSt+i is the forecasted 
dividend per share for year t + i, estimated using the current dividend 
payout ratio (k). Specifically, we assume FDPSt+i = FEPSt+i ×k,  
For any Horizon T, the terminal value is calculated as: 
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                                             (5.3-2) 
The last I/B/E/S data available before the acquisition announcement is used to 
estimate implied cost of capital for a given acquirer or target firm. Besides, the 
first I/B/E/S data available after the acquisition announcement is used to estimate 
implied cost of equity for a given combined firm.  
This study follows Gebhardt et al. (2001) and estimates FROEs and future book 
values as follows. Earnings forecasts are extracted from I/B/E/S for the next three 
years. I/B/E/S analysts provide one-year-ahead (FROEt+1) and two-year-ahead 
(FROEt+2) EPS forecasts well as a long-term growth rate (Ltg). This study uses 
Ltg to estimate EPS forecast for the third year: FROEt+3= FROEt+2 (1+ Ltg). The 
mean of the analysts’ EPS and Ltg forecasts are used for the estimations in this 
study. Theses earnings forecasts are then used in conjunction with the dividend 
pay-out ratios to generate explicit forecasts of future book values and ROEs. A 
clean surplus accounting approach is used for this purpose where all gains and 
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losses influencing book value are included in earnings. On this basis, the change 
in book value from period to period is calculated as earnings minus net dividends 
(bt - bt-1 = NIt – Dt).  
To calculate future book values or free cash-flows, an estimate of the expected 
proportion of earnings that is paid out as dividends is required. This ratio is 
calculated as actual dividends from the most recent fiscal year divided by earnings 
over the same time period. 
12
 For firms experiencing negative earnings, the pay-
out ratio is estimated as dividends paid divided by 0.06 × total assets.  The pay-
out ratios of less than zero are assigned zero and those greater than one are 
assigned one. Future book values are then calculated as follows: Bt+1 = Bt + NIt+1 
× (1-k), where k is the dividend pay-out ratio. 
The discount rate estimated by using this method is my main measure of implied 
cost of equity capital. This discount rate is estimated for the acquirer and the 
target using market value and analyst forecasts prior to the acquisition 
announcement to calculate their implied cost of equity capital. Moreover, market 
value of the combined firm and its forecasted future cash-flows subsequent to 
announcement of the deal are used to estimate the implied cost of equity capital of 
the combined firm. These estimated measures are then used to calculate the 
relevant WACCs.  
5.3.4 The cost of debt of acquirers, targets, and combined firms 
The cost of debt of the acquirer is estimated as the weighted average of yields on a 
portfolio of bonds of the acquirer on the third Thursday of the month preceding 
the acquisition announcement, where the weights are market values of the bonds. 
Similarly, the cost of debt of the target is calculated as the weighted average of 
                                                 
12
 Share repurchases are excluded due to practical problems discussed in Gebhardt et al. (2001). 
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yields on a portfolio of bonds of the target on the third Thursday of the month 
preceding the merger announcement. The cost of debt of the combined firm is 
estimated as weighted average yield of a portfolio of bonds of the acquirer and the 
target on third Thursday of the month following month of a merger. Third 
Thursday of each month is the day on which I/B/E/S analyst forecasts are 
available. Yields from third Thursday of a month are used to assure that our 
measures of cost of debt and implied cost of equity are consistent.  
5.4 Measuring total value effect of acquisitions  
This study collects three sets of I/B/E/S forecasts for each sample acquisition, 
including two sets for pre-merger individual acquirer and target firms and one set 
of analyst forecasts for the combined firm. These forecasts are then used to 
estimate the implied cost of equity for each firm. The estimated implied cost of 
equity is used along with an up-to-date yield to maturity of long-term debt to 
calculate WACC of each firm as discussed in section 3.3 of chapter 3. 
Subsequently, net present value (NPV) of I/B/E/S forecasted earnings are 
calculated by discounting them at the rate of respective estimated WACC. Finally, 
equation 5.4-1 is used to calculate the total value effect of an acquisition (TVA): 
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)                                                                          (5.4-1) 
This research uses a 12-year time horizon for estimation of TVA and its 
components. Although using the last forecast reports for the merging firms prior 
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to the merger for value estimations is plausible, identifying appropriate forecast 
reports for the combined firm is not as straightforward.  The reason being it may 
take a few months for the merging firms to close a deal. The probability of factors 
other than the acquisition impacting on analyst forecasts increases with the time 
distance between the announcement date and the closing date of a merger. 
Therefore, post-completion analyst forecasts may become too noisy, being 
affected by industry-wide changes or other firm-level plans. On the other hand, 
first post-announcement analyst forecasts provide relatively precise estimations of 
expected changes in future cash-flows and cost of capital. Therefore, to minimise 
the noise when estimating value effects of mergers this study uses first post-
announcement analyst forecast for a portfolio of the acquirer and the target as a 
forecast for the combined firm. .   
5.5 Factors affecting the components of combined value of 
mergers 
Prior research suggests that a number of deal and firm characteristics influence 
abnormal returns of mergers. Main factors suggested by extant literature include 
method of payment (e.g. Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Moeller et al., 2004; Travlos, 
1987; Uysal, 2011), size of the acquirer (Moeller et al., 2004), relative size of the 
merging firms (DeLong, 2001; James & Wier, 1987), value of the deal (Moeller et 
al., 2005), B/M ratio of equity of the acquirer (Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; 
Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003), the industry-diversifying nature of the deal 
(Graham et al., 2002), whether the acquisition is domestic or cross-border 
(Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005b), level of leverage of the merging firms 
(Morellec & Zhdanov, 2008), whether the acquisition is a tender offer or a merger 
(Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Walker, 2000), level of bidding competition (Bradley et 
Chapter 5 Research Method 
 
135 
 
al., 1988; Limmack, 1993), bidder’s toehold (Betton & Eckbo, 2000), and 
termination fees and lockup contracts (Burch, 2001; Coates & Subramanian, 
2000; Officer, 2003). This study distinguishes between those firm and deal 
characteristics that can contribute to the TVA of acquisitions and those that 
determine how the generated TVA is divided between the parties. Our criterion 
for this separation of the factors is whether or not they can affect at least one of 
the components of TVA as are expressed in equation 5.4-1. This study further 
examines factors that are likely to affect TVA and look for variables that can 
explain TVA and/or its components. The impact of these factors on TVA and its 
three components are tested. If market reaction to an acquisition announcement is 
related to TVA, then one expects to find evidence consistent with the studies that 
investigate the impact of these factors on the abnormal acquisition returns.  
Other characteristics of acquisition deals that are known to be able to explain the 
division abnormal returns are not likely to have an impact on TVA as they are 
basically theoretical explanations for how an acquirer can take a bigger part of the 
TVA cake. For example, in a hostile multi-bidder acquisition it is likely that all 
generated TVA goes to the target firm as suggested by the perfectly competitive 
acquisition market hypothesis (Mandelker, 1974). In contrast, in a solo-bidder 
friendly merger, the acquirer may retain a considerable part of the TVA, 
especially if an agency problem is present on the sell-side.  
It is well documented that size, measured as market value of equity, book-to- 
market ratio of equity and leverage of a firm, explain a major part of expected 
returns on the firm’s debt and equity (Fama & French, 1992; 1993, among others). 
As is discussed in section 5.3.2, historical relationships between return and size or 
B/M of equity of the acquirer do not provide precise estimations of expected 
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returns of the combined firm because the characteristics of the combined firm can 
be severely different from those of the acquirer. However, size and B/M ratio of 
equity of the merging firms and the combined firm are related to TVA. These 
relationships are multidimensional and complex. Size of the merging companies 
may affect operating synergies from mergers, i.e. the larger the merging firms the 
greater the potential operating synergies, in presence of industry-relatedness, 
similarity and asset complementarity (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson, 2008). Besides, 
these factors determine cost of debt and cost of equity of the acquirer and the 
target. These measures of cost of capital along with leverage of these firms 
determine their WACCs.  
Aside from that, as discussed in chapter 3, the role of market value of equity (i.e. 
size) and leverage of the merging firms and method of payment in determining 
financial leverage of the combined firm is important. Moreover, size and book-to-
market ratio of the combined firm are two important determinants of cost of debt 
and cost of equity. These capital costs in combination with leverage of the 
combined firm determine the combined firm’s WACC. Finally, WACC of the 
combined firm and WACCs of the merging firms, in conjunction with operating 
synergies from an acquisition, determine TVA as calculated by equation 5.4-1.  
Value of transaction is also shown to explain acquisition returns (Moeller et al., 
2005). I decompose value of transaction into two parts: (a) pre-merger market 
value of equity (i.e. size) of the target, and (b) acquisition premium. These two 
parts of the transaction value impact leverage of the combined firm. Additionally, 
they are determinants of the size of target and size of the combined firm. These 
factors, in conjunction with other factors that have been discussed previously, 
ultimately determine TVA. Therefore, it is plausible to examine value components 
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of the deal as determinants of TVA. Figure 5.5-1 depicts how characteristics of an 
acquisition deal, such as method of payment, industry-relatedness and acquisition 
premium, along with firm characteristics, such as size, B/M of equity and 
leverage, can affect combined value effect of acquisitions. This discussion sheds 
light on the mechanisms through which acquisitions are affected by a number of 
factors that are distinguished by prior research.   
Industry related acquisitions can provide greater operating synergies through 
reduction of operating costs and improving efficiency. On the other hand, 
diversifying acquisitions may reduce cost of capital of the combined firm. Hann et 
al. (2013) find that diversified firms have a lower cost of capital than comparable 
portfolios of standalone firms. They also find that the reduction in cost of capital 
is strongly associated with the correlation of business unit cash-flows. Therefore, 
diversification can reduce cost of capital of the combined firm because acquiring 
target firms from other industries that provide imperfect cash-flow correlations 
with the acquirer’s industry, causes a “coinsurance effect”. Hence, related and 
diversifying acquisitions can be both potentially value-creating and value-
destroying. However, actual value effects will depend on the extent to which 
synergistic cash-flows and the WACC are affected by an acquisition deal.
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Figure ‎5.5-1 Factors influencing total value of acquisitions 
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5.6 Combined announcement returns 
We follow Bradley et al. (1988) and calculate combined acquisition return as the 
weighted average of announcement returns for the acquirer and the target. The 
announcement abnormal returns are calculated over a 21-day window using the 
market adjusted abnormal returns. We expect the level of corporate risk to be 
largely affected by the acquisition announcement. Hence, using a market model or 
the CAPM for estimating the abnormal returns will be spurious as these models 
are based on the historical data and are essentially insufficient for estimation of 
the expected returns. Although the choice of method does not significantly affect 
the results of the estimations (Brown & Warner, 1985), this study uses the simpler 
market adjusted returns method because it is not based on the historical returns of 
the acquirer or the target.  
5.7 Value-creating mergers versus overvalued stocks 
In the absence of payments by over-valued acquirer stocks we expect three 
components of equation 5.4-1 to explain total value effect of acquisitions. 
However, if, as the theory of market-driven mergers suggests, overvalued stocks 
are used as medium of exchange in acquisition deals, then we expect the 
relationship between TVA and combined abnormal returns to be weak.  
Stock-paid acquisitions that are undertaken by highly valued acquirers are more 
likely to be market-driven mergers (Devos et al., 2009). Therefore, this study 
identifies a merger as a market-driven acquisition (MDA) if at least 50% of value 
of the acquisition is paid by stocks and the acquirer’s BTM ratio is in the bottom 
one-third. Moreover, if combined market reaction to the merger announcement 
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reflects factors other than value creation, the relationship between the TVA and 
the combined abnormal returns is expected to be weaker for market-driven 
acquisitions.  
An ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used in this study in order to 
estimate the relationship between combined abnormal announcement returns 
(RTRN) and the TVA. The dependent variable in this regression is the combined 
abnormal announcement return. The explanatory variables are two interaction 
terms: TVA × MDA and TVA × NonMDA. TVA is estimated by equation 5.4-1. 
MDA takes the value of 1 for market-driven acquisitions and 0 for other 
acquisitions. Conversely, NonMDA takes the value of 1 for other acquisitions and 
0 for market-driven acquisitions. MDA and relative size (RelSize) are included as 
control variables. The variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to prevent 
distortions by outliers. 
5.8 Diversifying mergers and components of TVA 
This study also investigates whether the relationship between components of the 
TVA and abnormal announcement returns is different for related and diversifying 
acquisitions. As discussed in section 2.4.3 of chapter 2, diversifying mergers are 
expected to reduce the WACC because of a coinsurance effect that reduces risk of 
the combined firm compared to risks of stand-alone acquirer and target firms. 
Therefore, diversifying mergers are expected to demonstrate a stronger 
relationship with the components of TVA that capture differences between the 
WACC of the combined firm and those of the acquirer and target. An acquisition 
is classified as diversifying in this research when the acquirer and the target are 
not from the same Fama and French (1997) industry.  
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An OLS regression is used in order to estimate the relationship between combined 
abnormal announcement returns (RTRN) and the component of TVA that captures 
value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the 
acquirer. The dependent variable in this regression is the combined abnormal 
announcement return. The explanatory variables are two interaction terms: CAW 
× DIV and CAW × NonDIV. CAW is estimated as the change in present value of 
future earnings of the acquirer that takes place merely because of a change in the 
WACC and is a part of equation 5.4-1. DIV takes the value of 1 for diversifying 
acquisitions and zero for non-diversifying acquisitions. Conversely, NonDIV 
takes the value of 1 for non-diversifying acquisitions and 0 for diversifying 
acquisitions. DIV and relative size (RelSize) are included as control variables.  
Another OLS regression is employed to investigate the relationship between 
combined abnormal announcement returns and the component of TVA that 
captures value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm 
and the target firm. The dependent variable in this regression is again the 
combined abnormal announcement return (RTRN). The explanatory variables are 
two interaction terms: CTW × DIV and CTW × NonDIV. CTW is estimated as 
the change in present value of future earnings of the target that occurs purely 
because of a change in the WACC. CTW is a part of equation 5.4-1. DIV takes 
the value of 1 for diversifying acquisitions and 0 for non-diversifying acquisitions. 
On the contrary, NonDIV takes the value of 1 for non-diversifying acquisitions 
and 0 for diversifying acquisitions. Here again, DIV and relative size (RelSize) 
are included as control variables. In all regression estimates, the variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to prevent distortions by outliers. 
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5.9 Measuring cost of equity of merging firms and the combined 
firm using CAPM 
This study also uses CAPM to estimate an alternative cost of equity measure for 
acquirer, target and the combined firm and then repeats all univariate and 
multivariate analyses described above. The study further compares the results of 
two alternative methods of estimating the cost of equity to provide insights how 
analyses from analyst forecasts may differ from an asset pricing model that has 
roots in the finance literature. First, this study estimates 5-year beta of acquirer 
and target using monthly returns and S&P 500 Composite Index.  The beta of the 
combined firm is computed in three steps. First, the unlevered betas for acquirer 
and target are estimated using equation (5.9-1): 
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(5.9-1) 
Second, unlevered beta of the combined firm is estimated as weighted average of 
unlevered betas of acquirer and target using market value of equity of the firms on 
the third Thursday of the month preceding merger month as weights.  
Finally, this research uses debt to equity ratio for the combined firm to estimate 
levered beta, and the CAPM to estimate cost of capital for the combined firm. The 
debt to equity ratio of the combined firm is estimated as a sum of outstanding 
long-term debt of acquirer and target over their market value of equity. This study 
uses a 7% market risk premium in the calculations. 
 
Chapter 6 Empirical Findings  
  
 
143 
 
Chapter 6 Empirical findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports empirical findings of the study that are found using a sample 
set explained in chapter 4 and the methods that are discussed in chapter 5. This 
chapter discusses the findings in light of different theories discussed in chapter 2, 
the literature review. The findings are reported in a similar sequence to the 
material provided in the method section so that they can be followed seamlessly. 
Section 6.2 reports the findings about changes in earnings forecasts for acquirers 
and targets subsequent to acquisitions. Section 6.3 provides information about 
differences between WACC of combined firms, acquirers and targets. Further 
details about the cost of debt and cost of equity of merging firms are also provided 
in this section. Section 6.4 reports statistics for TVA and its components. In 
section 6.5, combined abnormal announcement returns are reported. Section 6.6 
investigates the relationship between the TVA and abnormal announcement 
returns for market-driven and non-market-driven acquisitions. Subsequently, 
section 6.7 investigates the relationship between the TVA and abnormal 
announcement returns for diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. Section 6.8 
provides results and estimations when the CAPM is used for calculating the cost 
of equity. Finally, section 6.9 reports the results of univariate and multivariate 
analysis on the factors affecting TVA and its components.  
6.2 Changes in earnings forecasts subsequent to acquisitions 
Table 6.2-1 reports analyst earnings forecasts and the changes in average forecasts 
subsequent to acquisitions. Column (1) of the table reports summary statistics for 
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acquirers. Besides, Column (2) provides statistics for target firms. Statistics of 
combined firms are reported in column 3. Finally, column (4) reports the 
difference between forecasts for the combined firms and a portfolio of the 
acquirer and the target prior to announcement of the acquisition. Table 6.2-1 is 
organised in three panels. Panel A provides statistics for fiscal year 1 average 
forecasted earnings, scaled by total assets of firms. Panel B reports statistics for 
fiscal year 2, average forecasted earnings scaled by total assets of firms. Lastly, 
panel C provides statistics of forecasted growth rates for sample firms in this 
study.  Mean, median, first quartile, third quartile and number of observations are 
reported in each panel. 
As shown in panel A of table 6.2-1, mean (median) forecasted earnings for fiscal 
year 1 scaled by total assets at the end of the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement is 9.0% (6.8%) for acquirers. Moreover, mean (median) forecasted 
earnings for fiscal year 1 scaled by total assets is 7.4% (3.7%) for target firms. In 
addition, combined firms have a mean (median) forecasted earnings scaled by 
total assets for fiscal year 1 equal with 8.4% (7.2%). Finally, percentage 
difference between forecasted earnings of the combined firm and those of a 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target is averaged as 6.0% (t=1.78) with a median 
equal to 0.5%. These findings show a significant increase in fiscal year 1 average 
analyst forecasts subsequent to announcement of acquisition.  
Panel B reports mean (median) fiscal year 2 forecasted earnings scaled by total 
assets as 10.6% (7.9%) for acquirers. Mean (median) fiscal year 2 forecast for 
target firms is 10.7% (5.7%) of their total assets and combined firms’ mean 
(median) forecasted earnings over total assets is 10.3% (8.5%). Finally, 
percentage difference between forecasted earnings of the combined firm and those 
of a portfolio of the acquirer and the target is averaged as 4.3% (t= 2.23) with a 
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median equal to 0.9%. These findings also show a significant increase in fiscal 
year 2 average analyst forecasts subsequent to announcement of acquisitions. 
Table ‎6.2-1 Analyst forecasts for acquirer, target, and combined firm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Acquirer Target 
Combined 
firm 
%Ϫ 
(3) , (1+2) 
Panel A: Fiscal year 1 forecasted earnings scaled by total assets 
Mean 8.9657*** 7.3958*** 8.3706*** 6.02* 
[t stat.] [8.39] [2.85] [8.50] [1.78] 
Median 6.7512 3.7084 7.1838 0.53 
Q1 3.8151 2.0231 3.5736 -1.82 
Q3 12.8010 9.8450 10.4494 9.51 
#of Observations 68 68 68 68 
Panel B: Fiscal year 2 forecasted earnings scaled by total assets 
Mean 10.6785*** 10.7288*** 10.2611*** 4.29** 
[t stat.] [8.57] [3.70] [8.83] [2.23] 
Median 7.9773 5.7061 8.5182 0.89 
Q1 5.3393 3.5484 4.7049 -1.42 
Q3 13.1926 11.5614 13.6333 8.63 
#of Observations 68 68 68 68 
Panel C: Forecasted long-term growth rate (Ltg) 
Mean 16.7390*** 16.6891*** 16.8438*** 2.72 
[t stat.] [10.45] [9.95] [10.69] [1.05] 
Median 14.5500 15.2850 14.8409 0.00 
Q1 10.0000 9.8750 11.1172 -3.61 
Q3 19.3300 18.6200 18.0000 3.13 
#of Observations 68 68 68 68 
This table reports analyst earnings forecasts and the changes in average forecasts 
subsequent to acquisitions. Column (1) of the table reports summary statistics for 
acquirers. Column (2) provides statistics for target firms. Statistics of combined firms are 
reported in column 3. Finally, column (4) reports the difference between forecasts for the 
combined firms and a portfolio of acquirer and target prior to announcement of the 
acquisition. The table is organised in three panels. Panel A provides statistics for fiscal 
year 1 average forecasted earnings scaled by total assets of firms. Panel B reports 
statistics for fiscal year 2 average forecasted earnings scaled by total assets of firms. 
Lastly, Panel C provides statistics of forecasted growth rates for sample firms of this 
study.   
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Forecasted Ltgs are reported in panel C of table 6.2-1. As reported in the table, 
mean (median) forecasted long-term growth rate for acquirers is 16.7% (14.6%). 
Moreover, mean (median) Ltg for target firms is 16.7.9% (15.3%). In addition, 
combined firms have a mean (median) of 16.8% (14.8%). Finally, percentage 
difference between forecasted Ltg of the combined firm and Ltg of a portfolio of 
the acquirer and the target is 2.7% (t= 1.05) on average, with a median equal with 
1.3%. Similar to those of forecasted earnings, these findings again show an 
increase in Ltg forecasts subsequent to announcement of acquisitions. However, 
this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
6.3 Differences in WACCs 
6.3.1 Cost of debt 
Table 6.3-1 reports findings of this study about cost of debt of firms involved in 
mergers. The results are reported for acquisitions in which the acquirer and the 
target are non-zero debt firms and for which corporate bond yields are available.
13
  
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Cost of debt of a larger sample of acquirers and targets were also investigated for robustness 
checks. Un-tabulated results provide similar evidence to those reported in table 6.3-1. However, 
since there were non-zero debt firms with non-available cost of debt, it was not possible to 
estimate acquisition effect on cost of debt accurately. Therefore, the results are reported only for 
acquisitions that have corporate bond yields available for the acquirer and the target.   
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Table ‎6.3-1 Cost of debt of firms involved in mergers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Acquirer Target 
Combined 
firm 
%Ϫ 
(3) , (1) 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (2) 
Mean 6.2282*** 7.2249*** 6.6817*** 5.85*** - 5.69** 
[t stat.] [24.34] [21.32] [24.22] [3.34] [-2.21] 
Median 6.0958 6.6547 6.3668 5.38 -6.61 
Q1 5.2506 6.1221 5.5583 -1.14 -11.73 
Q3 6.9969 8.7719 7.2729 12.82 -0.12 
#of observations 42 42 42 42 42 
This table reports findings about cost of debt of firms involved in mergers. Columns (1) 
and (2) of the table provide statistics about cost of debt of acquirers and target firms, 
respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for cost of debt of combined firms. In column 
(4) percentage difference between combined firm’s mean cost of debt and that of the 
acquirer prior to the merger is calculated. Similarly, in column (5) percentage difference 
between combined firm’s mean cost of debt and that of the target prior to the merger is 
calculated. While mean cost of debt of combined firms is 5.9% greater than acquirers, it 
is 5.7% smaller compared to the mean cost of debt of targets. Both differences are 
significant. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of the table provide statistics about cost of debt of acquirers 
and target firms, respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for cost of debt of 
combined firms. Column (4) reports the findings about the difference between 
cost of debt of combined firms and cost of debt of acquirers. Lastly, column (5) of 
the table provides findings regarding the difference between cost of debt of 
combined firms and cost of debt of target firms prior to announcement of 
acquisitions. Mean, median, first quartile, third quartile cost of debt and number 
of observations are reported in the table.  
As reported in table 6.3-1, mean (median) estimated cost of debt of sample 
acquirers is 6.2% (6.1%). Moreover, target firms have a mean (median) cost of 
debt equal with 7.2% (6.7%). Besides, average (median) cost of debt of combined 
firms is 6.7% (6.4%). In addition, the average difference between cost of debt of 
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combined firms and cost of debt of acquirers is a significant 5.9% (t = 3.34). This 
observation means that cost of debt of combined firms is on average 5.9% greater 
than the cost of acquirer’s debt before the acquisition announcement. . . The 
median of such a difference is 5.4%. Finally, the average difference between cost 
of debt of combined firms and cost of debt of target firms is a significant -5.7% (t 
= -2.21). This observation implies that cost of debt of combined firms is on 
average smaller than the target’s by 5.7% of target’s cost of debt prior to the 
acquisition announcement. The median of such a difference is -6.6%. 
6.3.2 Implied cost of equity 
Implied cost of equity is estimated for acquirers, targets and combined firms using 
the method explained in section 5.3.3 of chapter 5. The results of estimations are 
reported in table 6.3-2. Columns (1) and (2) of the table provide statistics for 
implied cost of equity of acquirers and target firms, respectively. Column (3) 
reports statistics for implied cost of capital of combined firms. Column (4) reports 
the findings about the difference between implied cost of capital of combined 
firms and cost of debt of acquirers. Lastly, column (5) provides findings regarding 
the difference between implied cost of equity of combined firms and implied cost 
of equity of target firms prior to announcement of acquisitions. Mean, median, 
first quartile, third quartile cost of equity and number of observations are reported 
in the table.  
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Table ‎6.3-2 Implied cost of equity of firms involved in mergers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Acquirer’s  Target’s  
Combined 
firm’s  
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (1) 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (2) 
Mean 9.4018 9.4077 8.9151 7.99 11.11 
[t stat.] [9.60] [10.54] [11.29] [1.53] [1.07] 
Median 8.1306 8.4735 7.4872 -3.80 -10.05 
Q1 4.8283 5.1030 4.8438 -12.23 -24.45 
Q3 12.5495 12.0468 14.7411 14.74 22.63 
# of observations 68 68 68 68 68 
This table reports findings regarding implied cost of equity of firms involved in mergers. 
Columns (1) and (2) of the table provide statistics about cost of equity of acquirers and 
target firms, respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for cost of equity of combined 
firms. In column (4) percentage difference between the combined firm’s mean cost of 
equity and that of the acquirer prior to the merger is calculated. Similarly, in column (5) 
percentage difference between the combined firm’s mean cost of equity and that of the 
target prior to the merger is calculated. The evidence shows that cost of equity of 
combined firms is 8.0% greater than cost of equity of acquirers, and 11.1 % greater than 
cost of equity of targets, on average.  
 
According to table 6.3-2, the mean (median) estimated cost of equity of sample 
acquirers is 9.4% (8.1%). Target firms have a mean (median) cost of equity equal 
to 9.4% (8.5%). The average (median) cost of equity of combined firms is 8.9% 
(7.5%). In addition, the average difference between cost of equity of combined 
firms and cost of equity of acquirers is 8.0% (t =1.53). This observation means 
that cost of equity of combined firms is on average 8.0% smaller than the cost of 
acquirer’s pre-announcement equity.  The median of such a difference is  
-3.8%. Finally, the average difference between cost of equity of combined firms 
and cost of equity of targets is 11.1% (t =1.07). This result implies that cost of 
equity of combined firms is on average greater than cost of equity of targets by 
11.1% of target’s cost of equity prior to announcement of the acquisition. The 
median of such a difference is -10.1%. 
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6.3.3 WACC 
This section provides findings of the current research regarding WACC 
estimations along with summary statistics for the WACC of acquirers, targets and 
combined firms. The results are reported in table 6.3-3. Columns (1) and (2) of the 
table provide summary statistics for the WACC of acquirers and targets, 
correspondingly. Column (3) reports statistics for combined firms’ WACC. Then, 
column (4) reports the percentage difference between the WACC of combined 
firms and acquirers, and column (5) provides statistics for the percentage 
difference between the WACC of combined firms and targets. Table 6.3-3 reports 
mean, median, first and third quartile WACC, and number of observations in each 
column.  
As reported in table 6.3-3, mean (median) WACC of acquirers is 8.9% (7.0%). 
Moreover, mean (median) WACC of targets is 8.9% (7.5%). Mean (median) 
WACC is 8.3% (6.7%) for combined firms. Average percentage difference 
between the WACC of combined firms and acquirers is 5.4% (t = 1.13). This 
observation implies that average WACC of combined firms is 5.4% greater than 
the acquirer’s pre-announcement average WACC. The median of this difference is 
-3.5%. In addition, mean percentage difference between the WACC of the target 
and the WACC of the acquirer is 6.2% (t = 0.79). This finding shows that mean 
WACC of the combined firm is 6.2% greater than the mean WACC of target 
firms. The median of this difference is -10.11%.  
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Table ‎6.3-3 WACCs of combined firms, acquirers and targets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Acquirer’s 
WACC 
Target’s 
WACC 
Combined 
firm’s 
WACC 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (1) 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (2) 
Mean 8.8569*** 8.8513*** 8.2842*** 5.44 6.16 
[t stat.] [9.29] [10.59] [10.86] [1.13] [0.79] 
Median 7.0406 7.5050 6.6764 -3.49 -10.11 
Q1 4.8283 4.8581 4.5516 -15.53 -22.66 
Q3 11.1578 12.0468 11.5368 14.41 17.22 
# of observations 68 68 68 68 68 
This table reports findings of this study regarding the WACC of acquirers, targets and 
combined firms. Columns (1) and (2) of the table provide statistics about the WACC of 
acquirer and target firms, respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for the WACC of 
combined firms. In column (4) percentage difference between combined firm’s WACC 
and that of the acquirer prior to the merger is calculated. Similarly, in column (5) 
percentage difference between combined firm’s WACC and the WACC of targets prior to 
the merger is calculated. The evidence suggests that WACC of combined firms is 5.4% 
greater than WACC of acquirers, and 6.2 % greater than WACC of targets, on average.  
6.4 Sources of value in acquisitions 
Results of the study regarding the TVA and its components are reported in table 
6.4-1. The first column provides summary statistics for the TVA in the sample of 
this study. The second column reports statistics for the component of the TVA 
that detects earnings synergies. The third column reports the effect of the 
difference between the WACC of combined firms and the WACC of acquirers on 
the TVA. Lastly, the fourth column reports the effect of the difference between 
the WACC of combined firms and the WACC of targets on the TVA. Table 6.4-1 
reports mean, median, first and third quartile value effects as well as the 
percentage of samples with positive value effects.  
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Table ‎6.4-1 Components of combined acquisition value effects 
 TVA Earnings 
synergies 
WACC 
synergies of 
acquirer 
WACC 
synergies of 
target 
Mean 3.7156 2.2141 0.9838 0.5178 
% of TVA 100% 59.5% 26.6% 13.9% 
[t stat.] [1.22] [0.96] [0.47] [0.75] 
Median 2.5718 0.2144 1.3681 0.6903 
Q1 -3.8822 -4.0325 -1.6952 -0. 6186 
Q3 10.7677 8.9634 4.0081 2.6515 
% > 0 63.2 51.4 60.3 57.8 
This table reports the results of the study regarding the TVA and its components. The first 
column provides summary statistics for the TVA in the sample of this study. The second 
column reports statistics for that component of the TVA that detects earnings synergies. 
The third column reports the effect of the difference between the WACC of combined 
firms and the WACC of acquirers on the TVA. Lastly, the fourth column reports the 
effect of the difference between the WACC of combined firms and the WACC of targets 
on the TVA. The table reports mean, median, t statistics, first and third quartile value 
effects as well as the percentage of samples with positive value effects.  
 
In table 6.4-1 the reported value effects are deflated by the combined pre-merger 
market value of equity of the merging firms. That is because larger firms are 
expected to create larger cash-flows and generate greater values. Moreover, the 
size of the cash flows can also influence the value effect of changes in the WACC, 
i.e. the greater the cash-flows, the greater the value effect by changing the WACC. 
Therefore, combinations of relatively larger firms are expected to cause relatively 
greater value effects, when stated in dollars. Hence, it is necessary to deflate the 
estimated value effects by size of the firms to be able to make an apple-to-apple 
comparison.  
As table 6.4-1 reports, mean TVA is equal with 3.7% (t=1.22) of market value of 
equity of merging firms, which is not significantly different from zero. Besides, 
median TVA is 2.6% where 63.2% of estimated TVAs are positive. The value 
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effect of earnings synergies is 2.2% (t = 0.96) on average which accounts for 
60.4% of mean TVA. Median value effect of synergy earnings is 0.2% and 51.4% 
of earning’s synergies are positive. In addition, the value effect of the difference 
between the WACC of the combined firm and the acquirer is 1.0% (t=0.47) on 
average, with a median of 1.4%. This result accounts for around 26.5% of average 
TVA. Finally, mean value effect of the difference between the WACC of 
combined firms and targets is 0.5% (t = 0.75) where the median of this effect is 
0.7%. This result accounts for around 13.9% of average TVA.  
6.5 Combined announcement abnormal returns  
Abnormal announcement returns of acquirers, targets and combined firms are 
reported in table 6.5-1. The first column of the table reports summary statistics for 
acquirer abnormal returns over a 21-day window around announcement of 
acquisitions in the study sample. The second column provides statistics for target 
abnormal returns over the same period. Finally, the third column reports 
combined abnormal returns. Table 6.5-1 reports mean, median, first and third 
quartile announcement abnormal returns as well as the number of observations. 
The results are consistent with findings of several prior studies. Table 6.5-1 
provides evidence of positive and significant abnormal returns for target firms. 
The average abnormal announcement returns for target firms is 19.45% (t =7.02). 
Moreover, mean abnormal return of acquirers is around zero. That is, acquirers 
gain 0.2% (t = 0.09) on average. The median of abnormal announcement returns is 
-0.6% and 16.2% for acquirers and targets, respectively. The average combined 
announcement return is a significant 4.5% (t = 2.73) and the median of combined 
abnormal returns is 4.4%.  
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Table ‎6.5-1 Announcement abnormal returns 
 Acquirer (%) Target (%) Combined (%) 
Mean 0.1625 19.4536*** 4.4556*** 
[t stat.] [0.09] [7.02] [2.73] 
Median -0.5863 16.1879 4.4373 
Q1 -8.5533 9.6215 -3.0562 
Q3 9.3611 30.7627 12.1280 
# of observations 68 68 68 
This table reports abnormal announcement returns of acquirers, targets and combined 
firms. The first column of the table reports summary statistics for acquirer abnormal 
returns over a 21-day window around announcement of acquisitions. The second column 
provides statistics for target abnormal returns over the same period. The third column 
reports combined abnormal returns. Mean, median, first and third quartile announcement 
abnormal returns as well as numbers of observations are reported. 
 
6.6 Value-creating mergers versus overvalued stocks 
This section reports the results of the regression model that is used to investigate 
the relationship between stock returns and the TVA for market-driven and non-
market-driven mergers. The method of regression analysis is discussed in section 
5.7 of chapter 5. Table 6.6-1 reports the intercept and coefficients of the 
regression model along with their t-statistics. R-squared and the number of 
observations are also reported. The coefficient β1 on TVA × MDA is -0.004 (t = -
0.44) and the coefficient β2 on TVA × NonMDA is an insignificant 0.004 (t = 0.04). 
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Table ‎6.6-1 Stock returns, the TVA and market-driven acquisitions 
 Coefficient t statistic 
intercept 0.125*** 4.51 
β1 -0.004** -0.44 
β2 0.004 0.04 
β3 -0.074* -2.30 
β4 -0.110** -2.68 
R
2 
0.28  
# of observations 68  
RTRN  = β1 × TVA × MDA + β2 × TVA × NonMDA + β3 × MDA + β4 × RelSize. 
An OLS regression is used to estimate the relationship between combined abnormal 
announcement returns (RTRN) and the TVA. The dependent variable in this regression is 
the combined abnormal announcement return. The explanatory variables are two 
interaction terms: TVA × MDA and TVA × NonMDA. TVA is estimated by equation 
5.4-1. MDA takes the value of 1 for market-driven acquisitions and zero for other 
acquisitions. Conversely, NonMDA takes the value of 1 for other acquisitions and 0 for 
market-driven acquisitions. MDA and relative size (RelSize) are included as control 
variables. The variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to prevent distortions by outliers. 
*Significance at 10% level.  
**Significance at 5% level. 
***Significance at 1% level. 
 
6.7 Diversifying mergers and the TVA 
The results reported in this section provide evidence from four regression models 
that investigate the relationships between combined announcement returns and the 
TVA for diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. Table 6.7-1 presents the 
findings of these regression analyses. In first column the intercept and coefficients 
of the first regression model are reported along with their t statistics.  
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Table ‎6.7-1 Stock returns, the TVA and diversifying acquisitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
TVA Earnings 
synergies 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
intercept 0.053 
[1.57] 
0.060 
[1.76] 
0.061 
[1.51] 
0.051 
[1.44] 
β1 0.183 
[1.54] 
0.157 
[1.32] 
0.800 
[0.29] 
-0.133 
[-0.56] 
β2 0.05 
[0.51] 
0.039 
[0.35] 
0.300 
[0.67] 
0.048 
[0.04] 
β3 0.045 
[1.37] 
0.038 
[1.16] 
0.034 
[1.01] 
0.043 
[1.25] 
β4 - 0.075* 
[-1.70] 
- 0.087* 
[-1.93] 
-0.083* 
[-1.81] 
-0.076* 
[-1.71] 
R
2 
0.17 0.13 .21 .23 
# of observations 68 68 68 68 
RTRN  = β1 × TVA × DIV + β2 × TVA × NonDIV + β3 × DIV + β4 × RelSize. 
Four OLS regressions are used to estimate the relationship between combined abnormal 
announcement returns (RTRN) and value effects of acquisitions. The dependent variable 
in these regressions is the combined abnormal announcement return. The explanatory 
variables in the first regression are two interaction terms: TVA × DIV and TVA × 
NonDIV. In three other regressions TVA is replaced by that regression’s respective 
component of TVA. TVA and its components are estimated by equation 5.4-1. DIV takes 
the value of 1 for diversifying acquisitions and zero for non-diversifying acquisitions. 
Conversely, NonDIV takes the value of 1 for non-diversifying acquisitions and 0 for 
diversifying acquisitions. DIV and relative size (RelSize) are included as control 
variables. The variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to prevent distortions by outliers. 
*Significance at 10% level. 
**Significance at 5% level. 
***Significance at 1% level. 
 
Column (2) reports the intercept and coefficients of a regression that investigates 
the relationship between abnormal announcement returns and earnings synergies 
from diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. Columns (3) and (4) provide 
findings about the relationship between abnormal announcement returns and the 
components of TVA that capture value effects due to differences between the 
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WACC of the combined firm and those of the acquirer and the target, 
respectively.  
In model (1), the coefficient β1 on TVA × DIV is an insignificant 0.18 (t = 1.54) 
and the coefficient β2 on TVA × NonDIV is an insignificant 0.05 (t = 0.51). In model 
(2) these coefficients are similar to those of model (1) perhaps because of the relatively 
large impact of earnings synergies on the TVA. In model (3), the coefficient β1 on TVA 
× DIV is an insignificant 0.80 (t = 0.29) and the coefficient β2 on TVA × NonDIV is 
an insignificant 0.3 (t = 0.67). Finally, in model (4) the coefficient β1 on TVA × DIV is 
an insignificant -0.13 (t = -0.56) and the coefficient β2 on TVA × NonDIV is an 
insignificant 0.05 (t = 0.04).  
6.8 Using CAPM for estimating cost of equity 
In order to check the robustness of the results reported in previous sections this 
study also estimates cost of equity for acquirers, targets and combined firms using 
CAPM. The results of estimations are reported in table 6.8-1. Columns (1) and (2) 
of the table provide statistics for implied cost of equity of acquirers and target 
firms, respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for implied cost of capital of 
combined firms and column (4) reports the findings regarding the difference 
between implied cost of capital of combined firms and cost of debt of acquirers. 
Lastly, column (5) of the table provides findings regarding the difference between 
implied cost of equity of combined firms and implied cost of equity of target firms 
prior to announcement of acquisitions. Mean, median, first quartile, third quartile 
cost of equity and the number of observations are reported.  
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Table ‎6.8-1 Cost of equity of the firms involved in mergers using the CAPM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Acquirer Target 
Combined 
firm 
%Ϫ 
(3) , (1) 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (2) 
Mean 10.9256*** 11.5927*** 10.1793*** 0.99 -4.16 
[t stat.] [11.11] [11.52] [12.60] [t=0.29] [t=-0.70] 
Median 9.5625 10.3631 9.8098 -3.52 - 10.79 
Q1 5.8482 6.1055 5.7379 -9.34 - 26.46 
Q3 15.4563 15.2383 13.6470 6.20 7.42 
# of Observations 68 68 68 68 68 
This table reports findings regarding implied cost of equity of firms involved in mergers. 
Column (1) and (2) of the table provide statistics about cost of equity of acquirers and 
target firms, respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for cost of equity of combined 
firms. In column (4) percentage difference between combined firm’s mean cost of equity 
and that of the acquirer prior to the merger is calculated. Similarly, in column (5) 
percentage difference between combined firm’s mean cost of equity and that of the target 
prior to the merger is calculated. The evidence shows that cost of equity of combined 
firms is 1.0% greater than cost of equity of acquirers, and 4.2% smaller than cost of 
equity of targets, on average.  
 
According to table 6.8-1, the mean (median) estimated cost of equity of sample 
acquirers is 10.9% (9.6%). Moreover, target firms have a mean (median) cost of 
equity equal with 11.6% (10.4%). Besides, average (median) cost of equity of 
combined firms is 10.2% (9.8%). In addition, the average difference between cost  
 
of equity of combined firms and cost of equity of acquirers is 1.0% (t =0.29). This 
observation means that cost of equity of combined firms is on average 1.0% 
greater than the cost of acquirer equity prior to announcement. The median of this 
difference is -3.5%. Finally, the average difference between cost of equity of 
combined firms and cost of equity of targets is -4.2% (t =-0.70). This result 
implies that cost of equity of combined firms is on average smaller than cost of 
equity of targets by -4.2% of acquirer’s cost of debt prior to announcement of the 
acquisition. The median of such a difference is -10.8%.  
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This section also re-estimates WACC for acquirers, targets and combined firms. 
The results are reported in table 6.6-2. Columns (1) and (2) of the table provide 
summary statistics for the WACC of acquirers and targets, correspondingly. 
Column (3) reports statistics for combined firms’ WACC.  
Then, column (4) reports the percentage difference between the WACC of 
combined firms and acquirers and column (5) provides statistics for the 
percentage difference between the WACC of combined firms and targets. Table 
6.6-2 reports mean, median, first and third quartile WACC, and number of 
observations in each column. 
As reported in table 6.8-2, mean (median) WACC of acquirers is 10.4% (8.0%). 
Moreover, mean (median) WACC of targets is 10.8% (8.8%). Mean (median) 
WACC is 9.5% (8.1%) for combined firms. The average percentage difference 
between the WACC of combined firms and acquirers is -1.7% (t = -0.57). This 
observation implies that average WACC of combined firms is smaller than 
average WACC of acquirers by 1.7% of acquirers’ WACC prior to announcement 
of acquisitions. The median of this difference is -3.8%. In addition, mean 
percentage difference between the WACC of the target and the WACC of the 
acquirer is -5.2% (t = -0.95). This finding shows that the mean WACC of the 
combined firm is 5.2% smaller than the mean WACC of target firms. The median 
of this difference is -10.11%.  
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Table ‎6.8-2 WACCs of combined firms, acquirers and targets using CAPM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Acquirer’s 
WACC 
Target’s 
WACC 
Combined 
firm’s 
WACC 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (1) 
%Ϫ 
 (3) , (2) 
Mean 10.3583*** 10.8329*** 9.5042*** - 1.71 -5.24 
[t stat.] [10.60] [11.18] [11.78] [-0.57] [-0.95] 
Median 7.9786 8.8099 8.0692 - 3.81 -10.11 
Q1 5.7655 5.5448 5.4497 -8.86 -26.53 
Q3 13.8760 14.2426 12.0282 6.20 8.80 
# of observations 68 68 68 68 68 
This table reports findings of this study regarding the WACC of acquirers, targets and 
combined firms. Column (1) and (2) of the table provide statistics about the WACC of 
acquirer and target firms, respectively. Column (3) reports statistics for the WACC of 
combined firms. In column (4) percentage difference between combined firm’s WACC 
and that of the acquirer prior to the merger is calculated. Similarly, in column (5) 
percentage difference between combined firm’s WACC and the WACC of targets prior to 
the merger is calculated. The evidence suggests that WACC of combined firms is 1.7% 
smaller than WACC of acquirers, and 5.2 % smaller than WACC of targets, on average.  
 
Table 6.8-3 gives the results of the TVA and its components when CAPM is used 
to estimate cost of equity. The first column provides summary statistics for the 
TVA in the sample of this study. The second column reports statistics for the 
component of the TVA that detects earnings synergies. The third column reports 
the effect of the difference between the WACC of combined firms and the WACC 
of acquirers on the TVA. 
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Table ‎6.8-3 TVA and its components when the CAPM is used for estimating 
cost of equity 
 TVA Earnings 
synergies 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
Mean 4.0649** 2.0038 1.7393** 0.3217 
% of TVA 100% 49.4% 43.5% 7.1% 
[t] [2.02] [0.79] [2.23] [0.40] 
Median 2.6302 0.2245 1.3684 0.8667 
Q1 -3.7148 -3.8448 -1.2839 -0.0472 
Q3 12.0676 8.6773 3.7843 2.5862 
% > 0 61.8 52.9  67.6 66.2 
This table reports the estimates of TVA and its components where the CAPM is used for 
estimating cost of equity. The value effects are deflated by the market value of equity of 
the respective firms in order to make an apple-to-apple comparison possible. The table 
reports the mean and median value effects along with respective t statistics and p-values. 
*Significance at 10% level. 
**Significance at 5% level. 
***Significance at 1% level. 
Lastly, the fourth column reports the effect of the difference between the WACC 
of combined firms and the WACC of targets on the TVA. Table 6.8-3 reports 
mean, median, first and third quartile value effects as well as the percentage of 
samples with positive value effects. As with the reasons explained in section 6.4 
regarding table 6.4-1, table 6.8-3 also reports the value effects are deflated by the 
combined pre-merger market value of equity of the merging firms.  
As table 6.8-3 also reports, mean TVA is equal with 4.1% (t=1.44) of market 
value of equity of merging firms. Median TVA is 2.6% where 61.8% of estimated 
TVAs are positive. The value effect of earnings synergies is 2.0% (t = 0.79) on 
average which accounts for 49.3% of mean TVA. Median value effect of synergy 
earnings is 0.22%, and 52.9% of earning’s synergies are positive. In addition, the 
value effect of the difference between the WACC of the combined firm and the 
acquirer is a significant 1.7% (t=2.23) on average with a median of 1.4. This 
Chapter 6 Empirical Findings 
 
162 
 
effect is economically significant and accounts for around 42.8% of average TVA. 
Finally, mean value effect of the difference between the WACC of combined 
firms and targets is 0.3% (t = 0.40) where the median of this effect is 0.9%. This 
value effect accounts for 7.9% of average TVA.  
Table 6.8-4 presents the results of the regression model that is used to investigate 
the relationship between stock returns and the TVA
14
 for market-driven and non-
market-driven mergers. The method of regression analysis is discussed in section 
5.7 of chapter 5 and the CAPM is used for estimating cost of equity.  
Table ‎6.8-4 Stock returns, the TVA and market-driven acquisitions CAPM 
 Coefficient t statistic 
intercept 0.112*** 3.78 
β1 0.124 0.93 
β2 0.012 0.12 
β3 -0.061* -1.80 
β4 -0.108** -2.43 
R
2 
0.16  
# of observations 68  
RTRN  = β1 × TVA × MDA + β2 × TVA × NonMDA + β3 × MDA + β4 × RelSize. 
An OLS regression is used to estimate the relationship between combined abnormal 
announcement returns (RTRN) and the TVA. The dependent variable in this regression is 
the combined abnormal announcement return. The explanatory variables are two 
interaction terms: TVA × MDA and TVA × NonMDA. TVA is estimated by equation 
5.4-1 where the CAPM is used for estimating cost of equity. MDA takes the value of 1 
for market-driven acquisitions and zero for other acquisitions. Conversely, NonMDA 
takes the value of 1 for other acquisitions and 0 for market-driven acquisitions. MDA and 
relative size (RelSize) are included as control variables. The variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99% to prevent distortions by outliers. 
*Significance at 10% level.  
**Significance at 5% level. 
***Significance at 1% level. 
 
                                                 
14
 I regressed combined abnormal returns on the TVA and its components. When the implied cost 
of equity method is used the coefficient is 0.1 (t =1.22) and when the CAPM is used for estimating 
the cost of equity the results do not show a significant correlation.  
Interestingly, when the CAPM is used, the correlation coefficient between the combined abnormal 
returns and the effect of WACCP-A is 0.65 ** (t= 2.08) which shows the market is aware of the 
value effect of the changes in the WACC. 
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Table ‎6.8-5 Stock returns, the TVA and diversifying acquisitions 
 
TVA Earnings 
synergies 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
intercept 0.044 
[1.24] 
0.048 
[1.76] 
0.048 
[1.45] 
0.049 
[1.36] 
β1 0.004 
[0.03] 
0.009 
[0.06] 
0.776** 
[2.36] 
-0.638** 
[-2.16] 
β2 0.146 
[1.16] 
0.144 
[1.08] 
0.180 
[0.28] 
1.092 
[0.92] 
β3 0.051 
[1.48] 
0.047 
[1.40] 
0.027 
[0.75] 
0.049 
[1.36] 
β4 - 0.079* 
[-1.79] 
- 0.080* 
[-1.77] 
-0.067* 
[-1.56] 
-0.095** 
[-2.20] 
R
2 
0.17 0.14 .22 .22 
# of observations 68 68 68 68 
RTRN  = β1 × TVA × DIV + β2 × TVA × NonDIV + β3 × DIV + β4 × RelSize. 
Four OLS regressions are used to estimate the relationship between combined abnormal 
announcement returns (RTRN) and value effects of acquisitions. The dependent variable 
in these regressions is the combined abnormal announcement return. The explanatory 
variables in the first regression are two interaction terms: TVA × DIV and TVA × 
NonDIV. In three other regressions TVA is replaced by that regression’s respective 
component of TVA. TVA and its components are estimated by equation 5.4-1 where the 
CAPM is for estimating cost of equity. DIV takes the value of 1 for diversifying 
acquisitions and zero for non-diversifying acquisitions. Conversely, NonDIV takes the 
value of 1 for non-diversifying acquisitions and 0 for diversifying acquisitions. DIV and 
relative size (RelSize) are included as control variables. The variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99% to prevent distortions by outliers. 
*Significance at 10% level. 
**Significance at 5% level. 
***Significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 6.8-4 reports the intercept and coefficients of the regression model along 
with their t statistics. R-squared and the number of observations are also reported. 
The coefficient β1 on TVA × MDA is 0.12 (t = 0.93) and the coefficient β2 on TVA 
× NonMDA is an insignificant 0.01 (t = 0.12). 
Table 6.8-5 presents the findings of these regression analyses that investigate the 
relationships between combined announcement returns and the TVA for 
diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. In the first column the intercept and 
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coefficients of the first regression model are reported along with their t- statistics. 
Column (2) reports the intercept and coefficients of a regression that investigates 
the relationship between abnormal announcement returns and earnings synergies 
from diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. Columns (3) and (4) provide 
findings about the relationship between abnormal announcement returns and the 
components of TVA that capture value effects due to differences between the 
WACC of the combined firm and those of the acquirer and the target, 
respectively. 
 
In model (1), the coefficient β1 on TVA × DIV is an insignificant 0.00 (t = 0.03) 
and the coefficient β2 on TVA × NonDIV is an insignificant 0.15 (t = 1.16). In model 
(2) these coefficients are similar to those of model (1). In model (3), the coefficient β1 
on TVA × DIV is a significant 0.77 (t = 2.36) and the coefficient β2 on TVA × 
NonDIV is an insignificant 0.18 (t = 0.28). These results suggest that value effects from 
lower cost of capital of the combined firm compared to the acquirer is a driving force 
behind diversifying acquisitions.  Finally, in model (4) the coefficient β1 on TVA × DIV 
is a significant -0.63 (t = -2.16) and the coefficient β2 on TVA × NonDIV is an 
insignificant 1.09 (t = 0.92).  
6.9 Factors affecting TVA 
6.9.1 Univariate analysis 
This section investigates the impacts of factors likely to affect value effects of 
mergers. The findings are presented in tables 6.9-1 and 6.9-2. The findings 
reported in these two tables are different in their methods of estimation of cost of 
equity. While table 6.9-1 reports estimations of value effects based on implied 
cost of equity, table 6.9-2 presents findings estimated by using CAPM for cost of 
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equity. The tables are organised identically, each comprising seven panels. Each 
panel reports mean value effects of two groups that are separated based on a factor 
that is likely to determine value effects of mergers. Differences between mean 
value effects of the groups are also reported. Specifically, panel A of each table 
reports the difference between value effects of diversifying and related 
acquisitions. Panel B reports the difference between mean value effects of cash 
and non-cash acquisitions. Panels C and D present differences between below and 
above median relative size and relative WACC of target to acquirer, respectively. 
Then panels E, F, and G report differences between average value effects of below 
and above median acquirer’s BTM of equity, leverage and liquidity, respectively. 
Four columns of the tables report TVA, earnings synergies, value effect of the 
difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer, and 
finally, value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm 
and the target.  
As reported in table 6.9-1, the difference between average TVA of related and 
diversifying mergers is 4.4% (t = 0.75). This difference for mean value effects of 
earnings synergies is 2.9% (t = 0.53), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is -1.0% 
(t = -0.51), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is 2.5% (t = 1.17). In addition, 
the difference between average TVA of cash and non-cash acquisitions is -3.0% (t 
= -0.35). This difference for mean value effect of earnings synergies is -8.2% (t = 
-1.10), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is 2.2% (t = 1.20), and for mean value 
effect of WACCP-G is 3.1% (t = 1.13). Besides, the difference between average 
TVA of acquisitions with below and above median relative size of the target to the 
acquirer is 0.24% (t = 0.04). This difference for mean value effects of earnings 
synergies is 5.05% (t = 0.86), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is -2.7% (t = -
0.03), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is -2.1% (t = -0.96). 
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Table ‎6.9-1 Factors affecting TVA 
 
TVA 
(%) 
Earnings 
synergies 
(%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
 (%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
 (%) 
Panel A: Diversifying versus related acquisitions 
Related (N = 29) 5.58 3.44 0.55 1.59 
[t stat.] [1.23] [0.74] [0.37] [1.06] 
Diversifying (N = 39) 1.17 0.54 1.58 -0.95 
[t stat.] [0.32] [0.18] [1.20] [-0.61] 
Difference 4.41 2.91 -1.03 2.53 
[t stat.] [0.75] [0.53] [-0.51] [1.17] 
Panel B: Cash versus non-cash acquisitions 
Cash (N = 19) 2.86 -0.18 1.61 1.42 
[t stat.] [1.00] [-0.06] [1.19] [1.26] 
Non-cash (N = 49) 5.83 8.10 -0.55 -1.71 
[t stat.] [0.73] [1.17] [-0.47] [-0.68] 
Difference -2.98 -8.27 2.16 3.14 
[t stat.] [-0.35] [-1.10] [1.20] [1.13] 
Panel C: Relative size 
<Median relative size (N = 34) 3.84 4.80 -0.40] -0.55 
[t stat.] [0.81] [1.19] [-0.28 [-0.34] 
>Median Relative size (N = 34) 3.60 -0.26 2.31 1.54 
[t stat.] [0.91] [-0.06] [1.64] [1.04] 
Difference 0.24 5.05 -2.72 -2.09 
[t stat.] [0.04] [0.86] [-0.03] [-0.96] 
Panel D: Relative WACC 
<Median relative WACC (N = 34) 1.75 -0.17051 -2.58** 4.50*** 
[t stat.] [0.49] [-0.05] [-1.85] [3.30] 
>Median relative WACC (N = 34) 5.60 4.49 4.40*** -3.29*** 
[t stat.] [1.14] [0.99] [3.93] [-2.61] 
Difference -3.85 -4.67 -6.98*** 7.80*** 
[t stat.] [-0.63] [-0.79] [-3.90] [4.19] 
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TVA 
(%) 
Earnings 
synergies 
(%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
 (%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
 (%) 
Panel E: Acquirer’s book to market of equity 
<Median BTM of equity (N = 34) 1.92 -1.31 2.06 1.17 
[t stat.] [0.44] [-0.31] [1.17] [0.57] 
>Median BTM of equity (N = 34) 5.43 5.59 -0.05 -0.11 
[t stat.] [1.26] [1.39] [-0.04] [-0.12] 
Difference -3.51 -6.90 2.11 1.28 
[t stat.] [-0.57] [-1.18] [1.02] [0.57] 
Panel F: Acquirer’s leverage 
<Median acquirer leverage (N = 34) 4.41 2.98 1.51 -0.09 
[t stat.] [0.86] [0.59] [1.18] [-0.04] 
>Median acquirer leverage (N = 34) 3.06 1.48 0.48 1.09 
[t stat.] [0.88] [0.45] [0.30] [1.47] 
Difference 1.35 1.50 1.03 -1.18 
[t stat.] [0.22] [0.25] [0.50] [-0.53] 
Panel G: Acquirer’s liquidity 
<Median acquirer liquidity (N = 34) 3.27 1.01 1.56 0.70 
[t stat.] [1.11] [0.38] [0.94] [0.88] 
>Median acquirer liquidity (N = 34) 4.14 3.37 0.43 0.35 
[t stat.] [0.78] [0.65] [0.34] [0.17] 
Difference -0.88 -2.36 1.13 0.35 
[t stat.] [-0.14] [-0.40] [0.54] [0.16] 
This table reports estimations of value effects based on implied cost of equity. Each panel 
reports mean value effects of two groups that are separated based on a factor that is likely 
to determine value effects of mergers. Differences between mean value effects of the 
groups are also reported. Panel A reports the difference between value effects of 
diversifying and related acquisitions. Panel B reports the difference between mean value 
effects of cash and non-cash acquisitions. Panels C and D present differences between 
value effects of acquisitions with below and above median relative size, and relative 
WACC of target to acquirer, respectively. Panels E, F, and G report differences between 
average value effects of acquisitions with below and above median acquirer’s BTM of 
equity, leverage and liquidity, respectively. Four columns of the table report TVA, 
earnings synergies, value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined 
firm and the acquirer (WACCP-A), and finally, value effect of the difference between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the target (WACCP-G).  
*Significance at 10% level  
**Significance at 5% level  
***Significance at 1% level 
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Moreover, the difference between average TVA of mergers with below and above 
median relative WACC of target to acquirer is -3.85% (t = -0.63). This difference 
for mean value effects of earnings synergies is -4.7% (t = -0.79), for mean value 
effect of WACCP-A is -7.0% (t = -3.9), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is 
7.8% (t = 4.19). Furthermore, the difference between average TVA of deals with 
below and above median acquirer’s BTM of equity is -3.5% (t = -0.57). This 
difference for mean value effects of earnings synergies is -6.9% (t = -1.18), for 
mean value effect of WACCP-A is 2.1% (t = 1.02), and for mean value effect of 
WACCP-G is 1.28% (t = 0.57). Likewise, the difference between average TVA of 
mergers with below and above median acquirer’s leverage is 1.4% (t = 0.22). This 
difference for mean value effects of earnings synergies is 1.5% (t = 0.25), for 
mean value effect of WACCP-A is 1.03% (t = 0.50), and for mean value effect of 
WACCP-G is -1.2% (t = -0.53). Finally, the difference between average TVA of 
acquisitions with below and above median acquirer’s liquidity is -0.9% (t = -
0.14). This difference for mean value effects of earnings synergies is -2.4% (t = 
0.81), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is 1.13% (t = 0.54), and for mean value 
effect of WACCP-G is 0.35% (t = 0.16). 
According to table 6.9-2, the difference between average TVA of related and 
diversifying mergers is 7.8% (t = 1.38). This difference for mean value effects of 
earnings synergies is 7.1% (t = 1.41), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is -1.3% 
(t = -0.83), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is 2.0% (t = 1.20). 
Furthermore, the difference between average TVA of cash and non-cash 
acquisitions is -2.7% (t = -0.43). This difference for mean value effects of 
earnings synergies is -6.0% (t = -1.07), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is 4.5% 
(t = 2.78), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is -1.2% (t = -0.65).  
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Table ‎6.9-2 Factors affecting TVA When the CAPM is used for estimating 
cost of equity 
 
TVA 
(%) 
Earnings 
synergies 
(%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
 (%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
 (%) 
Panel A: Diversifying versus related acquisitions 
Related (N=29 ) 8.56* 6.13 0.98 1.46*** 
[t stat.] [1.89] [1.43] [1.17] [3.17] 
Diversifying (N= 39) 0.78 -1.01 2.29* -0.05 
[t stat.] [0.22] [-0.34] [1.90 [-0.37] 
Difference 7.79 7.14 -1.32 1.96 
[t stat.] [1.38] [1.41] [-0.83 [1.20] 
Panel B: Cash versus non-cash acquisitions 
Cash (N=19 ) 2.15 -2.23 4.90** -0.05 
[t stat.] [0.40] [-0.44] [2.92] [-0.39] 
Non-cash (N= 49) 4.84 3.73 0.05 0.67 
[t stat.] [1.45] [1.28] [0.59] [0.66] 
Difference -2.70 -5.96 4.45*** -1.19 
[t stat.] [-0.43] [- 1.07] [2.78] [-0.66] 
Panel C: Relative size 
<Median relative size (N = 34) 7.36*** 3.95* 1.68 1.73** 
[t stat.] [3.32] [1.89] [1.55] [2.06] 
>Median relative size (N = 34) 0.62 -0.03 1.80 -1.15 
[t stat.] [0.12] [-0.01] [1.57] [-0.84] 
Difference 6.74 3.98 -0.12 2.87* 
[t stat.] [1.20] [0.78] [-0.07] [1.81] 
Panel D: Relative WACC 
<Median relative WACC (N = 34) 0.91 -1.09 2.82** -0.83 
[t stat.] [0.23] [-0.33] [2.43] [-0.56] 
>Median relative WACC (N = 34) 7.36* 5.23 0.61 1.52** 
[t stat.] [1.88] [1.37] [0.61] [2.69] 
Difference -6.45 -6.31 2.21 -2.35 
[t stat.] [-1.15] [-1.26] [1.44] [-1.46] 
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TVA 
(%) 
Earnings 
synergies 
(%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
 (%) 
Effect of 
WACCP-G 
 (%) 
Panel E: Acquirer’s book to market of equity 
<Median BTM of equity (N = 34) 3.40 1.97 0.56* 0.87 
[t stat.] [0.96] [0.17] [1.80] [0.83] 
>Median BTM of equity (N = 34) 4.76 1.50 3.51 -0.26 
[t stat.] [1.06] [0.90] [1.32] [-0.20] 
Difference -1.36 0.47 -2.96 1.13 
[t stat.] [-0.24] [0.30] [-0.58] [0.69] 
Panel F: Acquirer’s leverage 
<Median acquirer leverage (N = 34) 6.49** 3.08 3.13*** 0.28 
[t stat.] [2.52] [1.38] [2.82] [0.43] 
>Median acquirer leverage (N = 34) 1.53 0.88 0.28 0.37 
[t stat.] [0.30] [0.19] [0.27] [0.24] 
Difference 4.96 2.20 2.85* -0.09 
[t stat.] [0.88] [0.43] [1.88] [-0.06] 
Panel G: Acquirer’s liquidity 
<Median acquirer liquidity (N = 34) 2.91 1.89 0.57 0.45 
[t stat.] [0.58] [0.42] [0.56] [0.30] 
>Median acquirer liquidity (N = 34) 5.27* 2.12 2.97** 0.19 
[t stat.] [2.04] [0.92] [2.57] [0.28] 
Difference -2.36 -0.23 -2.39 0.26 
[t stat.] [-0.41] [-0.04] [-1.56] [0.16] 
This table reports estimations of value effects when the CAPM is used to estimate the 
cost of equity. Each panel reports mean value effects of two groups that are separated 
based on a factor that is likely to determine value effects of mergers. Differences between 
mean value effects of the groups are also reported. Panel A reports the difference between 
value effects of diversifying and related acquisitions. Panel B reports the difference 
between mean value effects of cash and non-cash acquisitions. Panels C and D present 
differences between value effects of acquisitions with below and above median relative 
size, and relative WACC of target to acquirer, respectively. Panels E, F, and G report 
differences between average value effects of acquisitions with below and above median 
acquirer’s BTM of equity, leverage and liquidity, respectively. Four columns of the table 
report TVA, earnings synergies, value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the 
combined firm and the acquirer (WACCP-A), and finally, value effect of the difference 
between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target (WACCP-G).  
*Significance at 10% level  
**Significance at 5% level  
***Significance at 1% level 
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Moreover, the difference between average TVA of acquisitions with below and 
above median relative size of target to acquirer is 6.7% (t = 1.20). This difference 
for mean value effects of earnings synergies is 4.0% (t = 0.78), for mean value 
effect of WACCP-A is -0.1% (t = -0.07), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is 
2.9% (t = 1.81). Besides, the difference between average TVA of mergers with 
below and above median relative WACC of target to acquirer is -6.4% (t = -1.15). 
This difference for mean value effects of earnings synergies is -6.3% (t = -1.26), 
for mean value effect of WACCP-A is 2.2% (t = 1.44), and for mean value effect of 
WACCP-G is -2.4% (t = -1.46). In addition, the difference between average TVA 
of deals with below and above median acquirer’s BTM of equity is -1.4%  
(t = -0.23). This difference for mean value effects of earnings synergies is 0.5%  
(t = 0.29), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is -3.0% (t = -0.58), and for mean 
value effect of WACCP-G is 1.1% (t = 0.70). Likewise, the difference between 
average TVA of mergers with below and above median acquirer’s leverage is 
5.0% (t = 0.87). This difference for mean value effects of earnings synergies is 
2.2% (t = 0.43), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is 2.9% (t = 1.88), and for 
mean value effect of WACCP-G is -0.1% (t = -0.06). Finally, the difference 
between average TVA of acquisitions with below and above median acquirer’s 
liquidity is -2.3% (t = -0.41). This difference for mean value effects of earnings 
synergies is -0.2% (t = -0.04), for mean value effect of WACCP-A is -2.4%  
(t = -1.55), and for mean value effect of WACCP-G is 0.3% (t = 0.15). 
6.9.2 Multivariate analysis 
This section reports results of regression analysis of factors that are likely to affect 
the TVA.  The findings are presented in tables 6.9-3 and 6.9-4. While table 6.9-3 
reports the findings estimated by using implied cost of equity, table 6.9-4 reports 
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the results where cost of equity is estimated using the CAPM. Four regression 
models are estimated in each table. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes 
value of 1 if acquirer and target are from different 4 digits SIC industries and 0 
otherwise. Cash is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if an acquisition is paid 
100% by cash and 0 otherwise. RelWACC is the ratio of WACC of target to the 
WACC of acquirer. RelSize is the ratio of market value of equity of the target to 
the market value of equity of the acquirer on the third Thursday of the month 
preceding the month of acquisition announcement. Leverage is the ratio of long-
term debt of acquirer to market value of equity of the acquirer. Liquidity is the 
ratio of cash and short-term investments of the acquirer deflated by total assets of 
the acquirer. BTM is book-to-market equity ratio of the acquirer. Size is market 
value of equity of the acquirer on the third Thursday of the month preceding the 
month of acquisition announcement. 
First estimation, which is presented in column (1), includes all seven variables 
that are reported in table 6.9-1 plus market value of equity. Column (2) reports 
estimations for the second regression model. Five variables with more significant 
coefficients from model (1) are included in this model. Column (3) presents 
estimations for the third regression model. In this model three more significant 
independent variables from model (2) are used. Finally, column (4) reports 
coefficient estimations for the last model in which only two independent 
variables, Diversifying and Leverage, are used. As reported in table  
6.9-3, the coefficient of variable Diversifying in model (1) is -0.04 (t = -0.53), the 
coefficient of variable Cash is -0.02 (t = -0.25), the coefficient of variable 
RelWACC is 0.70 (t = 1.65), and the coefficient of variable RelSize is -0.39  
(t = -0.36). Moreover, the coefficient of variable Leverage is -0.27 (t = -1.08), the  
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 Table ‎6.9-3 Relationship of estimated TVA with deal and firm 
characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Intercept  0.140 
[0.97] 
0.152 
[1.46] 
0.154 
[1.53] 
0.180** 
[2.09] 
Deal characteristics     
    Diversifying  -0.037 
[-0.53] 
-0.030 
[-0.45] 
-0.032 
[-0.50] 
 
    Cash -0.020 
[-0.25] 
-0.010 
[-0.14] 
  
    RelWACC 0.70 
[1.65] 
0.062 
[1.56] 
0.063 
[1.60] 
0.063 
[1.61] 
    RelSize -0.39 
[-0.36] 
   
Acquirer characteristics     
    Leverage  -0.273 
[-1.08] 
-0.244 
[-1.04] 
-0.244 
[-1.05] 
-0.270 
[-1.21] 
    Liquidity -0.131 
[-0.67] 
-0.125 
[-0.71] 
-0.127 
[-0.74] 
-0.145 
[-0.87] 
    BTM -0.027 
[-0.20] 
   
    Size  0.000 
[0.47] 
   
R
2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
N 68 68 68 68 
Four regression models are presented in this table. First estimation includes all seven 
variables that are reported in table 6.9-1 plus market value of equity. Column (2) reports 
estimations for the second regression model. Five variables with more significant 
coefficients from model (1) are included in this model. Column (3) presents estimations 
for the third regression model. In this model three more significant independent variables 
from model (2) are used. Finally, column (4) reports coefficient estimations for the last 
model in which only two independent variables, including Diversifying and Leverage, are 
used. The variables are winsorized at 0.1% and 99% levels to prevent distortions by 
outliers. t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
** significance at 5% level. 
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Table ‎6.9-4 Relationship of estimated TVA with deal and firm characteristics 
when CAPM is used for estimating cost of equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Intercept  0.137 
[1.01] 
0.122 
[1.24] 
0.132* 
[1.75] 
  0.102* 
[2.00] 
Deal characteristics     
    Diversifying acquisition  -0.093 
[-1.41] 
-0.089 
[-1.42] 
-0.090 
[-1.51] 
-0.083 
[-1.44] 
    Cash -0.138 
[-0.18] 
-0.005 
 [-0.08] 
  
    Relative WACC 0.011 
[0.28] 
0.007 
[0.19] 
  
    Relative size -0.029 
[-0.28] 
   
Acquirer characteristics     
    Leverage (D/E) -0.158 
[-0.66] 
-0.164  
[-0.75] 
-0.171 
[-0.80] 
-0.109 
[-0.61] 
    Liquidity -0.086 
[-0.47] 
-0.081  
[-0.49] 
-0.086 
[-0.54] 
 
    BTM of equity -0.012 
[-0.10] 
   
    Size 0.000 
[0.15] 
   
R
2 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 
N 68 68 68 68 
Four regression models are presented in this table. First estimation includes all seven 
variables that are reported in table 6.9-2 plus market value of equity. Column (2) reports 
estimations for the second regression model. Five variables with more significant 
coefficients from model (1) are included in this model. Column (3) presents estimations 
for the third regression model. In this model three more significant independent variables 
from model (2) are used. Finally, column (4) reports coefficient estimations for the last 
model in which only two independent variables, including Diversifying and Leverage, are 
used. The variables are winsorized at 0.1% and 99% levels to prevent distortions by 
outliers. t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
* significance at 10% level 
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coefficient of variable Liquidity is -0.13 (t = -0.67), the coefficient of variable 
BTM is -0.03 (t =- 0.20), the coefficient of variable Size is 0.00 (t = 0.47). In 
model (2), the coefficient of variable Diversifying is -0.03 (t = -0.45), the 
coefficient of variable Cash is -0.01 (t = -0.14), and the coefficient of variable 
RelWACC is 0.06 (t = 1.56). The coefficient of variable Leverage is 
 -0.24 (t = -1.04), and the coefficient of variable Liquidity is -0.13 (t = -0.71). In 
model (3), the coefficient of variable Diversifying is -0.03 (t = -0.45), and the 
coefficient of variable RelWACC is 0.06 (t = 1.60). The coefficient of variable 
Leverage is -0.24 (t = -1.05), and the coefficient of variable Liquidity is  
-0.13 (t = -0.74). In model (4), the coefficient of variable RelWACC is 0.06  
(t = 1.61), the coefficient of variable Leverage is -0.27 (t = -1.21), and the 
coefficient of variable Liquidity is -0.15 (t = -0.87). 
Table 6.9-4, on the other hand, reports coefficients of regression models similar to 
those reported in table 6.9-3 when the CAPM is used for estimating cost of equity.  
According to this table, the coefficient of variable Diversifying in model (1) is  
-0.09 (t = -1.41), the coefficient of variable Cash is -0.14 (t = -0.18), the 
coefficient of variable RelWACC is 0.01 (t = 0.28), and the coefficient of variable 
RelSize is -0.03 (t = -0.28). Moreover, the coefficient of variable Leverage is -0.16 
(t = -0.66), the coefficient of variable Liquidity is -0.08 (t = -0.47), the coefficient 
of variable BTM is -0.01 (t = -0.10), the coefficient of variable Size is 0.00  
(t = 0.15). In model (2), the coefficient of variable Diversifying is -0.09  
(t = -1.42), the coefficient of variable Cash is -0.01 (t = -0.08), and the coefficient 
of variable RelWACC is 0.01 (t = 0.19). Moreover, the coefficient of variable 
Leverage is -0.16 (t = -0.75), and the coefficient of variable Liquidity is -0.08  
(t = -0.49). In model (3), the coefficient of variable Diversifying is -0.09  
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(t = -1.51). Moreover, the coefficient of variable Leverage is -0.17 (t = -0.80), and 
the coefficient of variable Liquidity is -0.09 (t = -0.54). In model (4), the 
coefficient of variable Diversifying is -0.08 (t = -1.44), and the coefficient of 
variable Leverage is -0.11 (t = -0.61).  
This study further investigates the relationship between components of the TVA 
and factors that are likely to affect them using regression models reported in table 
6.9-5. Several possible regression models were developed. However, only 
regressions that could best explain the relationships between independent 
variables and components of the TVA are reported. Moreover, from three 
components of the TVA, table 6.9-5 only reports findings regarding earnings 
synergies and value effects of the difference between WACC of the combined 
firm and acquirer. However, in untabulated results no significant relationship was 
found between WACCP-G and the variables introduced in table 6.9-1.  
As reported in table 6.9-5, in regression (1) the coefficient of variable diversifying 
is -0.089 (t = -1.59), the coefficient of variable leverage is -0.20 (t = -0.90), and 
the coefficient of variable liquidity is -0.21 (t = -1.27). In regression (2) the 
coefficient of variable cash is 0.29 (t = 1.81), and the coefficient of variable 
liquidity is 0.06 (t = 6.84). In regression (3) the coefficient of variable 
Diversifying is -0.06 (t = -1.17), the coefficient of variable Cash is 0.04  
(t = -0.73), and the coefficient of variable liquidity is -0.07 (t = -0.63). Finally, in 
regression (4) the coefficient of variable Cash is 0.05 (t = 3.01), and the 
coefficient of variable Leverage is -0.10 (t = -2.38).  
Implications and interpretations of the findings reported in this chapter are 
discussed in chapter 7. 
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Table ‎6.9-5 Components of the TVA, diversification and acquirer’s leverage 
 Implied Cost of equity for 
WACC 
CAPM for WACC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Earnings 
synergies 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
Earnings 
synergies 
Effect of 
WACCP-A 
Intercept 0.171** 
[2.05] 
0.016*** 
[6.65] 
0.087* 
[1.74] 
0.017* 
[1.74] 
Diversifying -0.089 
[-1.59] 
 -0.0631 
[-1.17] 
 
Cash  0.286* 
[1.81] 
-0.047 
[-0.81] 
0.046*** 
[3.01] 
Leverage  -0.195 
[-0.90] 
  -0.102** 
[-2.38] 
Liquidity -0.205 
[-1.27] 
0.062*** 
[6.84] 
-0.075 
[-0.63] 
 
R
2
 0.09 0.54 0.07 0.25 
N 68 68 68 68 
This table reports findings regarding relationship between value effects and the factors 
that best explain them. Column (1) reports relationships between earnings synergies and 
the independent variables where the WACC is estimated using implied cost of equity. 
Column (2) reports relationships between value effect of WACCP-A and the independent 
variables, where the WACC is estimated using implied cost of equity. Columns (3) and 
(4) replicate regressions (1) and (2), respectively, where the WACC is estimated using the 
CAPM model.  
*Significance at 10% level 
**Significance at 5% level 
***Significance at 1% level 
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Chapter 7 Discussions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a thorough discussion of the empirical findings provided in 
chapter 6 and in light of the literature reviewed in chapter 2. The literature 
reviewed in chapter 2 was obviously more extensive. However, not all those 
theories are germane with this study. Discussions follow a similar sequence to the 
material provided in chapters 5 and 6 and provide inferences drawn from the 
empirical findings. Section 7.2 discusses the findings about changes in earnings 
forecasts for acquirers and targets subsequent to acquisitions. Section 7.3 provides 
inferences about differences between the WACC of combined firms, acquirers and 
targets. Further discussions about the cost of debt and cost of equity of merging 
firms are also provided in this section. Section 7.4 discusses findings about TVA 
and its components. In section 7.5, the relationship between the TVA and 
combined abnormal announcement returns for market-driven and non-market-
driven mergers is discussed. Section 7.6 provides discussions on the relationship 
between the TVA and its components with combined abnormal returns of 
acquisitions for diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. Finally, section 7.7 
draws inferences from the results of univariate and multivariate analysis on the 
factors affecting the TVA and its components.  
7.2 Changes in earnings forecasts subsequent to acquisitions 
The findings reported in table 6.2-1 show that forecasted earnings and Ltg are on 
average greater for combined firms than for stand-alone acquirer and target firms. 
These observations imply that acquisitions generate synergies and improve 
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growth opportunities. This finding is consistent with the proposition of prior 
studies - that mergers are partly motivated by opportunities for synergy gains (e.g. 
Jensen & Ruback, 1983). It is also consistent with findings of a number of prior 
empirical works on mergers and acquisitions that suggest synergies are a source of 
value in mergers (e.g. Carline et al., 2009; Devos et al., 2009).  
7.3 Differences in WACCs 
7.3.1 Cost of debt 
Findings about estimated cost of debt of merging firms that are reported in table 
6.3-1 indicate that average cost of debt of combined firms is significantly smaller 
than mean cost of debt of targets. Specifically, mean cost of debt of combined 
firms is 6% smaller than mean bond yield of targets. On the other hand, it is 
significantly greater than the mean cost of debt of acquirers. That is, mean bond 
yield of combined firms is 5.9% greater than mean bond yield of acquirers. The 
findings presented in table 6.3-1 also show that, on average, acquirers have 
greater costs of debt than targets. 
When cost of debt increases, as was found in this study regarding acquierer’s cost 
of debt, the value of bonds declines and bondholders earn negative returns. 
Conversely, when cost of debt decreases, the value of bonds increases and 
bondholders earn positive returns. This is the case for cost of debt of target firms 
in the sample of this research. These results are consistent with evidence provided 
by Billett et al. (2004) who find that bondholders of non-financial acquirers earn 
negative announcement period returns. On the other hand, they find that 
bondholders of target firms gain significantly positive returns.  
Chapter 7 Discussions 
 
180 
 
Moreover, the results of this study regarding cost of debt of acquirers and 
combined firms are in line with the idea that mergers increase the default risk of 
acquirers (Furfine & Rosen, 2011). In fact, cost of debt is positively related to the 
risk of default. That is, the greater risk of default the greater cost of debt. 
Therefore, an increase in the cost of debt following an acquisition announcement 
can be considered as evidence of increase in the risk of default by the acquirer 
because of the acquisition.   
7.3.2 Cost of equity 
Table 6.3-2 reports implied cost of equity of merging firms which are estimated 
based on analyst forecasts. Table 6.8-1 reports cost of equity of merging firms 
using the CAPM model. Estimated cost of equity for merging firms are around 
2% greater when CAPM is used for calculations than when implied cost of equity 
is calculated. This observation is consistent with findings of previous studies that 
the implied risk premium is significantly lower than the estimate found from ex 
post returns (e.g. Claus & Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Pastor et al., 
2008).  
Findings reported in tables 6.3-2 and 6.8-1 show that mean cost of equity of 
combined firms is greater than cost of equity of acquirers. This difference is 
around 8% of acquirers cost of equity when implied costs of equity are used and 
1% of acquirers cost of equity when the CAPM is used for estimations. However, 
the median difference between cost of equity of combined firms and acquirers is 
negative in both tables, indicating a lower cost of equity for the combined firm 
compared to the acquirer. The difference between mean and median cost of equity 
in table 6.3-2 is because in four sample acquisitions cost of capital of the target 
firm is very much larger than that of the acquirer. In all these mergers the acquirer 
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and the target are from the same industry. Although these cases are relatively rare, 
they support the notion that even in the absence of operating synergies liquid 
firms acquire financially distressed firms in their industries in order to reallocate 
liquidity to firms that are otherwise inefficiently terminated (Almeida et al., 
2011). 
7.3.3 WACC 
Although cost of debt of combined firms is greater than cost of debt of acquirers, 
the WACC of combined firms is found to be smaller than acquirers because of 
their smaller cost of equity. Moreover, the WACC of combined firms are smaller 
than the WACC of target firms as both cost of debt and cost of equity of 
combined firms are smaller than those of target firms. These findings suggest that 
the value effects of differences between the WACC of combined firms and the 
WACCs of acquirers and targets are expected to be positive, on average.  
The evidence provided in table 6.3-3 shows that average WACC of acquirers and 
target firms are both around 8.9% whereas mean WACC of combined firms is 
slightly lower and is around 8.3%. Similarly, table 6.8-2 reports that mean WACC 
of combined firms is lower than that of acquirers and targets. The results of mean 
percentage differences between cost of capital of combined firms and those of 
targets and acquires are contradictory in tables 6.3-3 and 6.8-2 mainly because of 
high implied cost of equity of target firms compared to acquirers in a few cases. 
However, median differences are negative in both tables suggesting declines in 
the WACC of combined firms compared to acquirers and targets. The potential 
value effect of these changes in the cost of capital is substantial. For example, in 
the simple Gordon growth model and under a zero dividend growth assumption, a 
1% increase in cost of capital from 10% to 10.1% approximately translates into a 
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1% decline in firm value. However, the relationship between cost of capital and 
firm value is nonlinear and depends on other variables in the valuation formula 
including expected earnings and earnings growth. 
7.4 Sources of value in acquisitions 
Consistent with prior research, this study finds that the average value effect of 
acquisitions is positive. In other words, merger activity is value creating. Table 
6.4-1 reports that the average TVA of acquisitions included in the sample of this 
research is 3.7% when implied cost of equity is used for estimation of the WACC. 
The average TVA is only slightly different when the CAPM is employed for cost 
of equity and is around 4.1%. Besides, the combined abnormal announcement 
return for a 21-day event window is 4.5% on average. In addition, consistent with 
several other studies on synergy effect of mergers, the mean earnings synergies 
are positive suggesting that mergers create value through utilising potential 
synergies between acquirers and targets.  
As the results suggest, estimation of the TVA is reasonably robust against 
different methods of estimation of cost of equity capital. However, the 
contribution of its components is different from one method of estimation to the 
other. The synergy effect is more pronounced when analyst forecasts are used for 
estimating cost of equity capital and accounts for around 60% of the TVA. 
However, when the CAPM is employed, percentage contribution of earnings 
synergies to the TVA is around 49%. Moreover, value effect of the difference 
between the WACC of the combined firm and the acquirer accounts for around 
26% of the TVA when analyst forecasts are used for estimating cost of equity. 
However, this value effect is found to be around 43% of the TVA when the 
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CAPM is employed. Finally, value effect of the difference between the WACCs 
of combined firms and acquirers is around 13% when implied cost of equity is 
used, whereas it is around 8% when the CAPM is employed. Based on these 
observations, it seems that financial analysts tend to under-estimate the effect of 
changes in the cost of capital on value effect of acquisitions. Moreover, several 
other studies as well as this one find that implied cost of capital estimated using 
analyst forecasts is smaller than cost of capital estimated using ex post returns. 
Therefore, it is likely that changes in the WACC are less pronounced through 
these smaller estimations.   
7.5 Value-creating mergers versus overvalued stocks 
The relationship between stock-returns and the TVA are examined in tables 6.6-1 
and 6.8-4 to test whether acquisitions are driven by misvaluation of stocks in the 
market or actual value-creation incentives. If the abnormal announcement returns 
reflect factors other than expected TVAs, the relationship between estimated 
TVAs and the combined abnormal returns is expected to be weaker for market- 
driven acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) 
argue that acquisitions could be driven by stock market misevaluation of the 
merging firms. They suggest that in such instances overvalued acquirers use their 
stock as the medium of exchange to make acquisitions. On the other hand, 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) argue that industry shocks drive 
mergers. Harford (2005) argues that the relationship between high stock market 
valuations and merger waves has been misattributed to behavioral misvaluation 
factors. Rather, the relationship is actually driven by the higher capital liquidity 
(lower transaction costs) that accompany an economic expansion. Consistent with 
the theory of market-driven mergers, Devos et al. (2009) suggest that the 
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relationship between announcement abnormal returns and synergies is stronger for 
non-market-driven mergers. In this study, such a stronger relationship is not found 
between abnormal announcement returns and the TVA. The results reported in 
tables 6.6-1 and 6.8-4 suggest that the relationship between abnormal returns and 
the TVA is not significantly weaker for market-driven acquisitions than other 
mergers. Therefore, these findings do not support the idea of market-driven 
mergers.  
7.6 Diversifying mergers and components of TVA 
This study further investigates the relationship between combined abnormal 
returns and the TVA and its components in related and diversifying mergers.  
Industry-related acquisitions are more likely to create value through synergy 
gains. Therefore, such acquisitions are more likely to be motivated by earnings 
synergies. On the other hand, diversifying mergers are expected to reduce risk and 
cost of capital. Thus, diversifying mergers are more likely to be motivated by 
value effects of changes in the cost of capital. In this sense, abnormal stock 
returns are expected to be related to synergies in non-diversifying mergers. 
Moreover, abnormal announcement returns are expected to be related to the value 
effect of changes in the WACC in diversifying acquisitions. As reported in tables 
6.7-1 and 6.8-5, findings of this study suggest that the relationship between stock 
price reaction and synergy effects is stronger in related mergers. Moreover, 
combined abnormal announcement return is significantly related to value effect of 
the difference between the WACC of the combined firm and the WACC of the 
acquirer for diversifying mergers. This relationship is weaker in related 
acquisitions and is not significant. This evidence confirms that related mergers are 
Chapter 7 Discussions 
 
185 
 
motivated by synergies whereas diversifying mergers are motivated by value 
creation expected from reducing the cost of capital.  
7.7 Factors affecting TVA 
7.7.1 Univariate analysis 
This research further investigates the impact of a number of factors that are likely 
to affect returns from acquisitions. This includes the diversifying nature of the 
acquisition, method of payment, relative WACC of the merging firms, relative 
size of the merging firms, liquidity of acquirer, BTM ratio of the acquirer and size 
(market value) of the acquirer. The literature related to these factors and also the 
mechanisms used that may affect acquisition returns are extensively discussed in 
chapters 2, 3 and 5 of this dissertation. Results of the investigations are reported in 
table 6.9-1 when implied cost of equity is used for estimation of the WACC, and 
in table 6.9-2 when the CAPM is employed. 
The results reported in both tables (6.9-1 and 6.9-2) suggest that for mergers 
where the acquirer and the target firm are from the same industry the TVA is 
greater than with merging firms from two different industries. However, the 
differences are not statistically significant. Similarly, earnings synergies are 
greater for industry-related mergers. However, the difference between the WACC 
of the combined firm and that of the acquirer seems to be greater in diversifying 
mergers than related ones, perhaps because diversifying mergers reduce the cost 
of capital for acquiring firms. In contrast, the value effect of the difference 
between the WACC of the combined firm and the target is greater in related 
mergers suggesting that diversification creates value in the third part of equation 
5.4-1. 
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The study findings also provide interesting evidence on how the method of 
payment affects the TVA. As discussed in section 2.4.3 of chapter 2, there are two 
hypotheses regarding the market reaction to method of financing. First, target 
stockholders would prefer stock because cash acquisitions create an immediate tax 
liability for them, while stock payments are taxable only when they are redeemed. 
Second, the information asymmetries hypothesis suggests that acquirers who use 
stock to purchase a target are signalling to the market that their stock is 
overvalued. Hence, their stock price declines around announcement of the 
acquisition. In contrast, stockholders of targets who know their stock is 
undervalued prefer payment in stock rather than cash so they may enjoy the 
benefits of corrected valuation. While different theories offers several conflicting 
interpretations of the choice of financing, empirical evidence provided by Amihud 
et al. (1990) and Travlos (1987), among others, shows that acquirers who pay in 
cash earn significantly more than those who choose stock payments. Consistent 
with findings of prior studies, in un-tabulated results, this study finds that both 
acquirers and targets receive greater abnormal returns around the announcement 
of the acquisition. In fact, acquirers who pay cash gain 12% (t = 3.47) more than 
non-cash acquirers. Targets of cash acquisitions also earn abnormal returns 8% (t 
= 1.36) greater than targets of non-cash acquisitions. Combined abnormal returns 
are also greater for cash acquisitions compared to non-cash acquisitions by around 
9% (t = 2.98).   
In contrast with market reaction to announcement of cash acquisitions, the TVA is 
greater for non-cash takeovers. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
suggests stock-financed acquirers create value for their long-term shareholders 
(Savor & Lu, 2009). Stock financed mergers are equity issues as well. Therefore, 
the value changes cannot be interpreted as pure merger effects. Prior studies 
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suggest that equity issues are associated with negative abnormal returns around 
the announcement day. An explanation is that by issuing equity, mangers signal to 
the market that the stocks of their firms are overvalued. Consequently, the 
investors adjust for the equity issue news and the stock price declines (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Hence, it is essential to consider the equity issue effect in the 
analysis of acquisition returns. In this sense, worse abnormal return from non-cash 
acquisitions can be, at least partially, attributed to the effect of the equity 
offerings.  
Although the TVA as a sum of three components is greater for non-cash 
acquisitions, its components show conflicting effects. The findings of this study 
show that consistent with the TVA, earnings synergies are greater for non-cash 
acquisitions. However, the value effect of the difference between the WACCs of 
the combined firm and the acquirer in cash mergers is significantly greater than 
non-cash mergers, especially when the CAPM is employed for estimating cost of 
equity. This finding is interesting. It shows how choice of cash or stock payment 
can affect the value of an acquisition in two opposite ways. Specifically, it shows 
that cash payment typically reduces cost of capital for the acquirer, perhaps 
through increasing leverage and on the other hand, it seems that cash payments 
are  used in mergers that generate negative synergies.   
Relative size of the target to the acquirer is another factor that may affect 
acquisition returns (e.g. Gorton et al., 2009). Results of this study suggest that the 
average TVA is greater for acquisitions with below-median relative size of the 
target to the acquirer. In un-tabulated results this study also finds a similar 
difference between combined abnormal returns of acquisitions with below- and 
above-median relative size of the merging firms. That is, combined abnormal 
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returns to the merging firms 21-days around announcement day are around 6% (t 
= 1.15) greater for acquisitions with below-median relative size. Earnings 
synergies are also greater for mergers with below-median relative size. However, 
acquisitions with below- and above-median relative size are not different in the 
effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target. 
Interestingly, the results provided in table 6.9-2 suggest that acquisitions with 
below-median relative size generate significantly greater value because of the 
difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target. This 
difference implies that when a relatively larger acquirer takes over a relatively 
small target the decrease in the discount rate of future earnings of the target is so 
large that despite the small overall effect of this part of the model, it makes a 
significant difference in the TVA. This difference in the value effect is around 
42% of the total difference in the TVAs of acquisitions with below- and above-
median relative size and is statistically significant. 
This study also finds that acquisitions with greater relative WACC of target to 
acquirer generate more value. Moreover, earnings synergies and the value effect 
of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target   are 
greater for acquisitions with above-median relative WACC. However, the value 
effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the 
acquirer is smaller for acquisitions with above-median relative WACC.   
This study further examines the difference in the TVAs of acquisitions with 
glamour and value acquirers. Prior studies suggest that glamour acquirers with 
low BTM ratio of equity underperform value bidders with high BTM ratio of 
equity in the long term (Datta et al., 2001; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). As discussed 
in section 2.4.1 of chapter 2, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that this is due to 
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market over reaction to past performance of acquirers at the time of 
announcement of an acquisition. They call their hypothesis “performance 
extrapolation”. Moreover, it is likely that managers of glamour acquirers become 
overconfident and overestimate the value they can create through mergers due to 
hubris (Roll, 1986). Therefore, they are more likely to undertake acquisitions that 
are value-destroying or less value creating.  Consistent with extrapolation and 
hubris hypotheses, this study finds that acquisitions with below-median BTM 
ratio of equity of the acquirer generate smaller TVAs compared to those with 
above-median BTM of equity of the acquirers. Specifically, when implied cost of 
capital is used for calculating the WACC, acquisitions with value acquirers 
generate around 7% more TVA than acquisitions with glamour acquirers 
However, this difference is smaller when the CAPM is employed and is around 
1%.  
Next, this study investigates the effect of acquirer leverage on the gains from 
acquisitions. Prior studies find that acquirers are significantly less leveraged 
compared to a portfolio of control firms prior to acquisitions (Uysal, 2011; Welch, 
2004). One possible reason for this observation might be that lower leverage of 
the acquirer prior to acquisition is value creating. In fact, acquirers with lower 
leverage may finance the acquisition with a lower cost of capital and avoid value 
destruction because of too much leverage following the acquisition. This study 
examines whether lower leverage affects the TVA and its components. Consistent 
with this idea, the findings suggest that in acquisitions where the acquirer has 
below-median leverage, the TVA is greater than acquisitions in which the acquirer 
has above-median leverage. Specifically, when analyst forecasts are employed for 
estimating cost of equity and calculating the WACC, this difference is around 8%, 
on average. Similarly, when the CAPM is employed this difference is around 5% 
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and a significant 3% of it is generated by the difference between the WACC of the 
combined firm and the acquirer.  
Finally, the sample is divided into two groups, based on the liquidity of the 
acquirer, to test whether acquirer’s liquidity affects acquisition returns. Consistent 
with agency costs hypothesis, Harford (1999) finds that acquirers with greater 
cash reserves undertake acquisitions with subordinate returns. On the other hand, 
it is also likely that cash-rich firms, with lower risk of default and lower cost of 
capital, make better acquisition decisions that create value. Results of this study 
support the latter idea. That is, acquirers with above-median liquidity undertake 
acquisitions that generate average TVA around 7% greater than those undertaken 
by acquirers with below-median liquidity. Similarly, when the CAPM is used for 
estimating cost of equity, low-leverage acquirers create around 2% more TVA.  
7.7.2 Multivariate analysis 
The results documented in the univariate analysis section suggest that estimated 
TVAs vary in the cross section in a manner consistent with prior research. This 
study uses multivariate regressions to further investigate the cross-sectional 
patterns in the estimated TVAs. Tables 6.9-3 and 6.9-4 report the results of the 
multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the TVA. The explanatory 
variables are deal and acquirer characteristics used in the univariate analysis as 
well as size (market value) of the acquirer. Deal-specific variables include relative 
size, relative WACC and two dummy variables that take the value 1 for 
diversifying acquisitions and cash acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. Four regression 
models are developed. Model (1) includes a complete set of explanatory variables. 
In the three other models, variables with more significant coefficients are 
included.  
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If diversifying acquisitions are value-destroying and related acquisitions are value 
creating, the coefficient on the diversifying dummy variable is expected to be 
negative. On the contrary, if diversifying mergers create value and enhance the 
TVA, the coefficient on the diversifying dummy variable is expected to be 
positive. Moreover, if cash payment is value creating the coefficient on the cash 
dummy variable should be positive. In contrast, this coefficient is expected to be 
negative if cash payment decreases the TVA. Acquirer characteristics including 
leverage, liquidity, BTM ratio of equity and size (market value of equity) are used 
as control variables.  
The multiple regressions show that diversification has a significant role in 
determining the TVAs of acquisitions. The coefficients on the diversifying 
dummy variable are negative in all models suggesting that diversification reduces 
the TVA. This result confirms the finding in tables 6.9-1 and 6.9-2 that related 
mergers create greater TVAs. As discussed in the previous section, this is mainly 
because diversifying acquisitions generate negative earnings synergies with an 
absolute value greater than the positive contribution of reduced cost of capital of 
the combined firm compared to the acquirer. Consistent with Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998), the coefficient on the BTM of equity of acquirer is positive, implying that 
value acquirers undertake better acquisitions. Moreover, consistent with (Harford, 
1999), the coefficient on acquirer liquidity is negative, suggesting that cash-rich 
acquirers undertake acquisitions with less TVA. However, these coefficients are 
not statistically significant.  
Next, this study investigates the relationship between components of the TVA and 
the explanatory variables. Table 6.9-5 reports the findings. Models (1) and (2) 
provide the coefficients when implied cost of equity is used for estimation of the 
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WACC and the TVA, whereas models (3) and (4) report the results when the 
CAPM is employed. The relationship between the value effect of the difference 
between the WACCs of the combined firm and the target and the explanatory 
variables are not reported in this table due to the fact that its effect is small 
compared to other components of the TVA. In fact, in un-tabulated results no 
significant relationship is found between the explanatory variables and this 
component of the TVA. 
Findings in table 6.9-5 show that diversification has a negative relationship with 
the value created because of the earnings synergies. However, diversification does 
not have a relationship with the effect of the difference between the WACCs of 
the combined firm and the acquirer as the coefficients of the diversifying dummy 
variable are around 0 in models (2) and (4). This suggests that diversifying 
mergers are unlikely to reduce cost of capital of the combined firm compared with 
the cost of capital of the acquirer. This result potentially suggests that diversifying 
mergers do not have as much risk reduction effect as a number of scholars 
believe. In other words, the findings of multivariate analysis suggest that 
diversifying acquisitions are likely to be motivated by factors other than value 
creation. This is consistent with the proposition of Amihud and Lev (1981) who 
suggest managers undertake conglomerate mergers to diversify their personal 
portfolio and reduce their “employment risk”. This finding is also consistent with 
the “entrenchment hypothesis” of Shleifer and Vishny (1989) that suggests 
managers make themselves valuable to shareholders and costly to replace by 
diversifying through acquisitions, and therefore decrease chances of being 
replaced.  
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The findings suggest that cash payments are related to negative earnings 
synergies. On the other hand, the results show a positive and significant 
relationship between cash payment and value effects of the difference between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer. These observations suggest that 
acquisitions that are paid for by cash create value as they are more likely to reduce 
cost of capital of the combined firm compared to the acquirer.  
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Chapter 8 Summary and conclusions  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises contributions to new knowledge that this original 
research makes. The chapter also provides a summary of findings of the study and 
draws conclusions from the empirical evidence provided in chapter 6 and the 
model developed in chapter 3. Section 8.2 summarises main empirical findings 
and key discussions of this research. Then section 8.3 summarises discussions 
regarding the model developed by this study to decompose value effects of 
mergers. Implications of findings for practitioners and researchers are provided in 
section 8.4. Section 8.5 highlights new questions that can be raised based on the 
results of this research and makes suggestions for future research. Finally, section 
8.6 provides a summary of conclusions.      
8.2 Contributions of this research to knowledge 
Earlier in this thesis the prior research on value effects of mergers was 
summarised in Table 1.3-1. Prior studies find that, on average, acquisitions add to 
the combined value of merging firms. It is apparent that the big question of 
sources of value in mergers has not been sufficiently developed. The primary 
contribution of this research is decomposing sources of value in mergers in a 
novel way. This novel decomposition allows for detecting the impact of changes 
in the cost of capital on value-effects of mergers.  
The model of this study suggests that the combined value effect of mergers can be 
broken down into three parts: (1) earnings synergies discounted at the rate of the 
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WACC of the combined firm; (2) value effect of the difference between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer; and (3) the difference between the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the target. In any given merger, each of these 
components may add to or deduct from the total value of the merger.  
Moreover, the combined value of an acquisition estimated using this model might 
be negative, suggesting that the acquisition destroys value, or positive, suggesting 
that the acquisition creates value. Nevertheless, empirical evidence provided in 
this research shows that the combined value effect of acquisitions is positive and 
around 4%, on average. An important finding of this research is that average 
estimated TVAs are very close to the combined announcement returns obtained 
from the event study. This finding supports the robustness of the methods that are 
used in this research for measuring economic impacts of mergers.  
Aside from that, the results suggest that the two first components of the model 
account for more than 90% of value effect of acquisitions. The effect of the 
difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer is more 
pronounced when the CAPM model is used for estimating cost of equity than 
when the implied cost of equity is used based on analyst forecasts. A possible 
reason for this observation is that financial analysts underestimate the value effect 
of changes in the cost of capital of the combined firm compared to the costs of 
capital of the acquirer and the target, but overestimate the synergy effects instead.  
This study further documents how diversification, method of payment and capital 
structure of the acquiring firm before a merger impacts value of acquisitions. 
Diversification has a negative effect on earnings synergies and does not have a 
relationship with the value of the two other components that capture the effect of 
changes in the WACC. Earnings synergies also decrease in cash payments. In 
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contrast, the value effect of the difference between the WACCs of the combined 
firm and the acquirer increases in cash acquisitions. In addition, the value effect of 
the difference between the WACCs of the combined firm and the acquirer 
decreases when the acquirer has a greater percentage of debt in its capital 
structure.  
A few examples further explain how decomposing the value effect of mergers 
based on the proposed model contributes to a better understanding about sources 
of value in acquisitions. In the first example the acquirer and the target are both 
from the healthcare industry. The TVA is 7.3% of the value of the acquirer and 
the target together when the CAPM is used for estimating the cost of equity. The 
contributions of the three components of the TVA are 5%, 1% and 1% for 
components (1), (2) and (3), respectively. In this example value is created in all 
three components of the WACC with the biggest contribution from earnings 
synergies.  
In the second example, the acquirer is from the healthcare industry and the target 
is from the wholesale industry. This is a diversifying acquisition by a zero-debt 
acquirer where the settlement is 100% by stocks. In this acquisition the WACC of 
each of the merging firms is equal to their cost of equity. The TVA is -7.3% 
where its components are -6.0%, -10.7% and 9.3% for components (1), (2) and 
(3), respectively. In this example, value is destroyed in the first two components 
of the model suggesting negative synergy earnings and a greater WACC for the 
combined firm than the WACC of the acquirer. However, value is created in the 
third component implying that the WACC of the combined firm is smaller than 
the WACC of the target. This example shows how different components of the 
model may have opposite effects on the total value of an acquisition.  
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In the third example, the TVA is 0.1% and the values of its three components are  
-3.4%, 2.0% and 1.5% of total value of the acquirer and the target together, 
respectively. This example is a diversifying merger paid by cash and where the 
cost of capital of the combined firm is reduced compared to the WACCs of the 
acquirer and the target causing value creation in parts (2) and (3) of the model. 
However, the created value disappears because of the negative earnings synergies 
that destroy value in part (1) of the model.   
These examples illustrate how value-destruction and value-creation take place 
concurrently in an acquisition to determine the TVA. In fact, the three 
components of the TVA might countervail each other, or all contribute positively 
or negatively to the TVA of a given acquisition. Understanding the extent to 
which each of these components contribute to an acquisition helps practitioners to 
value an acquisition deal more accurately.  
This decomposition also contributes to finding mechanisms through which 
mergers create value by disentangling impact points of various deal and acquirer 
characteristics that are known to affect value of acquisitions. Each of these factors 
may have different effects on each component of the TVA. Once the TVA is 
broken down into its individual components, it will be easier to detect the 
magnitude of the effect of each factor on a component as well as the factor’s total 
impact. For instance, diversification may destroy value because of unrelated 
operation lines of the merging firm and concurrently reduce cost of capital of the 
combined firm compared to the acquirer and therefore create value this way. The 
overall value effect will then depend on the extent to which these components 
countervail each other. Therefore, the value effect detected by measures such as 
abnormal announcement returns cannot be used to determine associations between 
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diversification and components of value effects that are likely to be affected by 
diversification.  
While much emphasis is put on synergy gains from acquisitions by managers, 
analysts and researchers, the evidence provided in this study shows that the 
WACC of the combined firm and the merging firms may have a significant role 
on the value effect of mergers. These findings suggest that changes in the capital 
structure of the combined firm compared to capital structures of the acquirer and 
the target have a key role in determining value of an acquisition. For example, all 
the value created because of synergies between the operations of the acquirer and 
the target can be counterbalanced by raising too much debt for financing the 
acquisition, which in turn increases risk of default and cost of capital of the 
combined firm. Moreover, reducing cost of capital of the combined firm 
compared to the merging firms is value creating even in the absence of operating 
synergies.   
The empirical evidence provided in this study shows that the component 
of value that is associated with the difference between the WACCs of the 
combined firm and the acquirer is mainly determined by leverage of the 
acquiring firm and the method of payment. While cash payment is value 
creating, high leverage of the acquirer prior to an acquisition can destroy 
value by raising the cost of capital of the firm too much. This is especially 
important to managers at the stage of planning an acquisition. Although 
an acquisition might potentially create significant synergies in earnings, it 
may also increase the WACC of the combined firm. Then total value 
created or destroyed in that merger will depend on the extent to which 
value creating components and value-destroying components of an 
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acquisition counteract and neutralise each other. In other words, the value 
created because of synergies in earnings might be countervailed, for 
example, by raising too much debt for financing the acquisition which in 
turn increases cost of capital to a value-destroying level.  
8.3 A model for decomposing value effects of mergers 
This research develops a discounted cash-flow model for the combined 
value effect of acquisitions and provides empirical evidence on how three 
components of the model are affected by acquisition decisions. The model 
explains how mergers can create or destroy value depending on synergy 
gains and the relative WACC of the combined firm compared to WACC 
of the acquirer and the target. The value effect of mergers consists of 
three main components. The first component of value effect comprises 
different synergy effects of acquisitions discounted at the rate of WACC 
of the combined firm. This includes efficiency improvements resulting 
from economies of scale and scope, better governance, and new 
investment opportunities. The second component is merely related to the 
discount rates at which the future cash-flows of the acquirer should be 
discounted prior and subsequent to a merger. The third component of 
value effect is a function of the difference between WACC of target and 
WACC of the combined firm. The model in this study suggests that the 
total value effect of any given merger is equal with the aggregate impact 
of these three components.    
The model developed in this study explains how mergers can be value-
creating or value-destroying. Importantly, the model per se does not make 
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any prediction about the outcome of the mergers and the magnitude of 
their effect on the combined value of the merging firms. It proposes that 
three key elements of the model in relation to characteristics of the target, 
such as size and leverage, and industry- and economy-wide conditions, 
determine the extent to which mergers create or destroy value. However, 
since non value-creating mergers are less likely to be launched, it is 
plausible that undertaken mergers create value, on average. In any given 
set of industry or economic conditions, there are at least two variables as 
adjustment tools in the hands of decision makers that can determine the 
total value of acquisitions: choice of target, and method of payment. 
While characteristics of the targets available for merger determine the 
limits of profitability of any takeover activity, significant influence of 
method of payment on leverage, size and BTM of the combined firms 
gives it a key role in determining WACC of the combined firm. 
A further strength of the model developed in this study is that it is 
consistent with and extends the view to the neoclassical theory of mergers 
(Harford, 2005; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996) which explains how 
industry- and economy-wide shocks, such as technology developments 
and deregulation, can cause merger waves. In the absence of such shocks 
possible gains from undertaking acquisitions are generally less than 
expected costs. Takeover activity thus remains at a low level waiting for a 
change in the macro environment. Economy-wide and industry-wide 
shocks bring opportunities for value creation through mergers and trigger 
the waves.  
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Under the new conditions, the combination of acquirer and target firms is 
an option to utilise these opportunities and take advantage of synergies or 
reductions in the cost of capital. For example, Andrade et al. (2001a), 
among others, emphasise the role of deregulation as a key driver of 
merger waves. Ovtchinnikov (2010) shows that deregulation affects 
leverage decisions of firms in the deregulated industries as well as the 
determinants of capital structure. She suggests that following 
deregulation, overleveraged firms are likely to issue equity and reduce 
leverage. One of the possible ways the new issued equities can be used is 
by undertaking acquisitions. This is consistent with an increase in number 
of equity-paid takeovers during the merger waves reported by prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Rosen, 2006).   
8.4 Implications for practitioners and researchers 
Commercially, there should be returns to be made by mergers. Understanding 
sources of value in mergers and acquisitions are of essential importance to several 
stakeholder groups including shareholders, bond holders, customers, the 
government, policy makers and managers. Jensen (1984) argues that shareholders 
are the ultimate right holders of a firm and therefore should be in the centre of 
investigations regarding value effects of mergers. Consistent with this notion the 
value effect of mergers is primarily investigated in regard with shareholders' 
wealth. The findings of prior studies suggest that combined acquisition returns are 
positive, implying that shareholders gain significantly through mergers.  
Although a large body of research suggests that much of merger abnormal returns 
go to target shareholders, a recent study by Ahern (2012) shows that dollar 
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abnormal returns to target firms are only slightly greater than dollar abnormal 
returns to acquirers around announcement of acquisitions. Consistent with prior 
studies, this research finds that combined abnormal returns of acquisitions and the 
TVA are positive and significant. Using the model provided in this study, 
shareholders, investors, and analysts can make a relatively more accurate 
estimation of value effects of mergers. This may help investors and shareholders 
of the merging firms to make better investment decisions.  
Although shareholders are the ultimate holders of firms, the economic effects of 
mergers are not limited to the merging firms and their shareholders. Specifically, 
mergers are likely to affect bond holders, customers and governments. 
Shareholders can expropriate wealth from bond holders through leverage 
increasing acquisitions where shareholders can benefit from leverage tax savings 
at cost of bond holders that bear greater risk of default. On the other hand, a 
coinsurance effect may reduce the risk associated with the acquirer and the target 
firm and add to bond holders' wealth in both firms. Aside from that, wealth might 
be transferred from acquirer bond holders to target bond holders if the combined 
firm’s risk of default is greater than acquirer's risk but smaller than the target's 
risk. Moreover, if mergers increase market power of the merging firms and 
therefore impair competition in their respective product market, then it is likely 
that the shareholder value created in mergers be simply the transfer of wealth from 
customers' pocket to shareholders.  Besides, shareholders can become wealthier if 
firms simply pay less tax, for example, through utilizing unused carry forwards 
that would expire in absence of the merger and expropriate wealth from the 
government.  
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Policy makers regulate wealth effects of mergers on different stakeholder groups. 
In this sense, they are interested to know whether the value created for 
shareholders is from generated "synergies" or is transferred from other 
stakeholders to shareholders. If value is transferred from other stakeholders then 
policy makers may revise regulations in a way that protects rights of all 
stakeholders. The results of this study show that acquirer bond-holders lose value 
while target bondholders and shareholders and acquirer shareholders gain. 
Although findings of the study suggest an actual value creation in mergers it 
seems that a significant amount of value is transferred from acquirer bondholders 
to target bondholders. This observation has implications for policy makers to 
regulate the market for corporate control in a way that minimises expropriation of 
wealth.   
Managers are another group that benefit from a better understanding regarding 
sources of value in mergers. Managers have been accused to prefer their personal 
interests to shareholders interests for a long time. They allegedly tend to build 
empires and reduce their own employment risk through value destroying mergers. 
They are also accused to make non-profitable acquisitions because of 
overestimating their governance capabilities and hubris (Roll, 1969) and paying 
too much premium for target firms. Moreover, prior research suggests that firms 
who undertake value destroying acquisitions are likely to become acquisition 
targets later, and their incumbent managers are then likely to be replaced. 
Understanding sources of value helps managers to avoid risks of undertaking 
value-destroying mergers. The model suggested by this study and the empirical 
findings help managers to make accurate estimations of value effects of mergers, 
and therefore, determine the maximum amount of acquisition premium that does 
not destroy shareholder value in an acquisition plan. They can also use results and 
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discussion provided by this study when they choose a mix of different methods of 
payment and the target of acquisition.  
This study also has implications for teachers. The model developed in this study 
can be added to teaching agenda of corporate finance courses. Moreover, the 
empirical finding of this study suggest that more emphasise needs to be put on the 
role of changes in the cost of capital on value effects of acquisitions deals.    
8.5 Future research  
Future research in several areas flows from the analysis and findings in this thesis. 
Findings of this study bring up a fundamental question regarding the role of 
financial leverage of the merging firms in value effects of mergers. On the one 
hand, mergers are risky investments that increase risk of default and therefore as it 
is documented in this research cost of debt of the combined firm is significantly 
greater than cost of debt of the acquirer. Moreover, cost of equity of the combined 
firm is likely to decrease as the median of changes reported in tables 6.3.2 and 
6.8.1 in chapter 6. These observations shows that the ratio of cost of debt to cost 
of equity if greater for the combined firm than for the acquirer. Therefore, 
combined firms will typically lose value if they leverage up because increased 
leverage increases their cost of capital. On the other hand, prior research finds that 
combined firms leverage up subsequent to acquisitions and suggest that they can 
enjoy further positive value gains that that come with greater tax shields. 
Although both arguments are theoretically correct and there are empirical 
evidences that supports each, it is not clear that which effect is dominant and to 
what extent these two effects counteract. Addressing this question is left for future 
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research as data limitations didn’t allow further investigation of this question in 
this study. 
The model developed in this study can be extended considering that 
acquirers can plan multiple acquisitions to maximize value of the 
combined firm. In such multiple acquisition plans, synergy gains and cost 
of capital of the combined firm will depend on characteristics of the 
acquirer and all targets. The combined firm can also take advantage of 
synergies between the multiple target firms even if one-on-one acquisition 
of each of the targets does not create synergies. Cost of capital of the 
combined firm will depend on the leverage and other factors that 
determine cost of capital of the acquirer and its targets, and also method 
of payment and value of multiple deals. Further extension of the model 
and related empirical investigations are left for future research.  
8.6 Summary 
In summary, the key contributions of this thesis to the knowledge includes 
commercial, research and teaching implications as discussed above. In this study, 
sources of value in mergers are broken down into three components. Moreover, 
the relative importance of each component is empirically investigated. The study 
finds that synergy gains as well as the difference in the WACCs of the combined 
firm and the acquirer have key roles in determining value of acquisitions. 
Specially, it is documented that investigating the capital structures and the 
WACCs of the combined firm and the merging firms contributes to addressing 
questions about sources of value in mergers. Furthermore, this study shows that 
investigating the relationships between the components of value and the factors 
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that are likely to affect them provides opportunities for discovering mechanisms 
through which mergers create or destroy value. This study finds that factors such 
as diversification and method of payment have different and even counteracting 
effects on the value of acquisitions.  
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